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ABSTRACT OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY! THE SENATE YEARS
This study traces Kennedy's political development from his 
election to the Senate in 1964 to his death in 1968.
During that time, he transformed from a hesitant and 
orthodox liberal to spearhead a new radicalism and develop 
an alternative coalition for the Democratic Party. In the 
domestic arena, he proposed an alternative approach for 
urban renewal, and became remarkably popular with black 
voters (even more popular than has previously been 
accepted). This study attempts to fathom the full extent of 
this relationship and how powerful it could have become.
Kennedy was also among the first politicians of his 
generation to use the political muscle of the youth groups 
which were springing up in the mid-'60s, and the alternative 
labour organisations (most notably in California) which 
found themselves excluded from the old union power 
structures.
The study also charts his rise in the anti-Vietnam war 
movement, and questions his reputation as a hard-line anti­
communist which emerged during the Kennedy administration.
It examines his presidential campaign in the context of 
his alternative liberal coalition, and an analysis of his 
primary results suggests that the accepted wisdom of a 
Kennedy poverty coalition (made up of low-income black and 
white voters) is largely mythological.
Finally, the study offers some tentative conclusions 
about the real nature of Kennedy's contribution to modern 
liberalism, and a brief historiography.
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INTRODUCTION
JUST BEFORE the nomination of Bill Clinton at the 1992 
Democratic Convention in New York, a documentary film of 
Robert Kennedy was shown to delegates in the hall. For 20 
minutes the convention stood silent as Kennedy's image 
appeared on the giant screen, his words echoing across the 
decades to a new generation of Democrats hoping for a 
presidential victory.
The symbolism was clear: Clinton wanted to be associated 
with Democrats who could win elections. The film portrayed 
Kennedy as the last great radical, the last legendary 
Democrat. It featured his glorious presidential campaign of 
the spring in 1968, and his romantic and tragic death.
It served to rally Democrats to their new leader, and 
projected Robert Kennedy as the spirit and soul of the great 
liberal tradition. In a tribute to Kennedy's political 
legacy, the 1968 campaign was presented as a romantic and 
idealistic quest to end the war and restore social justice.
Despite Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, despite Jimmy
Carter's win in 1976, it was Robert Kennedy's 1968 campaign 
which liberals hoped would inspire a revival.
Although Robert Kennedy is best remembered today for the 
1968 presidential campaign, and his years as Attorney 
General in his brother's administration, his real political 
legacy was forged in the Senate.
His reputation as a ruthless investigator dated from his 
prosecution of union corruption in a Senate committee during 
the 1950s, and his position as senator from New York (1965 
to his death in 1968) was the only elected office he ever 
held.
Although a reluctant senator (he would, at least 
originally, preferred to have been vice-president and was 
often impatient with the slow, deliberate nature of the 
legislative body) his personal history ensured that he would 
always be more than just the junior member from New York. By 
1965 he was already a national politician, and during his 
three and a half years as senator he embarked on a 
remarkable transformation of his politics which later 
reverberated throughout the Democratic Party.
On entering the Senate after the 1964 elections, Kennedy 
found the old liberal agenda largely exhausted: blacks were 
on the verge of winning full voting rights, money was 
available for poverty and education programmes, and 
democracy was being protected in South Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, problems obviously remained, which led Kennedy 
to develop a new radicalism.
His sharp move to the left of his party was so extreme 
that it produced an almost unique strand of liberalism.
personal to Kennedy. The electoral demise of orthodox 
liberalism since the 1960s makes Kennedy's ideology - which 
was never fully tested and therefore never "failed" - 
enormously attractive for today's liberal candidates.
He was unique - a bona fide radical who could win. His 
former press secretary Frank Mankiewicz describes him as a 
"tough liberal", which is now almost a contradiction in 
American political terms.^ One reporter at the 1960 
Democratic Convention noted that "whenever you see Bobby 
Kennedy in public with his brother, he looks as though he 
showed up for a rumble", and his reputation as the White 
House toughie developed throughout the Kennedy 
administration.2 It was Bobby Kennedy who stood firm over 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (although not as firm as was 
originally believed), Bobby Kennedy who sent his deputy to 
stand eyeball to eyeball with George Wallace at the entrance 
to the University of Alabama, and Bobby Kennedy who 
championed the Green Beret counter-insurgency force.
Much of the image was hype, of course, which was 
encouraged by the White House to counter claims that the 
Attorney General was young and inexperienced. A decisive and 
efficient image was deliberately projected, although at 
times Kennedy really does appear to have moved with 
remarkable aggression. During problems with the steel 
companies in 1962, for instance, Kennedy unleashed the full 
power of his office against individual steel executives who, 
the Kennedy administration believed, had betrayed an earlier 
understanding not to raise prices. "I had the grand jury," 
he later recalled.
"We looked over all of them as individuals.
We were going to go for broke: their
expense accounts and where they'd been and 
what they'd been doing. I picked up all 
their records and I told the FBI to 
interview them all - march into their 
offices the next day. All of them were 
subpoenaed for their personal records.... If 
I started an investigation of you in your 
community, you're ruined. The FBI coming 
round and asking all the neighbours: 'What 
do you know?'....You'd never recover"
The ruthless image began to fade after the assassination 
in Dallas, as American television viewers saw Kennedy 
suffering at his brother's funeral. No softening job by 
public relations experts was needed for Kennedy's 1964 
Senate race, as he was perceived by the public to be a man 
engulfed by grief and burdened by the responsibility of 
carrying on his brother's political work. A wave of emotion 
almost took him to the vice-presidency in 1964, but Johnson 
managed to avoid offering it to him. Nevertheless, the 
sympathy vote did play a large part in his New York Senate 
victory.
Kennedy's election to the Senate came less than a year 
after the JFK assassination, and his campaign had relied on 
his family name and White House experience. As such, he had 
not been required to outline a clear manifesto for his plans
for New York. Barry Goldwater remarked in 1966 that "there 
is a religious fervour building up about his guy that is 
even stronger than they built up around Jack"
He was the benefactor of what Max Weber described as a 
"transferral of charisma" from his dead brother, which gave 
him considerable room for manoeuvre in developing links with 
almost any political group he chose.
His immediate and obvious need was to stake out a 
political base for himself (although he had won New York 
comfortably, he had relied on assistance from Lyndon 
Johnson). At the outset of 1965, he could have moved in 
several directions, but chose - either through acute 
political cunning, or personal preference, and probably both 
- to outflank his rivals to the left of the party and claim 
the most radical wing for himself.
This was not a cold decision he took one morning on 
entering Congress, but rather a series of responses made to 
political and international events during 1965 and 1966. It 
soon became clear, however, that Kennedy had the potential 
to commandeer the radical element in the Democratic Party, 
and use it as his political base. There were many, of 
course, who would have followed Kennedy whatever position he 
had taken on Vietnam, or the ghettos, but he had to do a lot 
of convincing before he could hope to become the new liberal 
darling.
He started early, criticising the President's handling 
of the situation in the Dominican Republic, charging that 
Johnson had been too heavy-handed on the reformers just 
because some communists might have been involved.
The leftward shift accelerated in the next couple of 
years, when he broke from the administration in early 1966 
over Vietnam and, later that year, on the Alliance for 
Progress. Other Senate liberals remained more cautious and 
less aware of the potential of the new political forces 
emerging in the country. Liberal colleagues like McCarthy, 
Mondaie and McGovern still approached poverty problems with 
New Deal remedies, whereas Kennedy was proposing radical 
programmes to lure private investment into the ghettos.
Arthur Waskow, a contributing editor to the radical 
magazine Ramparts. described Kennedy at this time as "a new 
kind of liberal, in the same way the SDS and SNCC are new 
kinds of radicals".^ Kennedy was never fully cognitive of 
how far this alternative coalition might go, or even what it 
would look like, but in '67 and '68 he was at least aware 
that it had serious political potential.
The study of Kennedy's Senate career which follows aims 
to trace his attempt at moulding an alternative power 
coalition. He responded early to the new political forces of 
the mid-60s, notably the black and youth movements. However, 
the political forces centred around women's issues and those 
concentrating on health/ecological concerns had yet to take 
off in a significant way by 1968, and he never enjoyed the 
support which these groups later provided to Democratic 
candidates.
Although the National Organisation for Women (NOW) was 
formed in 1966, its relations with the rest of the left were 
strained at this time, as mainstream liberalism initially 
regarded it as a threat. The New Left, whose radicalism
appealed to Kennedy, was also hostile. Women demanding 
attention to women's liberation at an SDS convention in 1966 
"were pelted with tomatoes and thrown out of the 
convention".^ Anyway, the women's liberation movement had 
not mustered enough political muscle in the mid-60s for 
Kennedy to have regarded it as essential to his coalition, 
and the first feminist activity to get front-page coverage 
(the disruption of a Miss America beauty contest) did not 
happen until September 1968, four months after Kennedy's 
death.
Nevertheless, Kennedy reached towards some of the 
emerging forces before any other national figure realised 
their significance. He tried to understand how they could be 
put together to make a powerful national constituency which 
he could lead.
At times, however, he could be ridiculously off-target 
in his search for blocks to build the new framework. In 
reaching out to the youth movement, he invited hippie poet 
Allen Ginsberg to his Senate office for a political talk in 
early 1968. Ginsberg described how he treated Kennedy to a 
monologue on the joys of drugs, but was finally interrupted 
by the senator. "He wanted to know the relationship between 
the flower-power people or the hip-generation people and the 
Black Power leaders. He wanted to know whether there was any 
kind of political relationship or any political muscle 
behind such a coalition. I said I had turned onto grass a 
number of times in Nashville with Stokely Carmichael. But it 
didn't extend to any formal political alliance...".^
Kennedy, while realising there was something in the
anti-war demonstrations and the hippie counter-culture, 
never fully grasped what sort of movement it was, and saw it 
in strictly political terms. He needed to know if it could 
be turned into political muscle. Occasionally, however, his 
heart ruled his head, as could be seen with his interest in 
Indian and Eskimo affairs, when it would appear that hard 
political considerations were not paramount. Other forays 
into "unpopular" areas (ie those without obvious political 
capital) included siding with Cesar Chavez and the
grape-pickers against some West coast fruit companies.
Even so, this identification with politically weak 
groups can also be seen as a wider part of Kennedy's jigsaw 
in breaking away from the traditional labour power blocks. 
Kennedy had problems with some organised labour dating back 
to his prosecution of union leaders in the previous decade.
Nevertheless, he needed to show he was on the workers' 
side if he were to become the new radical hope, and 
opportunities like links with Chavez - whose union was not 
part of the old established network - offered the
opportunity to identify with strikers while avoiding
association with big-time unionism. Kennedy admirer Jack 
Newfield described Kennedy "not as anti-union, but 
un-union", in a phrase perfectly inoffensive to all those 
Kennedy was trying to woo.^
However, this is not to suggest that Kennedy's Senate 
career was simply one long bid for the 1968 presidential 
election. By identifying himself with the new political 
forces he was broadening his political base, and making 
himself a more significant national figure. This
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constituency could be used not just for the a presidential 
campaign, but would also secure his power base in New York, 
make him more attractive as a vice-presidential candidate 
for the extra weight he could bring to the ticket (an 
outside possibility he considered seriously until early 
1967) , and would enable him to make more progress on the 
issues he believed in.
These considerations motivated the search for a new 
coalition and dictated the policy directions he took while 
in the Senate. Although they were not incompatible, from 
time to time one consideration would take priority over the 
others like, for example, the decision to enter the 1968 
primaries.
Moreover, Kennedy's search for a new coalition did not 
mean he burned his bridges with the old. Kennedy's political 
training, above all, had been in winning elections and 
managing campaigns. Some parts of the old Democratic 
coalition were still extremely powerful and, of course, it 
would have been virtually impossible for Kennedy to have 
become the party's nominee without the blessing of dozens of 
political professionals, the most powerful of which was 
Chicago's Mayor Daley. Although the old boss structures had 
largely been undermined by the New Deal reforms, which 
struck at the patronage power of municipal officials, by 
1968 the new politics had not yet fully taken over. Only a 
minority of states held presidential primaries, for example, 
and throughout his Senate career Kennedy was careful to 
remain in favour with party hacks who represented the 
remnants of the old order.
Additionally, Kennedy's problem during this time of 
political flux was that no-one knew exactly how powerful any 
of these particular movements really were. The New Hampshire 
primary of March 1968 suggested the depth of anti-Johnson 
feeling, but the Vietnam War remained popular during 
Kennedy's Senate career (although he did detect that its 
appeal was fading), and there was little way of knowing how 
the country would react at election time to the rioting 
which characterised black frustration during the mid-60s.
To accommodate the variables Kennedy's approach appears 
to have been one of "options open". No door was shut, no 
group left behind, no political leader offended unless it 
was absolutely necessary. This, of course, is basic 
political sense, but it is remarkable that Kennedy managed 
to keep so many plates spinning, as it were, while other 
national figures were forced to identify with one side of an 
issue or the other.
The best example is on the Vietnam War. Kennedy could 
oppose US involvement in the war, but - unlike other 
politicians - could easily evade the charges of being "soft 
on communism" because of his earlier record as Attorney 
General. Similarly, while Kennedy was regarded as 
sympathetic to the black struggle, he had also been the 
chief law enforcement officer in the country for four years, 
as he regularly reminded voters during the Indiana primary 
of 1968.
Kennedy's personal history made his political position 
extraordinary --he did not enter the Senate with the same 
problems of issue-identification which beset his colleague.
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and had a much freer role in developing his policy than most 
other senators.
As such, he was able to make huge leaps in policy 
direction in a very short space of time. In 1956, he had 
persuaded George Wallace to back John Kennedy's bid for the 
vice-presidential nomination. By 1966, Kennedy was trying to 
identify himself with the emerging black consciousness 
movement. In 1963, he was publicly an ardent proponent of 
the war against communists in Vietnam, but by 1966 he 
appeared to be advocating a coalition government there.
In fairness, however, it should be pointed out that he 
had privately voiced qualms about the war as early as 
September 6 1963. Pentagon minutes of a confidential
National Security Council (NSC) meeting (only published 
after Kennedy's death) report him as reasoning that if the 
war was unwinnable by any foreseeable South Vietnamese 
regime, it was time to get out of Vietnam. During the 
meeting, Kennedy also advocated giving US Ambassador to 
Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge "the necessary power to sort things 
out if Diem is the problem" (ie replace the Diem regime).*
Kennedy was not alone in rapid policy development during 
these years, of course, but his personal history, and his 
capacity to recognise new political movements at an early 
stage, make his career in the Senate a fascinating case 
study of a liberal politician.
On Kennedy's funeral train, psychiatrist Dr Leonard Duhl 
noted that the crowd of Kennedy supporters included 
"oddballs....You really began to see what a floating crap 
game it was. Bobby essentially began to evolve a form of
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coalition politics. Now, I don't think he understood all of 
this verbally, and he couldn't put it together. But yet, he 
was sensing this; so many people on the train could not 
understand why everybody else was there; they didn't 
understand this floating crap game in which he was the 
centre and connecting link, and that all the other players 
were not like themselves".
Whether Kennedy had put enough of this new coalition 
together in 1968 will never be known. George McGovern laid 
claim to its modern half in 1972, but without ultimate 
success. Ted Kennedy could not resurrect it powerfully 
enough in 1980, either, and perhaps it would never have been 
strong enough to take Kennedy to the presidency. Newfield 
believes that Kennedy "was trying to test a revisionist 
liberalism before there was a party or coalition to sustain 
it". Kennedy certainly tried to put the coalition together 
years ahead of its time and, as a later examination of the 
primary returns suggest, might well have pulled it off.
Quite how much this new liberalism relied on Kennedy's 
own personality should also be addressed: his brother Ted, 
for instance, ran for the presidency in 1980 on issues and 
with an organisation very similar to Robert Kennedy's, but 
without the same success (although, significantly, Ted 
Kennedy's bid for the 1980 nomination did prove useful in 
redefining the party's basic principles, identifying 
employment as the primary issue, for example).
Thus a study of Robert Kennedy's development from 
conservative to perhaps the first neo-liberal, from fierce 
anti-communist to hero of the SDS, from Republican voter in
12
1956 to radical Democratic senator in 1968, might offer some 
clues to present-day liberals on how to modernise the left 
into a popular and radical force.
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NOTES
Where possible, I have given the context of speeches, 
remarks, etc included in the text (eg RFK to Senate 
chamber) . All of the references in RFK: In His Own Words are 
from conversations Kennedy recorded for an oral history 
programme, and so were all made in confidence on the 
understanding that they would not be made public during his 
lifetime.
Where the source is repeated, I have used ibid followed by 
the original reference. For example, note 7 has the 
instruction ibid no. 2, which means the same source as note 
2 (in this case, Stein) followed by a different page 
number).
1. Personal interview with Manciewicz, May 1985
2. Stein p212
3. RFK: In His Own Words p316
4. Kimball pl29
5. Arthur Waskow in November 1967 edition of The Nation.
6. Deckard p332. The women's movement had a very tough 
reception from the mainstream and radical left. Stokely 
Carmichael's famous phrase that "the only position for women 
in SNCC is prone" was largely indicative of reactions in the 
mid-'60s. Kennedy did not regard the women's movement as 
politically significant, but he would have been in a fairly 
strong position to have cultivated links to it had he lived.
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or had it managed to organise before mid-'68. Although JFK 
was not as popular with women voters as legend suggests (he 
lost the women's vote 51% to Nixon by 49%), he made some 
effort to respond to women's concerns.
In December 1961, President Kennedy established a 
presidential commission on the Status of Women. Its report 
was made public in October 1963, and recommended that JFK 
issue an Executive Order embodying the principle of equal 
opportunity in employment. The following month, a few days 
before his death, JFK set up the Interdepartmental Committee 
on the Status of Women. RFK could have made a fairly 
persuasive case that women's issues had been addressed 
seriously by the JFK administration. In the months after 
RFK's death, the women's movement did begin to make its 
presence felt politically, and black feminist Shirley 
Chisholm was elected to Congress in November 1968.
7. ibid no. 2 p290.
8. ibid no. 5.
9. ibid no. 2 p389.
10. Pentagon Papers, pi81
11. Newfield pl80
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I. KENNEDY, POVERTY AND CIVIL RIGHTS
"Too white to be all right..." - Eldridge Cleaver of RFK
RACE wasn't the primary issue in the election campaign of 
1960. John Kennedy did invoke Abraham Lincoln during a 
television debate with Richard Nixon, but only to illuminate 
a point he was making about the Cold War, and not to 
highlight the candidates' differences in racial policies.
Although John Kennedy won a large percentage of the black 
vote in the election (68%) , his identification with the 
issue probably owed as much to the highly-publicised 
intervention he made during the campaign on behalf of the 
jailed Martin Luther King as his rather unspectacular voting 
record on civil rights.^
If John Kennedy's political career was not especially 
identified with the issue by 1960, his brother's involvement 
in "the negro question" had almost been non-existent. His 
main political experience had been on various Senate
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committees, notably during the McCarthy hearings and on the 
McClelland racket committee, where he had earned a 
reputation as a tough interrogator during investigations 
into corruption in unions. By the time of his formal 
appointment as Attorney General in 1961, Robert Kennedy's 
political experience was largely confined to these years as 
a member of the Congressional staff, and to managing John 
Kennedy's bid for the 1956 vice-presidential nomination and 
the successful run at the presidency in 1960.
He admitted to Harris Wofford (later White House Special 
Assistant on Civil Rights) in 1960: "We really don't know 
much about this whole thing....1 haven't known many negroes 
in my life. . . .It's up to you. Tell us where we are and go to 
it. Model liberals though they were, at the time of 
winning power the Kennedys couldn't even claim that some of 
their best friends were black. "I won't say I stayed awake 
at nights worrying about civil rights before I became 
Attorney General" Robert Kennedy later remembered. Three 
months into the Kennedy administration, he was forced to 
resign his membership from Washington's Metropolitan Club on 
the grounds that it refused to serve blacks.^
During his time in the White House, Robert Kennedy's 
position as head of the Justice Department meant that his 
efforts in the field were concentrated on enforcing the law 
on matters like desegregation and voting rights, rather than 
analysing social conditions in the inner-cities. Although 
poverty was a major problem for blacks at the time, it was 
not illegal, and so did not come in for special scrutiny by 
the Attorney General's office, except where it overlapped
17
with criminal issues like drugs, or gun control.
During his years in the Justice Department, Kennedy 
successfully petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to desegregate bus terminals in interstate travel 
facilities, and filed numerous suits to promote black voter 
registration. However, he had also permitted wire taps to be 
placed on the telephones of Martin Luther King and King's 
aide, Stanley Levison. When the existence of the taps became 
known, Kennedy experienced considerable animosity from black 
leaders, although this hostility was not generally shared by 
the majority of blacks, who increasingly came to regard him 
as a hero.
Generally, Attorney General Kennedy preferred to confine 
the issue to one of voting, and encouraged black leaders to 
press for voting rights as it placed them clearly on the 
side of law enforcement, and was less of an immediate threat 
to whites than the desegregation of public amenities. The 
moves to desegregate the bus terminals only came after well- 
organised and highly-publicised campaigns by non­
governmental civil rights ' activists threatened to embarrass 
the administration.
Robert Kennedy had criticised the Freedom Riders for 
generating bad publicity which weakened his brother's hand 
at a meeting with Khrushchev, and during the desegregation 
of the universities at Alabama and Mississippi was keen to 
settle the controversy quickly, and without undue 
embarrassment to local politicians. However, Kennedy did 
become increasingly aware that the issue was not confined to 
voting power, partly from his participation in the
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administration's committee on delinquents, which he chaired. 
Set up in 1961, the committee included the Secretaries of 
Health, Education and Welfare. Congress had also passed the 
Juvenile Delinquency Act, which authorised expenditure of 
$30 million over three years to test new approaches to 
delinquency prevention and control. This increasing 
realisation that the problem of civil rights was compounded 
by economic dimensions and special problems associated with 
the inner cities elicited traditional remedies - the 
appropriation of federal money, administered by the larger 
government departments in Washington.
Delinquency was regarded by Robert Kennedy and others in 
the White House as a disease which could be cured if 
sufficient federal resources were made available. In a 
speech called "Juvenile Delinquency: An Ounce of
Prevention", delivered in New York in 1962, the Attorney 
General noted how one delinquent was "doing well in the 
prison high school, and making rapid progress...because of 
his dramatic response to treatment.
This type of response, which relied heavily on the animal 
laboratory approach to urban problems, permeated much 
liberal thinking. Much liberal thinking on civil rights and 
poverty at this time was influenced by works like Gunnar 
Myrdal's An American Dilemma. perhaps the standard 
exposition of post-war liberal orthodoxy. It was Myrdal in 
1944 who cited white prejudice and racism as the roots of 
black disadvantage, and defined the issue in moral terms. 
Discrimination was something which ought to be fought in the 
best traditions of American democratic ideals, he proposed.
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Myrdal suggested that the worst excesses of inequality could 
be fought by vigorous and committed federal action, and his 
analysis provided the foundation for liberal reformers 
through the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, Robert Kennedy 
(through his ideas for private enterprise in urban renewal) 
became one of the first major figures to challenge its basic 
assumptions.
By the early 1960s, however, poverty was only beginning 
to appear on the political agenda as a serious issue. 
Michael Harrington's 1962 book The Other America had a great 
impact on popular and governmental appreciation of poverty, 
and urban centres were regarded as valid testing-grounds for 
many pet theories. An explosion in the popularity of social 
sciences, coupled with a dramatic increase in available 
government funds, saw sociologists produce a substantial 
amount of data on ghettos. In 1956, federal funding for 
social science research was $4 million, and had grown to $44 
million by 1966.^
The staff of the delinquency committee (often referred 
to as the HEW committee after the initials of the relevant 
government departments), included Richard Boone of the Ford
Foundation. At the time, the Ford Foundation was among those
/
trying out the idea of community participation in poverty 
programmes, and Robert Kennedy's assistant, David Hackett, 
sought out the ideas of the institution's experts on urban 
poverty. Boone, on the other hand, had studied at the 
University of Chicago, where he had worked on the idea of 
community participation, which the university had pioneered 
during the 1920s and 1930s.
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The idea of community action, of working with rather than 
for the poor, was put on the national agenda during this 
time. The HEW committee was perfectly happy with the idea of 
local participation, as long as it did not reduce the power 
of City Hall officials in the urban centres. Later 
proponents of the scheme may have wished this emphasis on 
co-ordination with city government had been maintained.
Local involvement in poverty legislation, or Community 
Action Programmes (CAPs), as it became known, was formally 
introduced to the federal government through the HEW 
committee, and to the rest of the country through the War on 
Poverty legislation of 1964. In the Kennedy administration, 
however, it remained largely a sociological theory whose 
reality was confined to a moderately successful experiment 
in the lower east side of New York. The New York experiment 
was funded by the Ford Foundation and the HEW, and had the 
federal government not found itself enjoying such a surplus 
of funds, the CAP may never have reached a national scale.
However, as Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Assistant Secretary 
of Labor in the Kennedy administration. Assistant for Urban 
affairs under Richard Nixon, and later senator for New York) 
pointed out, "the poor were put on the agenda by reformers, 
not by themselves. Moynihan suggested that because of the 
steady economic growth of the period (GNP grew from $503 
billion in 1960 to $807 billion in 1967), the economy needed 
large injections of spending to stay buoyant.
The idea of fiscal drag appeared, whose advocates claimed 
that unless the revenue increment of the government was 
immediately returned to the economy, it would have a
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depressing effect. "This, in a word, was money you had to 
spend in order to get," noted Moynihan.^ There was no 
shortage of ideas about where the money should be spent, and 
funds were available for the alleviation of urban poverty if 
appropriate methods were approved by the government. The HEW 
was enthusiastic about CAPs, and the Bureau of the Budget 
also believed they offered greater scope to monitor what was 
happening on the ground, and preferred the CAP ideas on 
spending to those where funds were tumbled about in a 
massive bureaucracy.
However, the assassination of President Kennedy in 
November 1963 affected the progress and development of the 
CAP plan. President Kennedy's death had many ramifications, 
including considerable pressure on the new President to 
produce a legislative record of his own on which to campaign 
in the 1964 election. Johnson decided that such a package, 
aimed at the problem of poverty, offered the best potential 
in terms of short-term gains.
The new President had less than a year in which to make 
an impact, and so quick, high-profile returns were 
emphasised in the legislation he proposed. Johnson recalled 
the frantic pace of those early months in office in his 
memoirs. "[Sargent] Shriver took over directorship of the 
poverty program on February 1 1964. I told him he would have 
to work fast. Not only did I want to propel a program 
through the Congress immediately but I wanted to produce 
visible results.... Only six weeks after the task force had 
first assembled, the program was ready to go. On March 16 I 
approved it and sent it to Congress."®
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Many of the proposals, which became the War on Poverty, 
were produced in a hurry. Much of the programme was rushed 
and ill- researched. The CAP idea, although fashionable in 
some circles, lost some of its attraction when the new 
administration realised that it was a medium-term project, 
taking several years to show benefits. Moreover, it was 
regarded by many as a Kennedy idea, championed by the 
previous President's HEW.
According to Moynihan, when Johnson heard that the CAP 
would not start to work before the 1964 election as under 
Shriver's proposal each project would be given 12 months to 
make a formal application for funds, the President lost 
interest in the plans. Instead, provisions which promised 
quicker results were concentrated on by the White House, 
including employment programmes for the elderly, loans for 
college students and lighting provisions for schools.
Although there is no reason to believe that Johnson was 
against the idea in principle, the CAP plan clearly did not 
serve his immediate purposes, and had Robert Kennedy not 
lobbied for it so vigorously, it might not have been 
included in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 at all. In 
the Congressional hearings on the legislative package, 
Robert Kennedy was the only administration official to refer 
to the HEW/Ford Foundation idea of "maximum feasible 
participation" by the poor. The rest of the debate on 
Johnson's Economic Opportunity Act centred on funding for 
parochial schools and whether the measures would be seen to 
be working by the November election.
Years later, when much of the programme was regarded as
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a failure, Moynihan wrote: "Congress... wanted action
without too much forethought, preparation, planning, 
negotiating, agreeing, staging. That is what it got.
The War on Poverty dominated the political agenda until 
it was overtaken by Vietnam. Many blamed the war against the 
Viet Cong for its downfall, and claimed that the funds for 
domestic legislation went to pay for weapons in Asia, and 
there is no doubt that without the foreign war more 
resources would have been available for America's cities. 
However, financing was only one of the problems faced by the 
War on Poverty. It was also seen as unco-ordinated and 
inefficient, and was accused of being little more than an 
election ploy for victory in 1964, and a hugely inflated, 
short-term public relations campaign run by the White House.
It did have its successes, however, and some poor people 
undoubtedly benefited from its programmes, but as the decade 
wore on, it became clear that the CAP idea, although 
theoretically a good one, was not working. In 1965, for 
example, there were 16 million households with income below 
the poverty line. Over two-thirds received some assistance 
from government programmes, lifting 4.7 million above the 
poverty line, but a hard-core underclass remained 
untouched.
By 1965, Robert Kennedy's immediate concerns had shifted 
from those of federal law enforcement to provisions for his 
New York constituents, and to the development of a national 
following which might offer him the chance to return to the 
White House as President. Already associated with the idea 
of maximum feasible participation by the poor, Kennedy never
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fully abandoned it. Later in his Senate career, he 
refined it, advocating a much greater role for private 
enterprise, when many liberal politicians were just only 
beginning to grasp its original principles. By the time of 
Kennedy's death, "Community action was an idea that came 
more and more to be associated with Robert Kennedy, even as 
he grew further from the centers of power in Washington 
where... its official fate was determined," wrote Moynihan 
in 1969.”
Apart from Vietnam, Kennedy's major differences with the 
centres of power in Washington during the period from 1964 
to 1968 focused on the urban crisis, and the best ways to 
move forward in fighting poverty. The CAP, like Robert 
Kennedy, soon spun out of White House control and in time 
both became symbolic of how out of touch the administration 
was with the problem of poverty.
Those in HEW who had conceived of maximum feasible 
participation were probably as surprised as everybody else 
at what they had created. In fact, had Kennedy been told in 
1964 how radical some of the projects would become, he might 
not have endorsed it, but as his political thought developed 
in the Senate, he was called for their extension and 
personally helped develop a CAP in New York.
Problems with community action were largely rooted in 
gaps in perception between poor communities and Washington. 
Both wanted the alleviation of poverty, but neither knew how 
best to bring it about. Moynihan, an early critic of the 
plans, recalled: "At that time [1964] I began to feel that 
official Washington had an entirely different, almost
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antithetical, view of the style and function of 'community 
action' from that of its proponents in the field, and that 
the intermediaries who had transmitted the idea, were either 
unaware of this discrepancy, or if not aware not perhaps 
entirely candid about it.
The execution of the plans sometimes bordered on the 
farcical, and federal funds went to fund all sorts of local 
projects. Money often went to groups which needed it least. 
The most articulate groups bidding for grants were most 
likely to get it, and federal understanding of local needs 
in apportioning funds was often minimal.
Those in Washington who had first proposed the idea 
(including Kennedy) had intended that it should be a tool of 
integration. However, peaceful integration was the last 
thing wanted by some of the groups Washington ended up 
funding. Bobby Seale, later to become a Black Panther 
official, was on CAP payroll in Oakland in 1966. He 
remembered, in an essay called "Using the Poverty Program", 
how he used the money to raise black consciousness (again, 
not a top priority for those who had originally lobbied for 
the bill, but one which Robert Kennedy came to appreciate 
during his time as senator)
"One of the things that hurt the poverty program was that 
they were always trying to do things by pulling that 
authoritarian stuff. They were citing the Marquis of 
Queensbury's rules and stuff like that.... Most of the 
brothers were from the streets. They wanted to be slick, 
they wanted to be pimps...," said Seale.”
Instead of increasing respect for the government, the War
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on Poverty was often regarded as tokenism by many in the 
inner cities ("We don't want a war on poverty," said Black 
Panther Eldridge Cleaver. "What we want is a war on the 
r i c h . ) Funding for local groups also coincided with the 
rise of black separatism in many urban centres, which 
attacked conventional ideas of integration, and so worked 
against the original aims of the HEW and the Economic 
Opportunity Act. Some officials in Washington must have 
thought they had created a monster.
Soon after the CAP plan was up and running. Jack Conway 
became chairman. A radical union leader who had been working 
at the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington, he expanded the 
idea of "maximum feasible participation" to its maximum 
feasible limits. He advocated grass-roots action, 
newsletters, local political leaders, the poor "forming 
their own institutions".”
Adam Yarmolinsky, Shriver's former deputy at the Office 
of Economic Opportunity, which was to supervise CAP 
projects, recounted how those who had devised the plan of 
local input had "no intention of getting the poor to think 
of themselves as a political force. It did not occur to us, 
and it did not occur to any of the highly professional 
politicians we consulted.
Money was given to inappropriate groups for inappropriate 
activities. "The government simply didn't know what it was 
doing," confessed Moynihan.” Previous generations of ethnic 
groups had managed to use the local political system to 
their advantage, but New Deal measures which were intended 
to empower the poor and eradicate corruption in local
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government served to break up the system of bossism.
For all its faults, the boss system represented ethnic 
groups very efficiently in many cities. During the 1960s, 
Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem insisted he should be allowed 
to appoint the police commissioner of his local district - 
one who would not harass his black constituents. In an 
earlier age, he probably would have had the power to do so, 
but reformers swept out much of the power of patronage of 
City Hall just as blacks were on the verge of taking their 
turn in operating it.
The Kerner Commission, set up by the President in the 
wake of the 1967 riots to investigate the urban problem, 
found that every riot studied started with a grievance 
against the local City Hall, from which the local black 
community felt alienated. If a black Skeffington had been 
around, it seemed to suggest, many of the problems of local 
empowerment might have been resolved. "It is plain that the 
negro ghetto resident feels deeply that he is not 
represented fairly and adequately under the arrangements 
which prevail in many cities," noted the Commission.
However, by the mid-60s, it was rather late to turn back 
the clock on the New Deal, or even on the CAP idea, which 
despite advocating community participation, envisaged it on 
a federal to street level, which often by-passed the local 
political machinery.
Moreover, it also had not adequately considered the 
question of jobs. Little planning seems to have gone into 
how employment programmes should be set up, what sort of 
jobs were appropriate, and who should pay for them. A
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company set up in Watts with federal help in 1966, clearly 
prompted by riots in the city a year before, "was formed in 
such a hurry that it incorporated and hired a black 
president and general manager before anyone decided what it 
would produce."^®
Eventually the company was awarded a large federal 
contract, from the Defense Department. Although the company 
soon appeared to falter in its production of military tents, 
it was ironically saved by the expansion of the war in 
Vietnam. Kennedy's criticism of the War on Poverty focused 
partly on the dependence on federal contracts to create 
employment in the ghetto, and he proposed a greater 
involvement of the private sector in job creation schemes.
Kennedy's plans represented a significant break with the 
Johnson administration and proved sufficiently different 
from traditional methods of fighting poverty for him to 
convince many voters in the 1968 presidential primaries (not 
least blacks) that he was offering something genuinely new 
in dealing with urban unrest. This departure was based 
mostly on his Urban Employment and Urban Housing & 
Development Bills of 1967, and on his record in helping to 
rejuvenate the Bedford Stuyvesant ghetto with funds from the 
private sector.
Under Kennedy's proposals, the economic encouragement to 
private investors would take the shape of lucrative tax 
breaks, and intended to involve the local municipality. 
Under the legislation for employment, for example, he 
suggested that a business wishing to locate in a low-income 
area would have to gain approval from the municipality and
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from the residents of the area itself. It would be required 
to hire a minimum of 20 people, two-thirds of whom would be 
either poverty-area residents or low-income individuals.
In return for participating, a business would be offered 
a 10% credit on machinery and equipment (an increase of 3% 
of what was permitted at the time), a 7% credit on costs of 
constructing a facility of leasing space (none was offered 
at the time) and a 25% deduction of salaries paid to workers 
hired to meet the requirements of the bill (no help was 
given in this situation at the time) . Other methods had been 
tried in an attempt to attract industry to the ghetto, and 
Kennedy warned big business that if conditions in the inner 
cities did not improve, the long-term risks to capitalism 
were substantial.
However, this approach appeared to have little impact on 
executives who were more interested in short-term economic 
gains that the larger threat to the fabric of society which 
might destroy their company in a generation or two. The tax 
break scheme designed to encourage business into the ghetto 
was an important ideological departure from previous 
proposals, including some Kennedy had sponsored.
In his first year as senator, he had joined with other 
orthodox liberals like Walter Mondaie, Eugene McCarthy and 
George McGovern in sponsoring a bill "to provide grants for 
public works...to alleviate conditions of substantial and 
persistent unemployment", and co-sponsored a bill to set up 
a Department of Housing and Urban Development, which was an 
old-style tentacle of the federal government.
In January 1966, he proposed that a series of "new towns"
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be established outside the most deprived cities, where at 
least 15% of residents would be black, who could afford to 
pay for their accommodation through a series of federal 
subsidies disbursed by the new government department. The 
proposal also sought to provide money to bus inner-city 
blacks to schools in these new towns, and so force the pace 
of integration.
His 1967 ideas on attracting business money were a good 
deal more imaginative than his previous efforts, and he also 
began to appreciate what local participation might entail. 
"Community action is going to be directed against the 
establishment. That means it is going to be directed against 
us," he noted.His shift in emphasis on funding proved even 
more significant. "The lack of private enterprise 
participation is the principal cause of our failure to solve 
the problem of employment in urban poverty areas," he 
declared in 1967
The federal approach had not been sufficiently efficient 
to combat the problem, Kennedy suggested, and he criticised 
this single-weapon approach for being particularly 
inefficient in building suitable housing. He criticised 
federal efforts at improving the situation: "In its 30 years 
of operation, the public housing program has completed only 
639,000 units, . . . [and while] the building of luxury housing 
in the city has been assisted by favourable treatment in the 
Internal Revenue Code... similar assistance has not been 
available for low-cost housing in the slums.
Through a series of tax incentives to businesses, 
including home building loans set at 2%, Kennedy wanted to
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"produce two- and three-bedroom units that will rent for 
under $100 a month". To involve the private sector was not 
Kennedy's idea, and not a particularly new one. The Housing 
Act of 1949, sponsored by Senator Taft, had encouraged 
greater private participation in slum clearance projects. 
The private sector had historically played a major part in 
the development of America, and from the large railroad 
companies of the Nineteenth Century to those firms who 
earned contracts in the space programme of the 1960s, the 
sector had taken on major responsibilities in modernising 
the United States.
However, Kennedy was among the first politicians, 
certainly from the Democratic Party, who advocated what 
became known as "neo-conservatism". Kennedy's proposals of 
1967, which drew on traditional Republican elements of 
private funding, together with his experience on the HEW 
committee, and his representation of New York in the Senate, 
were taken up by others, including the Kerner Commission 
and, to some extent, the Johnson administration. In his 
State of the Union address to Congress in January 1967, the 
President called for "a new partnership between government 
and private industry to train and to hire the hard-core 
unemployed persons"/”
Nevertheless, what the President had in mind was markedly 
different from the Kennedy proposals, which regarded private 
business involvement as a long-term prospect, with the major 
corporations of America investing generations of resources 
into the cities. By 1968, sociologist Kenneth B. Clark 
agreed that "business and industry are our last hope". In
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a curious change of direction for radical liberals at the 
time, it was those on the left of the progressive movements 
who were championing free enterprise, while the moderates 
stuck by the old federal approach. The debate was not only 
exemplified by the differences between Kennedy and Johnson 
camps over how much scope should be given to private 
enterprise.
The discussion was not a new one, and the federal/local 
dichotomy had shaped the American Constitution, its party 
system and its Civil War. However, for the first time in 
several generations, it surfaced on the left of the 
Democratic Party, which hitherto had been bound by a 
consensus of federal intervention, as realised in the shape 
of the New Deal.
By the mid-60s, as the New Deal electoral coalition was 
beginning to show signs of strain, so too did its philosophy 
of central government funding. Kennedy, despite his ties to 
the old school, was among the first on the left to call for 
its replacement. The debate was also being aired in forums 
other than the Democratic Party. Martin Luther King aide 
Andrew Young recalls how King was "quite rough on Jesse 
[Jackson] " for putting too much emphasis on the private 
sector in improving conditions in ghettos.”
King, according to Young, insisted that "jobs would 
finally have to be provided by the public sector rather than 
the private sector, and that [Operation Breadbasket] was 
essentially a private sector program. " Operation Breadbasket 
was a food relief programme for low-income urban areas. 
After King's death, when Jackson encountered less resistance
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to his private enterprise proposals, the thrust of 
Breadbasket shifted from employment to black capitalism. 
One study noted how "Jackson sought to induce the mighty 
corporations to buy from, bank with, and invest in black- 
owned businesses. Blacks should develop their own 'private 
economy' he insisted; they needed a 'capital base in the 
black community.' Apart from the ideological attraction 
to Kennedy in pioneering a new, radical thrust in urban 
policy, there was also the question of cost.
With the Vietnam war threatening to go on indefinitely, 
the federal government wasn't capable of keeping the 
promises of the earlier years, when money was apparently no 
object in the relief of poverty. Although many criticised 
the way money had spent in those early days of the Economic 
Opportunity Act, they were now beginning to worry that the 
money would not be available at all. I.E. Stone's Weekly had 
noted in April 1966 that "although 650 CAPs are now in 
operation, barely 10% of the nation's poor have been 
reached. In spite of this, the GEO has recommended that 
program development funds...be cut from $18m to $6m".^°
Civil rights leaders who met with Kennedy that year 
proposed a domestic Marshall Plan to "solve poverty", which 
would cost $100 billion, but with the war in Vietnam costing 
$2 billion a month, he told them that no such figure was 
likely to be appropriated in the near future. "If the 
Vietnam war ends, maybe in five years we can think in those 
terms," he said.^^
Part of Kennedy's credibility of the private enterprise 
proposals was staked on the success of his experiment at
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Bedford Stuyvesant, an especially poor ghetto in New York. 
The project was considered by Kennedy to be a prototype for 
community rehabilitation, and thanks largely to his personal 
involvement and contacts, it flourished in its first years.
By 1968, a community hall was being successfully rebuilt, 
over 300 homes had been renovated, IBM was planning to 
create 300 jobs in the area and several local businesses 
were expanding. Eighty banks and insurance companies, which 
had only previously provided money in black areas under the 
strictest conditions, agreed to offer conventional rate 
mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration. 
Newsweek described it as "the most sweeping and 
comprehensive rehabilitation effort ever brought to bear on 
a single American community"
The project succeeded where others failed partly because 
it had been properly worked out in advance, partly because 
it was paid for with large injections of cash from the 
private sector, which gave the project a certain dynamism 
government projects had lacked, and partly because Kennedy's 
personal involvement ensured it enjoyed a status which 
lesser-known projects lacked. Compared with other schemes of 
its kind, for example one set up in the Roxbury area of 
Boston, the Bedford Stuyvesant plan was well thought out and 
properly planned.
In March 1968, EG&G, a major nuclear research 
corporation, opened a metal fabricating plant in Roxbury, 
and a study of business in the ghetto compared its success 
with that of Kennedy's New York scheme. EG&G was not only 
inexperienced in light metal fabrication, but it proceeded
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to hire a group of disadvantaged workers and four black 
managers, all of whom were totally unfamiliar with such 
operations.
EG&G had little internal demand for such metal products, 
so outside markets had to be cultivated, which the company 
found almost impossible to find. The inexperience of the 
workers and managers meant that overheads ran at about three 
times wages - whereas under normal conditions they would be 
about a half. Despite a $575,000 training grant from the 
Labor Department, the plant lost $75,000 in 1968, and was 
forced to lose two of its four black managers.^
The Watts-based company, which was only saved by the 
escalation of the Vietnam War, had encountered similar 
problems, as it found its training costs to be nearer $5,000 
per worker than the $1,300 provided by the Labor 
Department.Two years after its inception, one of its 
executives reported: "There was a lot of flag waving in the 
beginning, but when the hurrahs died down, we were caught in 
the middle of it." IBM's involvement in Bedford Stuyvesant, 
on the other hand, is still prospering today. Beginning 
operations in July 1968, it originally produced computer 
cables for IBM, but this proved unprofitable. The plant 
gradually shifted to producing power supplies, which it was 
able to do at less than outside vendor costs (though still 
more expensively than at other IBM plants).
IBM succeeded where others failed because it consciously 
underplayed its goals to the public to begin with, and did 
not go in for the fanfare which heralded other business 
entries into ghettos. It also produced for an internal and
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guaranteed market : the demand was known and only the
question of supply remained to be worked out. The project 
depended on more than just IBM, of course, and two 
organisations were set up to monitor the rebuilding of the 
ghetto.
The Restoration Corporation represented the residents of 
the local community and was responsible for the development 
and implementation of programmes, whereas the Bedford 
Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation was 
established to represent the business community. In 1973, 
the two organisations merged to create the single 
corporation which now runs the project. In its first 15 
years of operation, the project in the ghetto received 25% 
of its funding directly from government, 15% from business 
subsidiary income, 20% from mortgage and loan financing, 18% 
from rent, 11% from special contributions and grants, and 
the rest it generated from other projects.^/
If there had not been so much pressure on the community 
action programmes to work so quickly, and had they been 
given sufficient time to be properly researched and 
developed, more projects might have enjoyed the benefits 
which were afforded to Bedford Stuyvesant. Moreover, if the 
large corporations could have been attracted into the 
ghettos through a series of. economic incentives, parent 
companies might have taken over from the government in 
providing many necessary services.
These might not necessarily have been any more efficient 
in providing long-term job prospects, but in some ways they 
were more stable than government agencies, whose funding
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could appear and disappear as regularly as there were 
elections. Kennedy's plans for the ghetto were not 
revolutionary, but he did help to pioneer ideas which were 
only realised some years after his death, mostly through the 
neo-conservatism of Moynihan in the Nixon White House, when 
business was encouraged to play a greater role, and where 
more planning was required before a community was awarded 
government money.
In fact much of Kennedy's community bias was echoed in 
Nixon's urban policy, which discouraged the federal 
government's participation in renewal programmes. Kennedy 
may not have been ready to go as far as Nixon, who preferred 
awarding block grants to local mayors to allocate money to 
specific projects in their cities, but it would not be 
stretching the parallel too far to submit that Nixon's neo­
conservatism was, in some ways, Kennedy's legacy.
These principles of private funding and local control 
have grown in strength since they were proposed by Kennedy, 
and have often been cited by politicians on the right as 
sensible approaches to the alleviation of poverty. In the 
early 1980s, they were commended to by Peter Walker, then a 
British cabinet minister in the Conservative government and 
later head of the country's Urban Regeneration Agency.
He suggested that Bobby Kennedy was acting in the 
tradition of former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan 
in advocating "The Middle Way". "Bobby Kennedy...drew 
attention to the powerful role that free enterprise needs to 
play in tackling the urban problem. He wanted private 
enterprise to have the ingenuity to provide decent
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housing....He recognised that welfare wrongly applied would 
destroy self-respect and encourage family disintegration"
In the early 1990s, the Bush administration also appeared 
to be reverting to Kennedy's ideas of the mid-1960s to fight 
American poverty. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
Jack Kemp suggested a cut in capital gains tax for those 
investing in the inner cities, and an expansion in inner 
city home ownership -both plans pioneered by Kennedy during 
his Senate career.” . In recent years, these tax incentives 
for inner cities have become known as "enterprise zone" 
schemes.
Whether the enterprise zone idea proves ultimately 
successful remains to be seen. So far, these ideas have 
failed to stem the drug trade or the increase in violent 
crime. That Robert Kennedy's ideas have not achieved total 
victory in the war against poverty does not mean they have 
not made a significant contribution. They were new 
approaches to historic problems, and Kennedy should at least 
be credited with being far ahead of his colleagues in his 
proposals for inner-city renewal.
During the major disturbances in Los Angeles in early 
1992, sparked by the acquittal of four white policemen 
charged with assaulting a black man, the two gangs which 
control much of the city drew up a truce and an economic 
plan for the future of their community. It demanded that 
private companies be forced to invest in the area. IBM, for 
instance, were asked to provide ten computers and three 
staff members. In return, 30 gang members would be trained 
as computer operators and repairmen. Computer manufacturers
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Apple and Micro were asked to train young blacks as software 
writers.
"We demand that welfare be completely removed from our 
community," declared the gangs, "and these welfare 
programmes be replaced by state work and product 
manufacturing plants that provide the city with certain 
supplies. State money shall only be provided for invalids 
and the elderly. The demands echo Kennedy's ideas for 
Bedford Stuyvesant, which appear to have been two decades 
ahead of their time.
There is no denying that Kennedy was particularly 
sensitive to black aspirations, and his popularity among 
black voters was remarkable. His support from their leaders 
was often less enthusiastic, who were worried by his 
previous involvement with FBI surveillance of Martin Luther 
King and his initially lukewarm response to civil-rights 
activists in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, his popularity 
with the majority of blacks was undoubted. How much of this 
support came from his legislative proposals, how much from 
his past relationship with President Kennedy, and how much 
from his glamorous image, is impossible to quantify.
Just as he was more advanced than most other politicians 
in the policies he proposed, so too was he more aware of the 
developments in black political thinking than nearly all of 
his fellow Congressmen. He was familiar with ideas of 
separatism and black consciousness years before many other 
liberals appreciated the principles, and his electoral 
success in black areas was bettered by no comparable 
candidate.
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His first exposure to black consciousness came as early 
as 1963, when he met James Baldwin and other prominent black 
leaders shortly before the March on Washington. Kennedy felt 
he had no reason to be ashamed of what his brother's 
administration had done for civil rights, but this record 
carried little weight in his New York meeting, and he was 
met with a barrage of criticism from those who thought the 
President had not done enough to recognise the difficulties 
being experienced by urban blacks at the time.
It was, by several accounts, the first time Kennedy had 
encountered the idea of black consciousness first-hand.” The 
playwright Lorraine Hansberry launched a virulent attack on 
the administration, warned of gun battles in the street, and 
introduced notions like black separatism to the Attorney 
General. Kennedy was shocked by the verbal assaults, and 
largely ignorant of the blacks' motives in criticising him. 
In an oral history programme recorded in 1964, he told the 
interviewer that "A number of them...have complexes about 
the fact that they've been successful. I mean, that they've 
done so well. . .so the way to show that they hadn't forgotten 
where they came from was to berate me and berate the United 
States government.
He also questioned the credentials of the blacks he met 
to speak on behalf of others. "They didn't really know, with 
a few exceptions, any of the facts. James Baldwin couldn't 
discuss any legislation, for instance, on housing or any of 
these matters. He didn't know anything about them. Harry 
Belafonte said afterwards - and he was right - that it was 
a mistake having them there because they didn't know
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anything."
Kennedy's position as senator from New York, which had 
one of the most militantly black separatist traditions in 
the country, also exposed him to some of the most radical 
blacks of the time. (According to Tom Hayden, "Kennedy met 
with [militant CORE leader] Floyd McKissick and continually 
gave him money. " )
Assigned to the committee on Labor & Public Welfare, and 
to the committee on Washington DC, his working day involved 
as much exposure to the problems faced by the urban poor as 
any other national legislator.
He was also an assiduous constituency senator. Having won 
a Senate campaign where he had been attacked for being an 
outsider from Massachusetts, Kennedy immediately expanded 
his Senate staff so that it soon became the largest in 
Congress. On entering the Senate in January 1965, he is 
recorded as having 20 administrative staff on the payroll. 
Within six months, 36 more had joined, making a total of 56 
- appreciably larger than the staffs of either his brother 
(who had 23) , other Senate newcomers like Walter Mondale 
(who had 26), or even New York's senior senator, Jacob 
Javits, who had 38 staff members. By 1968, Kennedy's Senate 
staff was by far the largest in Congress, numbering 70 (Ted 
Kennedy's and Javits' remained at about 1965 levels, while 
Mondale's had dropped to 16).”
With such resources (a senator was given a certain 
allowance by the government, which he could augment from his 
own pocket), Kennedy proved a competent, if unprolific, 
legislator, and earned a reputation for keeping in close
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touch with his constituents. He was the first senator from 
New York to run an upstate office, and the "carpetbagger" 
charges were soon dropped (in fact Kennedy had been born in 
New York, although had left it as a child). Although he
never favoured the approach of separatists like Malcolm X 
over the intégrâtionist views of, for instance, Martin 
Luther King, Kennedy was aware that lifting the legal 
obstacles to equal opportunity and voting rights was not 
enough. "You may remember that when the Civil Rights Act 
went into effect, Mississippi civil rights workers had to go 
to great lengths to ensure that all negroes who tested the 
law had enough money to pay for a single cup of coffee," he 
told the Senate in a remark which challenged the liberal 
consensus based on Myrdal's analysis that the issue was 
primarily a moral, one.
Once he had accepted that substantial economic 
independence was a prerequisite for real black emancipation, 
it was a short step for him to concede that other 
disadvantages experienced by the black community might also 
have to be dealt with before real integration could begin. 
There was nothing new in this, of course. Malcolm X had been 
saying it for years before, and Frantz Fanon had been saying 
it years before him. Nevertheless, Kennedy spotted the 
political potential of Black Power before any other major 
white politician (and a whole decade before the rise of 
Steve Biko and black consciousness in South Africa). 
"Blackness", he said, "must be made a badge of pride and 
honour ".
Probably only Edmund Brooke, a black senator from
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Massachusetts, rivalled Kennedy in Congress for his 
appreciation of the phenomena, and his major statement on 
the issue did not appear until July 1967. "Black Power is, 
more than a slogan, an idea with very many promising uses 
for negroes and for the country generally.... If the idea of 
Black Power assists the internal organisation of political 
strength in the negro slums, then it will have served a very 
useful national purpose indeed," said Brooke.”
Black Power, coined in October 1966 as a political slogan 
by Stokely Carmichael, was an effectively vague phrase which 
was used to suggest varying degrees of self-determination, 
from revolution to cultural pride. Kennedy's idea to develop 
Bedford Stuyvesant was one manifestation of Black Power, as 
local blacks were to be awarded an unprecedented measure of 
self-determination. But it was not without its paradoxes. 
The power could not be said to have been genuinely black if 
it had been granted (and could be withheld) by white money 
and white enthusiasm.
Moreover, Kennedy's project was only viable with a 
certain kind of pliable local leadership. According to 
former Kennedy staffers, Bedford Stuyvesant was chosen over 
Harlem because the local black leadership in Harlem was too 
developed to allow for such outside initiatives. Harlem was 
declared unsuitable because of its "highly structured 
political leadership, the strong influence of the militant 
anti-white groups which would create barriers, as would his 
own arm's length relationship with Adam Clayton Powell, who 
was at the time chairman of the House Education and Labor 
Committee," conceded members of Kennedy's Senate staff
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Bedford Stuyvesant, on the other hand, was eminently 
appropriate partly because "... it had no congressman of its 
own, its borders having been cut up and distributed between 
three congressional districts, [and]...no dominant negro 
leaders".” When some locals did object to Kennedy's plans 
for the ghetto, they were co-opted into the scheme, just as 
radical blacks had been co-opted into the March on 
Washington. (In the oral history programme, Kennedy recalls 
how the administration was concerned about communist 
infiltration in the March, and stopped an official from the 
Committee on Racial Equality from delivering an 
"inflammatory speech" because it was "an attack on the 
country. It attacked the President^^". ) "At one point, some 
of the neighbourhood groups threatened to discredit the 
project, but Kennedy... turned them back by broadening the 
membership of the community corporations to include younger 
and more militant elements," recalled the Senate aides.”
However, the Bedford Stuyvesant project did complement 
the notion of black assertiveness. "In the long run, it is 
only by a rebuilding process of which physical 
reconstruction is part, that we can achieve the 
comparability of housing which is an independent requirement 
of full integration," he declared to Congress.” The ultimate 
aim was still one of integration, but from a position of 
black strength, but this point proved too sophisticated for 
some of his most liberal colleagues in the Senate.
McCarthy was against it, and by 1985 had still not 
grasped the implications of the idea. "He [Kennedy] was 
really for apartheid; 'keep 'em in lots' was in effect what
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he was saying. I was saying that you had to have physical 
integration....He was big on Bedford Stuyvesant, which was 
segregated residential apartheid. There was even talk of 
putting industry in Watts - some[one] proposed to build a 
factory making baseball bats. Baseball bats! - the last 
thing you'd need in Watts. Perhaps pillows...".”
McCarthy was not the only one who was confused about the 
project's philosophy. John Bartlow Martin was an important 
figure in the Kennedy campaign. He had known Robert Kennedy 
since the 1950s, when he covered the union hearings as a 
journalist. After campaigning for JFK in 1960, he was 
rewarded with an ambassadorship to the Dominican Republic.
In 1968, Robert Kennedy asked him to organise his 
presidential campaign in Martin's native Indiana. Charged 
with the responsibility of encouraging black support in 
places like Indianapolis, Martin relied primarily on 
Kennedy's record as Attorney General rather than his new 
enthusiasm for black consciousness. "He talked about that 
[Bedford Stuyvesant] endlessly," recalled Martin in 1985. "I 
couldn't make head or tail of it. I didn't understand it. I 
remember talking to him early on in the campaign. He went on 
about Bedford Stuyvesant and I was bored...I didn't listen 
to that. I just literally didn't understand it.
It is difficult to judge if Kennedy himself really 
understood the limitations of his position as a white 
liberal in such a project. "If I could do what I really 
wanted to do, I would resign from the Senate and run Bedford 
Stuyvesant," he said in 1967, apparently missing the 
essential point that part of the project's raison d'etre was
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that it would not be run by outsiders, especially white
52ones.
Whatever his understanding of the principles involved, 
there is no doubting Kennedy's genuine popularity in the 
ghettos. In an immediate reaction to the death of President 
Kennedy, black Moslem leader Elijah Mohammed forbad public 
discussion of the assassination in case it offended blacks 
who idolised JFK. Within a week of the killing, however, 
Malcolm X addressed a black Islamic service at Temple Seven 
in New York, and referred to President Kennedy as a 
segregationist and to the Kennedys (John, Robert and Edward) 
as the KKK. The congregation, according to reports, left 
disappointed, unenthusiastic about Malcolm X's attack on the 
Kennedys.
It has been suggested that some of Robert Kennedy's 
popularity with blacks relied on his anti-war position, as 
money spent on the war effort in Vietnam could otherwise be 
used to improve inner-city areas. Although the war hit 
ghetto communities severely, it does not appear that by the 
time of Kennedy's death the war was a major concern of black 
voters. Martin and McCarthy saw the issues as distinctly 
separate, and there is little record of candidates 
emphasising their dovish war voting records in black areas.
In 1966, Kennedy made a much-publicised trip to South 
Africa, where he spoke out against racial injustice and met 
banned Nobel prize winner Albert Luthuli. There is little 
evidence that American blacks were especially drawn to him 
because of this sort of stand, although just as his 
brother's speech in 1957 calling for Algerian independence
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was probably not significant in attracting black support 
1960 it may have had little electoral impact.
According to McCarthy, "blacks didn't know what [Kennedy] 
was saying and they didn't care anyway" Kennedy's 
phenomenal popularity in black areas did not necessarily 
reflect his views on the war, or even his sensitivity to the 
emergence of Black Power. It could simply have been glamour 
or charisma. According to most authoritative studies of 
charisma, charismatic leaders (ie those who are perceived to 
have extraordinary abilities or supernatural talents) emerge 
at times of great change or confusion.
By the mid-60s in America, there is little doubt that 
many perceived the social situation to be critical, and a 
crop of charismatic leaders surfaced. John Lindsay, Ronald 
Reagan, George Wallace, Martin Luther King and Barry 
Goldwater all emerged from mainstream politics at this time 
offering strong and attractive leadership, while the fringes 
produced Bobby Seale, Malcolm X and Tom Hayden.
How the unlikable and unglamorous Bobby Kennedy of the 
early '60s became the most worshipped of these figures (even 
to the point of messianic reverence) is still unclear, 
although according to the classic study of charisma produced 
by Max Weber earlier this century, charisma can be 
"transferred" from one charismatic leader to a nominated 
successor, often "to the kinsmen of its bearer... this is the 
case of hereditary charisma".Assuming that some of Robert 
Kennedy's appeal came from his relationship to John Kennedy, 
it is conceivable that Bobby Kennedy's charisma was 
"inherited" in this way.
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In a more recent study of the charismatic appeal of Jesse 
Jackson, the author contends that "it is critical for 
charismatic figures to become attached to the primary myths 
of the culture... .Thus John F. Kennedy, a glamorous but 
hardly charismatic figure for most Americans, became a 
charismatic figure after his assassination by being 
assimilated to the Lincoln myth" (The author describes how 
Jesse Jackson tried to align himself to the myth of Martin 
Luther King immediately after he was assassinated by wearing 
a shirt on television which had apparently been stained with 
King's blood.)
Thus Robert Kennedy, more directly associated with 
President Kennedy than either his other brother or JFK's 
officially designated successor, Lyndon Johnson, might have 
benefited from the transference of charisma.
A lieutenant of Martin Luther King during the 1960s and 
now the Congressman for Washington DC, Walter Fauntroy, 
supports this suggestion. Kennedy's popularity among blacks, 
he says, was partly rooted in "the feeling that his brother 
was assassinated for the forthright stand he was moved to 
take in 1963 around the Birmingham movement... and at a 
subliminal level, blacks felt that for whatever reasons he 
was killed, among them was his forthrightness on the 
question of civil rights....There was a desire to reward 
[Robert Kennedy] with what the people would've rewarded his 
brother had he lived"
Certainly, the Kennedy presidential campaign of 1968 felt 
confident enough to leave out a great deal of political 
substance during his appearances in ghettos, preferring to
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rely more on the simple pull of his presence. His campaign 
manager, Fred Dutton, believed that "blacks need a high- 
intensity, high-visibility style of campaigning (so do blue- 
collar whites, but not as much) . We made an intentional 
pitch to the blacks and made the most out of dramatic 
situations."^®
Kennedy himself, it would appear, was not beyond making 
dramatic statements in private to black leaders during the 
campaign. At Martin Luther King's funeral, he told Walter 
Fauntroy in a private conversation that "there are guns 
between me and the White House"’^^
A rough "line of descent" appeared to emerge in popular 
culture in the months after Robert Kennedy's assassination, 
as a Motown song, "Abraham, Martin and John" - which reached 
number four in the US charts of November 1968 - grouped 
Bobby Kennedy with fallen heroes Presidents Lincoln and 
Kennedy, and Martin Luther King. Kennedy's links with 
popular black culture did not end there. Musician James 
Brown "had just about decided to endorse Senator Robert 
Kennedy" when he was assassinated, and Diana Ross and The 
Suprêmes played a $1,000 a plate fundraiser/concert in April 
1969, the proceeds of which towards paying off Kennedy's 
campaign debts. In June 1971, Motown subsidiary Mowest 
released "What The World Needs Now Is Love" where the lyrics 
were interspersed with extracts of speeches from King and 
John and Robert Kennedy.®®
The line of descent appears to have been enlarged, but 
Robert Kennedy is still part of it. Addressing the 1984 
Democratic Convention in San Francisco, Jesse Jackson
50
referred to the achievements of the civil rights movement in 
the 1960s: "We lost Malcolm, Martin, Medgar, Bobby and John 
and Viola. The team that got us here must be expanded, not 
abandoned".Whatever Kennedy’s real place in black culture, 
he appears to have joined the pantheon of black heroes and 
heroines credited with black progress.
Kennedy was primarily concerned, of course, with how far 
this affection translated into electoral support. He swept 
ghetto areas in the presidential primaries with overwhelming 
majorities (and only lost in Oregon, which was virtually 
ghetto-free). In fact, Kennedy's popularity in the ghettos 
threatened to damage his image with suspicious white voters. 
The urban response to Kennedy was often overwhelming.
While McCarthy stayed away from ghettos because he 
"didn't want to stir them up ", McGovern recalls how he 
"would watch the nightly news and you'd see these largely 
youthful, black, poor crowds crushing around him and it 
frightened a lot of people. The majority may not have been 
quite ready for Robert Kennedy in 1968."®^
John Bartlow Martin had similar memories of organising 
Kennedy's primary campaign in Indiana. "I remember he was at 
Monument Circle in Indianapolis and he got a crowd there 
such as I've never seen. I've seen Eisenhower's crowds there 
and Stevenson's and I've never seen anything like this....I 
was scared physically. I fell and broke a tooth and it was 
just a mess. "®^
The pop-star image of Kennedy in his latter days as a 
senator proved effective in primary campaigning, especially 
in low-income areas. Stokely Carmichael had complained to a
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Kennedy aide about the candidate's popularity: "I would not 
want to see your man run for president because he can get 
the votes of my people without coming to me. With the other 
candidates. I'll have bargaining p o w e r . E v e n  Eldridge 
Cleaver, one of the most militant black leaders and a Black 
Panther official, described Kennedy's performance at a 
Senate hearing in 1967 with reticent respect, before 
dismissing him as "too white to be all right". "He wore the 
aura of an idol - smasher. He was the bad boy on the 
committee, the only one who contained the potential in his 
image to ask the scandalous questions.... The other two 
members of the committee...bore no promise..." wrote 
Cleaver.®®
Moderate black leaders also respected him much more in 
these years. In the summer of 1967, King suggested that 
Kennedy would "make a great President" (although he says he 
doesn't believe Kennedy could win the nomination from 
Johnson) . ®^  NAACP leader Roy Wilkins also conceded that "When 
Sirhan Sirhan shot Bobby Kennedy in Los Angeles, I came as 
close as I ever have come to losing faith in the workings of 
democracy. I had always felt a degree of distance from Bobby 
Kennedy, partly because he had become senator in New York by 
defeating Kenneth Keating, a Republican who had always been 
a very good friend of the NAACP. But the older Bobby grew, 
the more clear matters of race relations became to him. By 
1968 he obviously felt the problem deeply, and he was poised 
to offer considerable help."®®
Ironically, Kennedy's popularity with blacks suggested 
to many that he could also be a popular figure among low-
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income whites, and a popular theory expounded in the press 
suggested that Kennedy was the first choice of many who 
eventually voted for George Wallace in 1968.
On the night of King's assassination in April 1968, John 
Bartlow Martin was due to meet Kennedy at Indianapolis 
airport. Kennedy was due to open his primary campaign 
headquarters in the city and attend a rally in the ghetto. 
While waiting for Kennedy's plane to land, Martin asked a 
police inspector if the candidate should still attend the 
rally in light of King's death. The police inspector, 
according to Martin, replied: "If he doesn't, they'll tear 
this town apart tonight. He's the only one that can do it." 
Martin remembered: "The negroes did burn the cities that
night, except Indianapolis....Bobby did exactly what the 
policeman wanted him to do without knowing the policeman 
wanted it...".®* This notion of understanding blacks was 
certainly one of Kennedy's main attractions among whites, 
who often believed he could keep blacks under control.
According to Walter Fauntroy, when Kennedy was 
assassinated, the police authorities in Washington DC 
deployed extra troops in the areas which had rioted after 
King's death, believing that blacks in the city might become 
violent on hearing of another of their leaders murdered. On 
the outskirts of the city 10,00 soldiers were placed on 
alert in case Kennedy's death triggered rioting.^®
One of the areas which the police believed offered 
potential for violence was around the Lincoln Memorial, 
which had become home to those who had arrived in Washington 
at the end of the Poor People's March. The march was
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designed to embarrass the government into doing something 
for the poor of the country, and poor people from all over 
the nation converged on Washington in 1968, and set up camp 
near the memorial.
According to NAACP lawyer Marion Wright, the march was 
Kennedy's idea. "I had told him [in August 1967] that I was 
going to stop back in Atlanta and see Dr King - he said 
'Tell him to bring the poor people to Washington'. And as 
simply as Bobby Kennedy had said it. King instinctively felt 
that that was right....Out of that, the Poor People's 
Campaign Was born.
The suggestion was typical. By encouraging thousands of 
poor people to Washington, Kennedy could ensure that the 
President was embarrassed on the issue of poverty and claim 
extra credibility for himself with radical leaders by 
adopting the mantle of direct (if non-violent) 
confrontation.
Whether Kennedy's position at the cutting edge of civil 
rights was anything more than part of a master-plan to 
recapture the presidency will never be known, and his 
motivation in embracing some of the most radical ideas of 
black self-determination is not as important as the fact 
that he was successful at it.
This radical appeal to blacks self-sufficiency proved a 
formidable vote-winner, and has not been emulated by a white 
candidate since.
This chapter has traced Kennedy's shifts in attitude to 
civil rights. From a weak grasp of civil rights as Attorney
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General, Kennedy moved beyond the orthodox liberal Myrdal 
model to push for Community Action Programmes and to develop 
projects which would eventually become known as "enterprise 
zones". By extending tax incentives, private enterprise 
would be encouraged to invest in the ghettoes. Despite mixed 
success with this idea during the 1960s and later, a few 
individual projects did work very well, notably Kennedy's 
urban renewal plans for Bedford-Stuyvesant.
His popularity in the ghettoes may not have relied 
primarily on his vision for renewal, but was apparently 
based on a charisma inherited from President Kennedy.
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II - KENNEDY AND INDUSTRY
"...slightly less dangerous than Mao Tse Tung" - Wall St 
Journal of RFK in March 1968.
ACCORDING TO AN FBI report, Southern Californian ranchers 
paid towards a $500,000 contract to kill Robert Kennedy in 
June 1968.^ He had, it is fair to say, never been recognised 
as a friend of big business, and some of the larger ranchers 
in California were angry at Kennedy's support for Cesar 
Chavez, who was trying to unionise their employees.
It would also be fair to say, however, that Kennedy had 
never been recognised as a friend of big unions, either. In 
February 1963, President Kennedy told Newsweek journalist 
Benjamin Bradlee that Jimmy Hof fa of the Teamsters Union had 
sent an assassin to Washington to kill Robert Kennedy^.
Kennedy's problems with organised labour went back to the 
1950s when he was part of a Senate investigation which
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exposed corruption in several large unions, including 
Hoffa's International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT).
The investigations were where Kennedy's "ruthless" image 
first emerged, as he hounded several union officials to 
breaking-point in the Senate caucus room where, a decade 
later, he would announce his presidential candidacy. Many 
thought Kennedy went too far in his harassment of union 
officials he believed to be corrupt. One Teamster official, 
John O'Rourke, was badgered so fiercely by Kennedy during 
the hearings in 1957 that he broke down and cried^.
The Teamsters begun at the turn of the century to 
represent city delivery crafts - drivers of coal, milk and 
bread trucks. It grew steadily but slowly until the 1930s, 
when younger leaders organised the union more vigorously, 
realising that the Teamsters could exert national political 
influence. With the proliferation of auto transport, the 
Teamsters were in a powerful position to demand substantial 
improvements in pay and conditions, as they controlled much 
of the country's commodity transportation network.
One of these young organisers was Jimmy Hoffa. Like most 
union officials who end up corrupt, Hoffa began honest. He 
had started as a junior official with the Teamsters in 
Detroit, and had helped organise its first city-wide strike 
in 1937. The strike was violent, and Hoffa later claimed 
he'd been beaten up "at least two dozen times" that year.^
To help his members in their struggle, the young Hoffa 
had used contacts in organised crime to fight off the 
bosses' thugs, and when relations between the Teamsters and 
the governing union body, the Congress of Industrial
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Organisations (CIO), soured in 1941, Hoffa brought in his 
mobster friends to help sort things out.
Within a month CIO control of Detroit was over, and 
Hoffa's IBT was in control. The war years saw Hoffa standing 
trial for racketeering in 1941 and 1942 (he had persuaded 
the draft board that his union work was vital to the war 
effort, and so had been exempted from military service) . 
Although acquitted, a 1953 Congressional investigation into 
corruption found evidence of racketeering in thre IBT, with 
union officials being accused of taking members' money (one 
car washer told the investigation that his weekly earnings 
had dropped from $30 to $18 after he'd joined the union)
Nevertheless, the Congressional hearings were abruptly 
ended in 1953, and Hoffa was temporarily spared further 
investigation. In 1955 he moved the IBT headquarters from 
Detroit to Washington DC, and managed to gain an innovative 
benefit for his members, whereby employers agreed to pay $2 
a week per employee into a pension fund. This provided Hoffa 
with considerable support from his members, and a huge war 
chest which he could use to extend his influence.
Within a year, he had taken control of most of the 
eastern states' Teamster operations by winning dubious 
elections with the support of "paper" locals, i.e. local 
branches which really only existed on paper, and became 
second in the union hierarchy to Teamster President Dave 
Beck.
During these years, Kennedy carried on his work with the 
Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, which by the 
mid-1950s was getting over its preoccupation with
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anti-communism. An investigation in 1955 into government 
procurement of uniforms had led the committee into a fresh 
field of exploration: labour corruption. When Kennedy
returned from his work campaigning for Adi ai Stevenson in 
the presidential election of 1956, he began to probe reports 
of corruption coming from the West Coast, and found that 
Dave Beck had siphoned off $320,000 in union funds to build 
a private home.
Kennedy persuaded Senator McClellan of Arkansas to set 
up a Senate select committee to look in to union corruption, 
and in February 1957 the committee opened with Kennedy as 
leading prosecutor. Dave Beck was ruined within the first 
month of hearings, being forced to take the Fifth Amendment 
(a safeguard against self-incrimination) 140 times in one 
session.
Hoffa proved a wilier adversary. A series of appearances 
before the committee during 1957 left Hoffa's reputation in 
tatters, but Kennedy was unable to amass enough evidence 
against Hoffa to send him to jail, and the union boss's 
skirmishes with Kennedy seemed only to enhance his 
popularity with his members.
With Beck about to go to prison at the end of 1957, Hoffa 
won the Teamster presidency by a majority of three to one, 
although he was barred from taking up the position by a 
legal ruling which found some of the delegates voting for 
Hoffa at the IBT Convention to have been improperly 
selected.
Moreover, the wider labour movement was embarrassed by 
Hoffa, and the governing AFL/CIO (the CIO having merged with
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the American Federation of Labor in 1955) expelled the IBT 
from its organisation in 1958. Hoffa dismissed the expulsion 
as "back-alley politics by the Kennedys".®
Nevertheless, Kennedy earned a reputation at this time 
as a prosecutor given to excess in investigating unions, an 
image which his father thought might damage John Kennedy's 
chances for the presidency in 1960. To emphasise his 
interest in union reform, rather than his interest in 
persecuting union officials, John Kennedy introduced a bill 
in 1959 which required union officials to guarantee regular 
elections with secret ballots, to file financial reports 
with the Labor Department and to disclose financial deals 
which might involve conflicts of interests.
The AFL/CIO, aware that the hearings had damaged the 
image of organised labour across the country, endorsed the 
bill and took every opportunity to distance itself from the 
corrupt exploits of the Teamsters (it had also forbidden its 
representatives to cite the Fifth Amendment before the 
committee, and had thrown out the East Coast Longshoremen 
from its movement for thuggishness).
The Kennedy-Ives bill had been presented the year before, 
but although popular in the Senate, had failed as both the 
Teamsters and the Eisenhower administration opposed it. This 
time, it passed after complicated negotiations and provided 
John Kennedy with a significant piece of legislation to his 
credit for the 1960 election campaign.
Robert Kennedy's time as prosecutor had not proved 
stunningly successful in terms of putting bent officials 
behind bars (in all, only three convictions were secured by
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the Department of Justice as a result of the hearings), but 
he had helped to create a climate for union reform, enabling 
his brother to take advantage and pass a popular bill.
Throughout his Senate career, however, the "ruthless" tag 
would remain, and many in the labour movement never trusted 
him for damaging its reputation during the late 1950s. Among 
those criticised as a result of Kennedy's investigations 
were Unions of Bakers, Operating Engineers, United Textile 
Workers, Meat Cutters, Carpenters, Hotel & Restaurant 
Workers and Sheet Metal Workers^. Of course, Kennedy's prime 
concern at this stage of his political career was not 
electoral success for himself, and if making such powerful 
enemies did not interfere with his brother's chances of the 
presidency, he had no compunction in upsetting union chiefs.
Moreover, the labour movement was not a monolithic bloc, 
and there were significant pockets of influence which 
remained loyal to Kennedy throughout his Senate years. Apart 
from the various disaffected local Teamsters, who had fallen 
on the wrong side of Jimmy Hoffa at one time or another, 
powerful figures like Walter Reuther remained close to 
Kennedy, and any new coalition would have to include 
progressive labour leaders like Reuther, president of the 
influential United Auto Workers (UAW).
Reuther, like Hoffa, had come up through union ranks the 
hard way. For years, he was suspected as a secret communist 
by many on the right for the trip he made to the Soviet 
Union with his brother Victor during the 1930s, but Walter 
Reuther shared Kennedy's capacity to learn politically. He 
had been shot in an assassination attempt in the 1940s, and
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soon after helped found Americans for Democratic Action with 
fellow liberals Reinhold Neibhur and Arthur Schlesinger.
He too first met Kennedy during the racket hearings, when 
Kennedy went to Wisconsin to investigate a strike backed by 
the UAW, and ended up supporting the strikers' demands for 
longer lunch breaks. John Kennedy remembered how his brother 
at this time "might have been intolerant of liberals as such 
because his early experience was with that high-minded, 
high-speaking kind who never got anything done. That all 
changed the moment he met Walter Reuther."®
During the investigation into the Wisconsin strike, John 
Kennedy told the labour leader that "you fellows are 
educating Bobby", and throughout the next decade Kennedy 
would look to Reuther as his most important political ally 
in the union hierarchy.*
Although powerful in his own union, however, Reuther's 
increasing radicalism in the 1960s meant he was losing 
influence with the wider movement. While the AFL/CIO did not 
support the March on Washington in August 1963, for 
instance, Reuther was there, persuading SNCC leader John 
Lewis to tone down his attacks on the Kennedy 
administration. Three years later he was supplying Tom 
Hayden's Students for a Democratic Society with funds for a 
revolutionary ghetto rehabilitation project.
Reuther was politically light years ahead of his AFL/CIO 
colleagues (and the UAW would later officially split from 
the organisation). Virulently anti-communist, the AFL/CIO 
was never part of the international left, and remained a 
strident supporter of American involvement in Vietnam
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throughout the 1960s. AFL/CIO leader George Meany disliked 
the more progressive Reuther, and took it as a personal 
insult when Kennedy praised Reuther at a speech in Detroit 
in 1964 for all he had done for John Kennedy. Meany had 
thought himself a greater ally of the late president and was 
outraged. It was the beginning of Kennedy's difficulties 
with the AFL/CIO.
However, it was leaders like Reuther Kennedy looked to 
in forging a new electoral coalition of workers. In 1966, he 
went to support the striking grape-pickers in California 
because Reuther asked him to. The grape growers in 
California were an extremely powerful lobby, and Kennedy was 
the first politician to visit the strikers in Delano in 
1966. "Politically speaking, in California at that time, it 
was probably a stupid thing to do, " said Michael 
Harrington.^
The Senate Migratory Labor Subcommittee was due to hold 
hearings on the issue in Delano, and Kennedy agreed to 
attend. He became a hero among the grape-pickers almost 
immediately for his aggressive prosecution of the local law 
enforcers for their treatment of the pickers, in one 
memorable incident suggesting that the local sheriff use his 
lunch-break to read the Constitution of the United States.
It may have been stupid politics, but Kennedy needed the 
support of those electoral blocs like the migrant workers 
who were not already organised and controlled by traditional 
union leaders. The emerging workers' organisations, like the 
National Farmers Association organised by Cesar Chavez, were 
not directed by AFL/CIO powerbrokers, and so Kennedy could
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go straight to them without having to barter with the (often 
antagonistic) old guard. This principle - which also 
extended to the other pools of unorganised poor, like 
Indians and some blacks - could only be stretched so far. It 
wasn't as if there were enough people outside the old-style 
voting blocs to elect him, and he would have to barter with 
the traditional bosses in the traditional way during the 
presidential election.
Unfortunately for Kennedy, his main rival in the 
primaries turned out to be Humphrey, who was hugely popular 
with the AFL/CIO leadership. Even Reuther could not go 
against Humphrey and declare himself for Kennedy, which left 
Kennedy with only a handful of endorsements from local union 
leaders during the 1968 election.
In the Indiana primary, the only union support which 
declared for Kennedy were the local UAW branches in 
Indianapolis and Kokomo. The rest went to local Governor 
Roger Branigan, widely recognised as a stand-in for 
Humphrey. President of the Labor Council in Indianapolis Max 
E. Brydenthal stated that 60% of union members who were 
Democrats favoured Branigan.
Given the indifference, and sometimes hostility, Kennedy 
faced in securing the support of union bosses, he aimed his 
pitch straight at the members. Union members could, of 
course, be approached at levels other than that of 
employment : they may fall into other sociological categories 
where Kennedy was stronger. For example, many union members 
were young, some black, some Catholic, and Kennedy could 
garner a significant number of union votes by appealing to
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voters on those levels.
In 1967, for example, 25% of union members were under 30, 
and 50% under 40, a whole generation younger than most union 
officials. At the AFL/CIO Convention in Miami on December 12 
that year, Kennedy shrewdly sent a young emissary who 
identified with the membership more than the leadership.
The Wall St. Journal noted how "the Senator's Labor Aide, 
Carter Burden, Harvard '63, stands out in the informal 
convention setting with his long hair and British-style 
s u i t s I n  a bid to counter the influence of union leaders 
on their members, Kennedy's strategy in the primaries was 
aimed at leaders of local unions and the younger staff 
members of the large international unions, but official 
support either remained neutral (like Reuther), or went to 
Humphrey.
There is little doubt that there was still enough of the 
old politician in Kennedy to have won AFL/CIO backing had he 
won the nomination in 1968, despite his opposition to the 
war (although such support was withheld from Democratic 
nominee George McGovern four years later). Nevertheless, 
traditional union support would have swung heavily behind 
Humphrey at the Chicago Convention, and was a major obstacle 
to Kennedy's securing the nomination. According to the 
estimates of Kennedy aides in 1968, about 300 delegates to 
the Democratic Convention were union members, but "between 
500 and 600 others [of a total number of 2,622] were men 
whose votes could be influenced by the recommendations of 
the powerful unions in their area".^^
While Kennedy could probably count on the support of
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organised labour after he had won the nomination, backing 
from the country's business community would prove far more 
elusive. Business endorsements were not crucial in deciding 
the outcome of the Democratic primaries, and were primarily 
useful to the candidates for fundraising purposes. Kennedy's 
personal wealth, and his willingness to spend it on 
campaigning, meant he did not have to bargain with the usual 
series of business interests which clustered around other 
candidates.
Kennedy's wealth had come from his father's legendary 
stockbroking deals in the 1920s and 1930s, and although 
Joseph Kennedy Sr enjoyed some influential business 
contacts, he had always been far from the inner circle on 
Wall St, and was regarded by many in the business community 
as a conniving cheat, amassing wealth for political 
ambition.
He had regarded them with similar affection, and in a 
famous remark described "all businessmen as sons of 
bitches". Asked in December 1964 about his father's remark, 
Kennedy said that businessmen were like liberals; "The 
people who are selfish are interested in their own singular 
course of action and do not take into consideration the 
needs or requirements of others or what ultimately be 
accomplished.
Kennedy's opinion of businessmen remained much the same 
in the coming years, that they were essentially selfish 
people uninterested in working for the common good. However, 
although relatively unimportant in the primary tussles, the 
business community would be a significant national
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constituency when it came to the November election, able to 
apply powerful lobbying forces on candidates throughout the 
country, candidates whose support Kennedy would need to win 
the presidency.
As such, he made sporadic efforts to improve his poor 
image with big business. Memories of the steel crisis in 
1962 didn't help. Nor did his association with Cesar Chavez 
and the migrant workers, and nor did his constant harassment 
of the cigarette industry, which could also have been called 
"stupid politics". The tobacco lobby war much stronger at 
this time than the anti-smoking lobby, in terms of money and 
political clout, and in attacking the industry Kennedy was 
making powerful enemies over an issue which he did not, in 
strictly electoral terms, have to risk political capital.
Nevertheless, Kennedy was a vigorous opponent of 
cigarette advertising in his Senate years, introducing bills 
to curb smoking advertising on television, and proposing 
that stronger brands of cigarettes be taxed more heavily.
The tobacco industry was, to be fair, mostly concentrated 
in the south, whose business class would have been hostile 
to Kennedy anyway. However, his badgering of tobacco 
interests and his readiness to call for federal regulation 
to control them must have worried business magnates in other 
industries.
In June 1965, he opposed a bill calling for health 
warnings on cigarette packets beacuse it was too weak, and 
continued to push for stronger legislation. He told the 
Senate that while "the cigarette lobby spends more than 
$300m a year on advertising...300,000 people each year die
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from diseases associated with smoking".
In April 1966 he suggested that the warning on packets 
be extended to all kinds of cigarette advertising, and 
threatened the tobacco industry that if it did not regulate 
itself "within the next few months...the administration 
should act". He criticised the industry (as he had the 
previous year, in exactly the same phrase), for "portraying 
smoking as the smart, sophisticated thing to do", and 
compared the idea of federal controls on cigarettes as 
sensible as those banning dangerous cars.
He attacked the equally powerful broadcasting industry 
for conspiring with the cigarette manufacturers to sell 
death. "As to young people, the advertising is a weapon to 
lure them to their ultimate destruction, a tool to lead them 
to snuff out their own lives at an early day. Both 
industries, therefore, must come up with realistic programs 
to police themselves."^' If they did not, he threatened, the 
government would do it for them.
Of course, they did not, and the following year Kennedy 
sponsored five different bills to limit the sale and 
advertising of cigarettes, including one to forbid the 
broadcast of such advertising after 9pm and during sports 
coverage. The day before he introduced this proposal to the 
Senate on September 12, 1967, he had addressed the World 
Conference on Smoking and Health. He proposed that 
anti-smoking commercials be broadcast on television. "One 
suggestion that I thought appropriate," he said in a jibe at 
the famous Marlboro ad, "would place the tough, rangy man 
with the tattoo on his hand in front of a hospital ward and
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have him say: 'This is Emphysema country'
The tobacco barons apart, Kennedy regarded the rest of 
the business community with little respect, and the feeling 
was mutual. There were exceptions, of course, and IBM, for 
instance, had been helpful in supporting the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant project, but businessmen generally 
distrusted Kennedy, and he distrusted them.
"[President Kennedy] never liked them", Robert Kennedy 
said in 1964. "He always just felt that you couldn't do 
anything with them; there's no way to influence them. We 
were brought up thinking they were - - My father thought 
businessmen didn't have any public responsibility. And we 
just found that they were antagonistic and you couldn't do 
anything with them".
The Kennedy administration's relations with big business 
had soured badly over the steel incident, although local 
businessmen were used as a powerful lobbying group by the 
Kennedys during the integration of the University of 
Alabama. "We wrote down in a book the name of every company 
with more than 100 employees - I think - in the whole state 
of Alabama. All those names were distributed at a Cabinet 
meeting....A Cabinet member or somebody called, I guess, 
every one of them....We built up a reaction to what Wallace 
was doing," Kennedy recalled in 1964.
Such co-operation with business interests was rare, 
however, and in an October 1966 feature on Kennedy the Wall 
St Journal noted that although he proved a popular 
campaigner in the mid-term elections, "the South and business 
community remain areas of substantial resistance"
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Kennedy's entry into the presidential campaign seriously 
worried many business leaders, and the Wall St Journal 
wasted no time in outlining the reasons why a Kennedy 
candidacy was a bad idea: "The South regards the Senator as 
only slightly less dangerous than Mao Tse-Tung. AFL/CIO 
president George Meany and other key labor barons have 
disliked and distrusted him since his days on the staff of 
the Senate's Labor Racketeering Investigation Committee. 
Businessmen in both parties have feared him ever since he 
was his brother's tough lieutenant in the fight against Big 
Steel," it declared in its edition of April 3, 1968.
The business magazine Fortune was no more encouraging: 
"During recent weeks. Fortune has surveyed the political 
views of business leaders in cities scattered across the 
nation. At each meeting with the businessmen, mention of the 
name Bobby Kennedy produced an almost unanimous chorus of 
condemnation... Although the traditional alignment of 
business with the Republicans has weakened, there is 
agreement that Kennedy is the one public figure who could 
produce an almost united front of business opposition....If 
Kennedy should become the Democratic candidate, this 
hostility would stuff the Republican coffers, and if he were 
elected it might seriously impair his ability to govern.
Hubert Humphrey noted that during the early stages of the 
1968 presidential campaign "a large share of the money 
pledged to me came from New York business leaders who feared 
and distrusted Bob. With his death, their interest in me 
waned ".
In an effort to counteract the hostility, Kennedy met
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with a few business leaders sympathetic to his candidacy, 
and they agreed that he should make a major address to a 
business audience, and have Fortune or the Wall St Journal 
conduct an independent investigation into what had happened 
during the steel crisis.
Kennedy's version of events was that although he had 
ordered the questioning of steel executives, it was the FBI, 
perhaps being deliberately heavy-handed to discredit him, 
who burst into the bosses' homes in the early hours of the 
morning in Gestapo-like raids.
The business address was scheduled for April 5 to the 
City Club of Cleveland. It was the only appointment Kennedy 
kept that day, the rest of his schedule having been 
cancelled due to the assassination of Martin Luther King the 
day before. At it, however, he dispensed with his prepared 
speech on the economy and spoke instead about violence.
Had he delivered his address on the economy, many of the 
businessmen might have been surprised at his neo-liberal 
ideas. His proposals for ghetto redevelopment were, of 
course, heavily dependent on private investment and tax 
breaks for businesses willing to help fight social problems. 
The war, too, was not overwhelmingly popular with the whole 
business community - it increased the tax burden 
significantly. However, most liberal businessmen at this 
time favoured the Republican Nelson Rockefeller, and Kennedy 
was unlikely to win many supporters from this group.
He did not have a strong grasp of macroeconomics, but 
then neither had President Kennedy (who had once remarked 
that asking Kennedys about economics was like asking nuns
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about sex). In fact, the Kennedys' only real political 
disagreement with each other during the administration 
(other than a minor skirmish over the building of a dam in 
Ghana) was over a cut in the rate of income tax.
At the start of the administration, the Attorney General 
was in favour of increasing income tax to "bring home to the 
American people...the fact that everybody was making a 
sacrifice".^" The President opposed the idea, as did most 
financial experts, and the event nurtured the idea that 
Robert Kennedy was a lightweight economist, prepared to mess 
with the economy for political points. (Speaking about the 
incident with Kennedy in 1964, John Bartlow Martin recalled: 
"I think at the time the general impression was that you 
were alone in this position".)^
The image was hard to shake off in business circles, and 
the Bedford-Stuyvesant project was regarded by some 
businessmen as little more than gimmickry. The Wall St 
Journal made it difficult for its readers to take the 
Kennedy candidacy seriously. "He must push the jet setters 
further into the background of his entourage. Many campaign 
aides are breathless young dilettantes with names like 
Pebble and Muffie, who create the impression that the 
Kennedy headquarters has replaced Acapulco as the place to 
be this year," it noted a month before Kennedy's first 
primary.
For all his efforts in attracting top industrialists to 
his campaign, by the end of May 1968 a national Citizens for 
Kennedy advertisement included only two significant business 
names: Jerold Hoffberger of the National Brewing Company,
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and an old friend of Joseph Kennedy Sr., and Harold 
Williams, President of Hunt Foods and Industries.
The business community was a low electoral priority for 
Kennedy during the primaries, however, and was unlikely to 
ever form part of any radical alternative coalition. No 
doubt many would have been distraught at the prospect of a 
Robert Kennedy but despite apocalyptic warnings would not 
have sabotaged the economy just to make life difficult for 
him. Business had, after all, put up with John Kennedy and 
(unless certain assassination conspiracy theories are to be 
believed) , had not prevented him from governing the country.
Traditional labour organisations probably had more to 
fear from a Robert Kennedy presidency. In dismantling the 
old New Deal structure to build an alternative Democratic 
structure, union bosses - along with some southern 
politicians - may have found themselves early casualties of 
Kennedy's new power base. Little love would have been lost 
on either side.
This chapter has tried to establish the nature of 
Kennedy's relations with American industry and labour 
movements. With a few notable exceptions, Robert Kennedy 
never repaired the damage to his relations with the union 
leadership inflicted by the 1950s corruption hearings. 
However, the decline in the power of the union bosses meant 
that by 1968 Kennedy could attract the votes of many union 
members despite the hesitancy of union barons.
Although he made sporadic attempts to improve relations 
with the business community, he remained widely distrusted
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in much of the industrial sector. His relentless badgering 
of the tobacco industry, for example, and his enthusiasm for 
government regulation of cigarette advertising, particularly 
worried business leaders that he did not share their views 
on economic policy.
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Ill - KENNEDY AND THE NEW LEFT
"George Wallace is Robert Kennedy in drag..." - Jerry 
Rubin.
WHEN Ginsberg visited Kennedy's office and was quizzed about 
his political links with the Black Power movement, the 
conversation lurched from LSD to religion to reconstructing 
the human universe, and finished with Ginsberg chanting the 
Hare Krishna mantra for the senator.
Kennedy, not much the wiser about youth politics, made 
his excuses and left, still wondering if a coalition of 
youth groups could be put together and, if so, how strong it 
would be. During the mid-60s, the demographic changes in 
America meant that there were more people aged under 35 than 
at any time in the nation's history.
Children born after the Second World War also enjoyed an 
unsurpassed material security which allowed them, claim some 
commentators, to indulge in self-conscious social and
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political behaviour. Whatever the reasons for the tumultuous 
changes in youth culture, there was no denying its existence 
or the possible impact it could have on the political 
agenda, as the universities in particular became 
increasingly politicised.
Kennedy's interest in this new generation was primarily 
political, and as the new leader of the radical left in his 
party would have to establish links with the larger youth 
organisations who were at the forefront of dissent. The new 
radicals, or "New Left", as they were usually referred to at 
this time, were remarkably different from those on the old 
left, who had emerged in the 1930s and either become New 
Dealers or communist sympathisers. The New Left was broadly 
anti-communist (although this distinction was difficult for 
many in the US government to understand) , anti-authoritarian 
and often unfocused in its political objectives.
As such, Kennedy could identify more easily with the New 
Left, with its evolving and uncertain policy direction, than 
with the old-style left, many of whom distrusted him anyway 
for his part in the labour racketeering hearings of the 
1950s.
In June 1964, the Socialist Youth Conference (made up 
broadly of university students, but decidedly old left in 
its traditions) voted on a resolution chastising Kennedy for 
his record as Attorney General. The motion failed (229 to 
202) but is revealing if compared with his relations to New 
Left groups at this time.^
These, of course, were early days in terms of Kennedy's 
links with the new radicals, but as Attorney General he had
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already had significant dealings with one of the two most 
important New Left organisations to emerge in the following 
years - the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee 
(SNCC). Born in 1960, SNCC had resisted being co-opted by 
any of the adult organisations like the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) , or the 
Committee for Racial Equality (CORE) which offered it 
financial support but were often perturbed by its 
controversial tactics.
SNCC had been involved in the sit-ins to highlight 
segregation in southern states, and later had injected 
impetus into the Freedom Ride movement at a time when it 
appeared the Freedom Riders would have to call off their 
attempt to integrate interstate bus terminals. As Attorney 
General, an exasperated Kennedy had been asked to ensure the 
safety of those involved in the Freedom Rides, and he had 
taken some steps to make sure that the buses progressed 
(including a famous call to "Mr Greyhound" to get a driver 
for one group of riders threatened with violence).
Nevertheless, Kennedy had regarded the Freedom Rides 
(with some justification) as publicity stunts designed to 
cause his brother's administration international 
embarrassment. Kennedy had urged SNCC to concentrate on 
voter registration for blacks in the southern states, 
instead of sensational media events. As Attorney General, he 
argued, he could afford them more vigorous backing if they 
concentrated on registration, as the federal role in such 
matters was much clearer, and hence more easily enforceable, 
than with the desegregation of public facilities. Voter
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registration drives also provided fewer embarrassing photo 
opportunities than, for instance, mobs stoning a bus.
SNCC did do a lot of voter registration work at this 
time, and were given significant backing by the Kennedy 
administration, which was often identified in the south with 
the SNCC radicals urging blacks to register. The Deputy 
Sheriff in Dawson, Georgia, interrogated SNCC activist Ralph 
Allen in 1963, and demanded:
"Did Bobby Kennedy send you?"
"Indirectly," replied Allen.^
SNCC's relationship with the Kennedy administration was 
far from one of mutual admiration, however, and during the 
March on Washington SNCC leader John Lewis was persuaded at 
the last minute to refrain from publicly criticising the 
administration's record on civil rights. Lewis represented 
the moderate wing of SNCC, however, and in May 1966 he lost 
the chairmanship of the organisation to the far more radical 
Stokely Carmichael. Carmichael was too extreme for 
Kennedy to deal with directly, but Kennedy appealed to much 
of Carmichael's political base, a fact Carmichael 
acknowledged. However, SNCC joined Kennedy in backing the 
grape-pickers at Delano, and (Carmichael apart) SNCC 
supporters would be an important part of any youth coalition 
sought by Kennedy. Another block in any new political 
framework would be the Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS). Described by Carl Oglesby, its president in 1965, 
as "the SNCC of the north", SDS was to prove the most 
influential youth group during the latter half of the 
decade, and is credited with organising huge anti-Vietnam
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War demonstrations.^ However, SDS was more than a 
single-issue movement. In its earlier years of 1963 and 
1964, the emphasis was on ghetto renewal and community 
action politics. Founded in Michigan in 1962, the SDS was 
based on the famous "Port Huron Statement", which eschewed 
the old materialist values of American capitalism, and 
declared "that work should involve incentives worthier than 
survival", and be creative and educative.
The Port Huron Statement attacked the alienation of the 
American workforce, and drew on the writings of C. Wright 
Mills to insists that "a new left must transform modern 
complexity into issues that can be understood and felt 
close-up by every human being....In a time of supposed 
prosperity, moral complacency and political manipulation, 
a new left cannot rely on only aching stomachs to be the 
engine for social reform.
Tom Hayden, SDS president in 1963, persuaded the leader 
of the Union of Auto Workers Walter Reuther to donate $5,000 
to the SDS ghetto projects. Reuther, it should be noted, 
was also the sort of union leader Kennedy regarded as 
important to an alternative Democratic coalition. Reuther 
represented links to the new and old left. He had broken 
from the old union networks, but had a tradition of 
radicalism stretching back to the 1930s, when he had visited 
the Soviet Union.
He had been a founder of the American for Democratic 
Action organisation in the late 1940s with liberals like 
Arthur Schlesinger and Reinhold Neihbur, and had himself 
been shot in an assassination attempt. Kennedy's personal
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links with Reuther went back to the labour racket hearings. 
Despite his associations with the old socialist factions, 
Reuther had maintained credibility with the emerging New 
Left, who regarded him as a different breed from the more 
traditional union bosses, and it was Reuther who interceded 
on the Kennedy administration's behalf to persuade Lewis to 
change his speech during the March on Washington.
The programmes Reuther's money funded for the SDS were 
not unlike those advocated by Kennedy in his urban renewal 
proposals. The money went to the Economic and Research 
Action Project (ERAP) in Newark, which Hayden described as 
"like a SNCC programme", and which encouraged participatory 
democracy and community action.^ Kennedy was one of the few 
national politicians who enjoyed significant credibility in 
SDS circles, and at least one ERAP activist worked for 
Kennedy's 1964 Senate campaign. Hayden notes that by 1967 
"the only politician who expressed an interest in what I was 
doing was Robert Kennedy", although Kennedy's interest in 
Hayden often centred on what sort of political links he 
could offer to other organisations.^
SDS saw itself as very different from the old leftist 
student organisations, and deliberately moved its 
headquarters away from the tribal feuds of the old left in 
New York and set up in Chicago. By 1965 the Vietnam War 
began to dominate the SDS agenda and national politics. A 
march organised by the group in April 1965 attracted 60,000 
demonstrators to Washington, and in June SNCC activist 
Julian Bond was elected to the Georgia state legislature on 
an anti-war platform. (Bond was denied taking his seat
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because of his stance on the war.)
In November, another SDS anti-war rally attracted tens 
of thousands to Washington, and in the following February 
Kennedy broke with the White House in calling for a 
coalition government in Vietnam. However, the anti-Vietnam 
War coalition was certainly not a majority at this time (or 
at any time before Kennedy's death), and Kennedy had to 
ensure that he was not too closely identified with the 
anti-war demonstrators. Once he had made his break with the 
Johnson administration, and claimed some of the radical 
ground to the left of the party, he fell into a long silence 
about the issue and did not speak out again as forcefully 
for another year.
Elsewhere in the country, meanwhile, the SDS and other 
New Left organisations were trying to mobilise opposition to 
the war on a variety of fronts. Demonstrations were fine 
for politicising the public, but did not appear to be 
changing policy. During the summer of 1966, Bob Scheer, 
editor of Ramparts. organised an electoral campaign for the 
Democratic Party nomination to Congress in the San Francisco 
Bay Area. He won 45% of votes on a radical platform firmly 
opposing the war. Others also stood as peace candidates 
during the mid-term elections, but without registering the 
sort of success Scheer achieved.
Moreover, the anti-war policy, though potentially 
powerful, was not enough on which Kennedy could base his 
national constituency. The issue, and with it his political 
base, could disappear within a week, and he was careful not 
to ally himself solely with those New Leftists opposing the
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war.
The poverty, or black, issue, provided some scope for 
relations with the new activists, and in ideological terms 
they were more receptive to his ideas for private capital 
helping to renew urban centres than the old-style socialist 
left would have been. Of course, not all Americans under 
30, or even the majority of students, were New Leftists. 
However, it was New Left philosophy which was becoming 
increasingly influential on campuses throughout the 
mid-60s.
The relatively conservative National Student Association 
(NSA), for instance, which represented the respectable face 
of student politics, passed resolutions at its 1965 
convention for a halt to offensive action in Vietnam, the 
admission of China to the UN and the establishment of a 
national police force to protect civil rights.
While NSA students were eventually drawn to the McCarthy 
campaign in 1968, Kennedy's appeal appears to have skipped 
over much of this moderate faction, and he was to find a 
surprising amount of support in the more radical youth 
elements. However, one radical New Leftist who was not 
impressed by Kennedy's image of developing radicalism was 
Bob Scheer. "He's been raised in a traditional, political 
bag, and he was fundamentally a hack, " he noted, but 
conceded that Kennedy "could be awed by radicals".^
Scheer wrote a lengthy and critical profile of Kennedy 
for Ramparts in February 1967, which warned New Leftists 
not to trust the senator. "What Bobby learned during the 
course of the [1964] campaign was that it was possible to
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gain liberal support without losing the other; for while 
'bosses' care about the substance of power, liberals remain 
suckers for mere rhetoric."® Scheer was determined not to 
believe the hype: "The Kennedy people have raised co-option 
to an art form. At hearings of his subcommittee, his tours 
through New York's ghettoes, and during speeches before 
dozens of college audiences, they have hooked onto the mood 
of crisis and, as with everything else, have come to use 
it. "*
However, while Scheer accused Kennedy of relying on 
"standard Cold War mythology" in foreign affairs, Scheer 
himself was guilty of standard class war mentality in 
criticising the plans for fighting poverty. "On relying on 
private investment as a panacea for Latin American problems, 
he is clearly to the right of the New Deal," he declared, 
not grasping that Kennedy's "hack" background enabled him 
to break out of the old right v. left equation.
Andrew Kopkind, writing for Ramparts during the '68 
primaries, made the same mistake of viewing Kennedy in the 
context of old ideology, but this time came down admiringly 
on the senator's side: "The Kennedy men have been interested 
in reorganising Democratic politics ..., but they put little 
stock in the peace movement as their agent. Rather, they 
favour the 'urban' route; the angry and oppressed masses in 
the cities are a tougher force than the suburban [anti-war] 
SANE-niks. The Kennedys don't forget their Marxism.
Both Scheer and Kopkind got near to the point, but missed 
it. Kennedy's overriding motivation was neither to the 
right of the New Deal nor Marxism. He was trying to put
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together a vaguely liberal (and the vaguer the better, as 
it would exclude fewer participants) to form a national 
constituency.He had severe image problems with some of the 
older leftists (I.F. Stone and James Baldwin both backed 
Keating in the Senate race) , but the New Left liberalism 
offered him the chance to develop a new base on the left 
without relying on the old unions and former New York 
~socialists^rt~waS”the-very“lack-of—ideology in the New Left 
which attracted him to them, and them to him.
New Left leader Abbie Hoffman, for instance, acknowledged 
Kennedy's attraction for many radicals. In December 1967, 
Hoffman founded the Youth International Party (Yippie!), 
designed to obstruct the Democratic Convention in Chicago 
the following summer. It was part of a wider New Left 
movement, which included organisations like the National 
Mobilisation Committee to End the War in Vietnam, to 
protest at the convention.
The New Left rallying cry from the end of 1967 was "On 
to Chicago", and various schemes (including the 
"nomination" of a pig) were planned to create disturbances 
in the city. Hoffman explained how Yippie! drew support from 
many of those supporting Kennedy's presidential campaign. 
"Bobby, there was the real threat. A direct challenge to 
the theatre-in-the-streets, a challenge to the charisma of 
YippieI"
When Kennedy announced his candidacy in March, "it was 
no contest," says Hoffman. "When young longhairs told you 
they'd heard that Bobby turned on, you knew Yippie! was 
really in trouble
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By the end of May, Hoffman's constituency had been so 
severely eroded by the Kennedy campaign that it was 
disbanded. After Kennedy's death, it was resurrected, and 
duly caused chaos in Chicago. Kennedy's appeal to the 
Yippie! constituency was apparently based largely on emotion 
{ "a challenge to the charisma of Yippie!..."). As with his 
campaigning style in black areas, Kennedy appears to have 
relied heavily on style, leading Scheer to-warn in-Ramparts_ 
that Kennedy "could easily co-opt the prevailing dissent 
without delivering to it ... providing the illusion of 
dissent without its substance".^
Yippie! co-founder Jerry Rubin was similarly unimpressed 
with Kennedy's reliance on glamour: "The right-wing menace 
exists but it's not George Wallace. It's the Kennedy 
liberals....George Wallace is Robert Kennedy in drag."^^
In his 1967 book To Seek a Newer World, which was to 
become his presidential campaign manifesto, Kennedy's 
opening chapter is on youth, and in an emotional attempt to 
claim his brother's charisma by aligning himself with the 
martyred image of the dead president, Kennedy refers to 
"the story of Moses, who brought his people within sight of 
the promised land and then dies, leaving to Joshua the 
leadership in achieving goals that both completely shared".
Similarly direct appeals were made to youthful audiences 
throughout the presidential campaign, with a student 
audience in Kansas being told that they were "the most 
important generation in history". Nevertheless, the chapter 
on youth in Kennedy's manifesto is primarily concerned with 
outlining the part young people could play in a new
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coalition. He cites the example of the radical Proves in 
Amsterdam who stood for municipal elections with some 
success, and whose ideas were incorporated into mainstream 
politics.
Kennedy pointed out that the old left had little to offer 
the new generation, and that liberals must be prepared to 
adapt to the New Left agenda. "Nor, painful as it may be for 
liberals to acknowledge, are these young people enchanted 
with liberal institutions....They think labour has grown 
sleek and bureaucratic with power... occasionally even 
corrupt and exploitative, a force not for change, but for 
the status quo," he explained.^®
The tone of the chapter is one of Kennedy interpreting 
the younger generation's grievances for the adult world. In 
a argument, which is peppered with quotations from Dylan, 
Lennon and the radical Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, 
Kennedy appears to offer himself as a go-between between 
the young dissenters and the older voters, just as he often 
presented himself to white audiences as a person who 
understood black frustrations, and could deal with them.
Traditional liberals were often among the most suspicious 
of the New Left. The radicals, after all, threatened liberal 
symbols like the universities, and attacked working-class 
heroes like Richard Daley. The tension between the old and 
new liberals who supported Kennedy was evident during his 
Senate career, and was exacerbated during his presidential 
campaign.
Traditional liberal Arthur Schlesinger remains bitter 
towards the New Left. "If you look at the leaders of the New
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Left, where the hell are they?" he said in 1985. "They're 
selling real estate or they're on Wall Street like Jerry 
Rubin, or they're in the State Assembly in California [Tom 
Hayden]. I mean, these weren't highly principled figures. 
These were opportunistic figures...none of them I know is 
a New Leftist today. I think it was an ephemeral 
movement.... [Adam] Walinsky [Kennedy Senate aide and 
speechwriter] was bitter on-the left and now he's bitter on 
the right. . . ".
Kennedy faced difficulties in trying to join the old and 
new leftists in any sort of coalition, let alone putting 
them together to work with more traditionally hostile 
elements, like blue-collar whites. Nevertheless, he kept on 
searching out New Left ideas to incorporate into his new 
agenda, and in February 1967 met with Tom Hayden and 
another New Leftist, Staughton Lynd before delivering his 
major speech on Vietnam. At the end of the meeting, Kennedy 
said he was going on to have dinner with two liberals from 
the old school, Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith, and 
that Hayden and Lynd were welcome to carry on the discussion 
there. Both declined. "I just had no desire to become part 
of that circle of intellectuals, because I didn't feel I 
belonged there," remembered Lynd.
As 1968 approached, however, Kennedy's links with the New 
Left became stronger. He overcame revelations in early 1967 
that as Attorney General he had approved CIA subsidies to 
the NSA and other "moderate" student organisations designed 
to counter the activities of communist and other radical 
student groups (which presumably included the SDS).
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By the time of the 1968 election many NSA members 
preferred McCarthy, while the more radical student 
elements, like those found in the SDS, supported Kennedy. 
The NSA membership, although broadly against the war, 
tended to be involved with local anti-Vietnam protests 
rather than national demonstrations.
McCarthy's much-vaunted appeal to disaffected youth was, 
according to one study of the New Hampshire primary, 
confined "to quieter students, rather than radical 
demonstrators".^’ Only a minority of McCarthy's student 
volunteers had taken part in any of the major anti-war 
marches, found Sidney Hyman in his study of Youth in 
Politics. In fact, in a study of 800 McCarthy volunteers in 
the New Hampshire primary, it was found that the young 
weren't represented any more than any other age group, with 
as many volunteers aged between 50 and 55 as between 20 and
25 .^ °
The idea of a McCarthy children's crusade was rooted in 
media hype, and from the initial press reports to come out 
of New Hampshire one particular weekend in January, when 
students were heavily represented among the volunteers. 
Kennedy, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly 
associated with the more extreme elements in the New Left 
(or "the beards" as he called them).
In a confidential FBI memo dated July 20, 1968, an
un-named agent reports "that it was rumoured prior to the 
assassination of Robert F. Kennedy that substantial sums of 
'Kennedy money' were given to Tom Hayden and Renee Davis, 
both affiliated with the National Mobilisation Committee to
96
End the War in Vietnam, to create demonstrations at the 
National Democratic Convention, August 1968".^
The FBI report continues: These demonstrations, funded 
by 'Kennedy money' were to be directed against President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, and for Senator Kennedy....a large 
meeting was called at an unknown lake outside Chicago, 
Illinois for the purpose of planning these demonstrations.
Source related one ---------  [name deleted by the FBI]
co-ordinated the invitations to this conference, and made 
free airline tickets available to various groups, through 
Hayden and Davis"
No doubt there were elements in the FBI willing to 
believe Kennedy was engaged in subversive operations, but 
there is no better example of how far Kennedy had come 
during his Senate years than in the existence of this 
document: he was on the CIA's side in 1963 in countering 
the threat of groups like the SDS, but five years later he 
was suspected of being in cahoots with their leaders to 
disrupt the Democratic Convention.
Although it would be an exaggeration to imply that 
Kennedy was very close to the SDS on many policy matters, 
he did respond to the sorts of concerns they expressed 
probably better than any other national politician 
(including McCarthy). He was not, however, in favour of a 
unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam, and did not (overtly, 
at least), share the hippies' advocacy of free love and 
drugs (although New Left historian and Kennedy admirer Jack 
Newfield did point out that during Senate hearings on drugs 
Kennedy "was less tough on the pro-LSD witnesses than was
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his younger brother")
In a piece for The Nation in November 1966, Newfield also 
declared that while Kennedy was "not an advocate of 
reforming our repressive narcotics and abortion laws, he is 
not a headline-hunting crusader against the beard and 
b e a t s W h i l e  Kennedy himself could not ever accurately 
be described as having been a New Leftist, his emerging 
liberalism incorporated much of the style, and content, of 
what the younger radicals were saying.
In a standard campaign speech delivered dozens of times 
at stops in small towns during he 1968 presidential 
primaries, Kennedy told voters they would "find neither 
national purpose nor personal satisfaction in a mere 
continuation of economic progress, in an endless amassing 
of worldly goods...the gross national product includes air 
pollution and advertising for cigarettes, and ambulances to 
clear our highways of carnage... it does not allow for the 
health of our families, the quality of their education or 
the joy of their play.. . " Hayden found the speech 
startling "in its resemblance to Port Huron", and with 
several other leading figures on the New Left (including 
writer Pete Hamill) went to work for Kennedy in the 
California primary.
Many planned to work for Kennedy in the New York primary, 
scheduled for June 18, which of course he never entered. The 
last words Kennedy ever spoke were the New Left slogan "on 
to Chicago", where any chance of coalition between old and 
new liberals eventually died. If Kennedy had made it to 
Chicago, even without winning the nomination, the split
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might have been avoided, but as it was - with old left hero 
Mayor Daley ordering his police to attack the new radicals 
- the wound proved mortal.
Hayden and Hoffman were among eight New Leftists tried 
inciting violence at the convention, in a trial FBI Director 
J. Edgar Hoover regarded as an opportunity "to seriously 
disrupt and curtail the activities of the New Left" 
Humphrey proved an unattractive candidate to the New Left, 
and in 1972 George McGovern tried so hard to appeal to the 
new liberal vote that he could not carry the old labour 
left.
Kennedy, for all his misunderstanding of the hippie 
subculture, might have brought the New Left into mainstream 
liberalism as part of an electoral and governing coalition. 
No-one else came close.
In this chapter, Kennedy's response to the rise of the 
New Left has been analysed. By exploring the political 
muscle of the New Left, Kennedy demonstrated an awareness of 
its potential before most of his Congressional colleagues. 
Realising that the New Left was not a part of the old 
international socialist movement, nor simply a new 
generation of the Old Left, he attracted some of their most 
radical elements.
Although this attraction was base primarily on his anti­
war position, it also relied on his personal charisma and 
his youthful image.
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IV - FOREIGN POLICY: THE WHITE HOUSE EXPERIENCE
"The Americans . . . had, on the whole, been open and 
candid with us, especially Robert Kennedy." - Premier 
Khrushchev, after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
DURING THE Senate vote on January 21 1961 to confirm Robert 
Kennedy as Attorney General, several senators expressed 
reservations about his lack of experience for the job. 
Although none actually voted against the appointment, a 
handful made long speeches pointing out that he had never 
practised as a lawyer. Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, 
the Republican leader on the Judiciary Committee, joined 
with several colleagues in recording that he had received a 
large amount of mail urging him to oppose the nomination, 
and also reminded the Senate that Robert Kennedy, if 
appointed, "must advise the President not only on domestic 
problems, but on international problems as well".^
In the following three years, Robert Kennedy would become
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more involved in the execution of U.S. foreign policy than 
any other Attorney General before or since. His influence on 
foreign policy increased throughout the Kennedy 
administration, and his role would develop far beyond the 
constitutional boundaries of advising the president on 
foreign affairs to developing major initiatives on his own, 
and sometimes made key decisions on international affairs 
without the President's knowledge.
By the time of his brother's assassination in 1963, 
Robert Kennedy was in effect deputy president in many areas 
of foreign policy, and on occasions when his brother was 
absent actually took presidential decisions on critical 
international events. His familiarity with world affairs on 
becoming Attorney General in 1961 was limited, although it 
was probably greater than his knowledge of many aspects of 
the law.
An early initiation into the world of foreign policy 
began at the age of 13, when in 1938 his father was 
appointed Ambassador to the Court of St James. The 
appointment turned out to be a disastrous one for Joseph 
Kennedy's political career, as his reluctance to urge 
American entry into the Second World War branded him an 
anti-Semitic appeaser.
Whether the streak of dissent on US foreign policy which 
Robert Kennedy was to reveal in his last years was rooted in 
his father's experience is difficult to assess, although as 
a senator 30 years later Robert Kennedy would defend the 
rights of those opposed to US involvement in war.
With his father's policy discredited by the attack on
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Pearl Harbour and American entry into the war, Robert 
Kennedy's international education was halted, and his next 
venture abroad was a tourist trip to Latin America as a 
reward for his work in helping John Kennedy win a 
Congressional seat in 1946.
The trip apparently made little impression on him 
politically, however, and it was only in 1948, when his 
father sent him on an educational mission to Europe and the 
Middle East that he first began to formulate his own serious 
ideas on international politics. Thanks to his father's 
contacts, Robert Kennedy left America armed with impressive 
letters of introduction from a number of influential 
figures, and an accreditation from the Boston Post to act as 
a foreign correspondent.
In Israel when the British mandate ended, Kennedy (now 
23) was arrested by police, blindfolded and taken for 
interrogation. In dispatches to his Boston readers he 
dutifully blamed the British for the mess in the Middle 
East, before travelling to Europe, where the threat of war 
over Berlin and Czechoslovakia appeared imminent.
Kennedy had by no means become an instant expert on 
international affairs during the trip, but was no longer a 
novice, and another such fact-finding trip three years later 
proved significantly influential on his thinking in later 
years, as impressions he formed with John Kennedy in 1951 
shaped many of their attitudes to foreign policy matters 
when they took over the White House a decade later.
His unfavourable opinion of Nehru, for example, was made 
during the trip in '51, and remained unchanged ten years
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later. Speaking in 1967, Robert Kennedy remembered how 
"Nehru just talked to my sister Pat and directed everything 
to her. My brother always remembered that ... [JFK] really 
hated Nehru. Nehru was really rude to us when we went to 
India in 1 9 5 1".^
More significant, though, was the impression the brothers 
developed about struggles for national liberation. Robert 
Kennedy was shocked on his '51 trip at how little American 
diplomatic staff new about "the people", and his own disdain 
for official diplomatic channels during his Senate years can 
be traced back to this experience.
The Kennedys' evaluation (and it can be safely assumed 
that the brothers' views coincided so closely to be
considered a shared evaluation) was largely based on their 
experience in Saigon, where Robert Kennedy noted that the 
French were "greatly hated", and he blamed the Americans for 
not insisting "on definite political reforms by the French 
towards the natives as prerequisites to any aid. As it
stands now we are becoming more and more involved in the war
to a point where we can't back out".^
Although the assessment is not without irony when 
considered against the Kennedy administration's policy on 
Vietnam, this early judgement reveals much about John and 
Robert Kennedy's foreign policy principles. These ideas can 
be found in the Alliance for Progress, and the various 
initiatives the administration undertook in Africa.
This appreciation that it was in America's best interests 
to identify itself with those agitating for 
self-determination did not dawn on many other political
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figures until much later in the century, and not all have 
grasped it yet. However, this belief (though not always 
carried out in action) remained the most positive aspect of 
the Kennedys ' foreign policy for the remainder of both their 
lives, and made them heroes in a variety of unlikely places 
around the world.
The 1951 trip was set up (again with their father's help) 
to promote John Kennedy as a foreign policy expert and 
enhance his credentials for his Senate campaign the 
following year. Following his victory over Henry Cabot Lodge 
in 1952, John Kennedy's career in the Senate was generally 
marked by its moderation and blandness. The Senate for John 
(and Robert) was always going to be a platform from which to 
launch an assault on the presidency, and throughout his 
eight years John Kennedy was careful not to make enemies by 
championing controversial campaigns - except once.
His only major break with mainstream political thinking 
during his whole Congressional career was over national 
independence for Algeria. At a time when Washington was 
trying to maintain a discreet silenced over the war against 
the French in Algeria, John Kennedy accused the Eisenhower 
administration of helping France continue a repressive 
colonial war and refusing to recognise legitimate Algerian 
claims for self-determination.
In July 1957 he called on the US to "redouble its efforts 
to earn the respect and friendship of nationalist leaders^". 
This belief, rooted less in ideological sympathy with the 
Algerians than with basic common sense on what was best for 
US interests, surfaced in Robert Kennedy's decision several
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years later to receive Eduardo Mondlane in the Attorney 
General's office. Mondlane was head of Frelimo, the 
liberation movement in Mozambique which eventually threw out 
the Portuguese to gain independence, and Kennedy's 
invitation was regarded in some quarters as an insult to 
Portugal.
It would not be fair to suggest that the Kennedys were 
secretly battling for the overthrow of colonial governments 
during their time in the White House, and Nelson Mandela was 
originally arrested, it should be remembered, after a 
tip-off from the CIA during the Kennedy administration. 
Nevertheless, John Kennedy's speech on Algeria was at least 
a recognition of the validity of one liberation struggle, 
and his time on the Subcommittee for African Affairs in the 
Senate presumably expanded his understanding of 
international politics during the 1950s.
Robert Kennedy, meanwhile, was not generally involved 
with international affairs during this time. During his 
brother's Senate career, Robert remained in government 
service, working for various Senate committees investigating 
the Teamsters' Union and organised crime.
He had also spent the six months following John Kennedy's 
election to the Senate working for Senator Joe McCarthy as 
assistant counsel for the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, when he was given a foreign-related task: to 
research the trade carried on by US allies with Communist 
China. By the time of his appointment as Attorney General, 
Kennedy's knowledge of international affairs was based on a 
spell as an ambassador's son, a short foray into the navy.
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his research for McCarthy on Chinese trade patterns, and a 
couple of trips around the world.
Despite these limitations, he had helped to engineer his 
brother's victory in an election which had been dominated in 
a large part by the Cold War, and which candidate was best 
able to deal with it. It was not crucial to global security 
in 1961 that the US appoint an Attorney General who was an 
expert on international affairs, but in his unique position 
as deputy president, Robert Kennedy's influence over world 
events was far greater than the framers of the US 
Constitution, or even Everett Dirksen, could have predicted.
By the early 1960s the US found itself taking over 
commitments for which it was ill-prepared. Its decision to 
enter the Second World War proved more far-reaching than did 
the decision to enter the First. At the end of the war, the 
US found itself outright winners - its country's 
infrastructure was intact, its enemies defeated, and much of 
the world looked to it for economic survival.
However, by taking up responsibilities which Britain and 
other colonial powers found they could no longer afford, the 
US soon made itself the most unpopular country in the world. 
It didn't add to its popularity rating by backing oppressive 
regimes in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East to 
protect its economic interests.
The bankrupt colonial powers were more than willing to 
cede their traditional spheres of influence to the new world 
power which, during the 1950s, appeared militarily and 
politically unassailable. However, centuries of diplomatic 
experience in dealing with the Third World could not be so
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easily transferred from the European powers to the US, and 
American unfamiliarity with local concerns in Vietnam, 
Israel and dozens of other countries around the world was to 
prove disastrous.
For example, when British Prime Minister Atlee refused 
to play any part in the partitioning of Palestine after the 
war, he not only "deftly exchanged the United States for 
Britain as the most disliked Power in the Middle East," as 
Dean Acheson observed, but also ensured that Washington came 
to dominate the region.^ Washington, however, with only a 
handful of years on the world scene, stood like a child next 
to the European grandmasters of geopolitical diplomacy and 
too often revealed its lack of sophistication in displays of 
Manichaeic policy-making.
By the '50s American foreign policy experts still lacked 
the intelligence-gathering agencies necessary to police the 
world, and its institutions were ravaged by a Red Scare, 
itself a result of failing to understand the motives of 
foreign governments. It was not as though the old powers had 
never made mistakes, of course, as evidenced by two world 
wars in 30 years, but the US made some staggering foreign 
policy judgements in this period. When Frank Bender, the 
CIA's chief expert on Latin American Communism met Fidel 
Castro in 1959 for a three-hour interview, he enthused: 
"Castro is not only not a Communist; he is a strong 
anti-Communist fighter".*
It was against this background that the Kennedys entered 
the White House. The American public, indirectly empowered 
to solve many of the problems of the rest of the world, had
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little understanding of international affairs. John 
Kennedy's Catholic religion had featured significantly in 
the 1960 campaign, primarily because of the electorate's 
xenophobia.
It was not because John Kennedy believed in 
transubstantiation or the Immaculate Conception which 
bothered much of the public, but that he might somehow be 
open to manipulation by the Vatican. President Kennedy's 
inaugural address was a self-conscious acceptance of the 
US's new role in world affairs. Inexperienced, like most of 
his fellow Americans, in international affairs, he promised 
too much and understood too little.
His new Attorney General, it should be added, understood 
even less, but was immediately involved in appointing 
representatives of the US government around the world. 
Although he had never negotiated with a foreign government, 
Robert Kennedy, now 36, spent his first days in cabinet 
advising his brother on major ambassadorial appointments.
In an oral history programme recorded the year before 
Robert Kennedy was killed, he was asked about various 
aspects of his involvement in foreign policy questions 
during the Kennedy administration. "It is interesting to 
look back on all these things going on, " he said. "I was 
involved in more things than I thought".^
The extent of Robert Kennedy's influence on world events 
during those years in remarkable by any standards, 
especially in the light of his credentials. In the oral 
history, he reveals that before he was asked to become 
Attorney General, President Kennedy offered him the
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ambassadorship to Moscow. ("I didn't think it was a good 
idea," he noted)
Within days, however, he was being asked for his advice 
on who would be the best person to send to the Soviet Union 
in his place, and for suggestions to fill other 
ambassadorial vacancies. Robert Kennedy, in 1967, remembered 
those ambassadors who were appointed because they were 
colleagues of the President, and those who were appointed 
because they were colleagues of his own. "Then a good number 
of them I knew. So, if there were a particular problem. I'd 
have correspondence with them, whether it's Jim Wine [then 
Ambassador to the Ivory Coast], or Bill Attwood [Ambassador 
to Guinea], or [William P.] Mahoney in Ghana, and some of 
the others...".*
Within weeks of the Kennedy administration, it was clear 
that Robert Kennedy was not bound by the traditional 
constitutional limits on an Attorney General. He was the 
President's brother, and so could apparently roam at will 
into other areas of responsibility and decision-making 
(although where he stood on the question of accountability 
if, for instance, a decision he made outside his remit 
turned out to be a mistake is not clear).
At times, it appears as though Robert Kennedy actually 
thought of himself as an alternative president when his 
brother could not be reached. In May 1961, President 
Trujillo, the Dominican Republic's president, was 
assassinated, sparking off a major crisis in the region.
President Kennedy was in Paris, on his way to Vienna at 
the time, and so Robert Kennedy, in Washington, immediately
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assumed the mantle of the President. "...Nobody seemed to be 
doing anything," he remembered in 1964. "...I guess I had
the major responsibility of trying to work out some 
plans. . . .We moved the fleet in closer.
Robert Kennedy's memories of how the incident developed 
become even more revealing, as he practically claims to have 
been the President during the time when John Kennedy was in 
Europe. John Bartlow Martin, interviewing Robert Kennedy in 
Virginia in April 1964, asks if the Kennedy administration 
knew in advance of the Trujillo assassination.
Martin: "I don't think they'd plan to assassinate a chief 
of state without telling the President."
Kennedy: "No. That's what I think. They wouldn't have
done it without telling me."^ [my italics]
However good the quality of advice Robert Kennedy gave 
to the President, he was not empowered by the Constitution 
to think of himself as President, and on another occasion - 
in dealing with Castro for the return of prisoners captured 
during the Bay of Pigs - Robert Kennedy was apparently 
negotiating with the Cuban leader without John Kennedy's 
knowledge. This is not meant to suggest, of course, that 
President Kennedy minded in the least that his brother was 
willing to bear any burden in foreign policy-making, but it 
does raise some worrying questions about accountability and 
the potential power of an unelected official in cabinet.
The Trujillo episode, where Robert Kennedy took charge 
in Washington, was presumably a strong reaction to what had 
happened the previous month, when the Kennedy administration 
suffered its greatest embarrassment at the Bay of Pigs. The
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Kennedys thought they had been led into the disastrous
invasion by experts who were badly informed, and John 
Kennedy's instant reaction when news began to reach him that 
the assault on Cuba had failed was to tell his assistant 
Kenneth O'Donnell: "I should have had Bobby in on this from 
the start.
After the April debacle, Bobby was in on every major 
foreign policy decision President Kennedy made. After the 
Bay of Pigs, "I then became involved on every major and all 
the international questions," he recalled in 1964.^^
The Bay of Pigs invasion was a classic example of the
Kennedys' thinking on how best to cope with Communist
revolutions. They had, after all, learned in 1951 that 
struggles for national liberation could be achieved by 
guerrillas operating out of small units in unconventional 
warfare.
To combat this, the Kennedys, and especially Robert, were 
drawn to the idea of counter-insurgency techniques. This 
fitted well with the athletic but intellectual image of the 
administration. Robert Kennedy was particularly associated 
with the elite counter-insurgents, the Green Berets - top 
soldiers who would be able to compete with guerrillas on 
their own terms and on their own terrain. The Kennedys 
encouraged Third World military experts - even ambassadors 
- to read up on local guerrilla techniques. John Kennedy 
urged his generals to read Guevara and Mao. The Green Berets 
were the American answer to the Communist guerrillas and 
were regarded with a special awe in the administration.
They were viewed, as David Halberstam notes, "as
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brilliant, young, great physical specimens in their green 
berets, swinging through the trees, you know, arm in arm, 
and speaking six languages, including Chinese and Russian, 
and who had Ph.Ds in history and literature, and ate snake 
meat at night"
Robert Kennedy was much taken with the idea of the Green 
Berets, and even when their military effectiveness was 
largely discredited a few years later, and they had failed 
to make any significant headway in Vietnam, he still kept a 
green beret behind his chair in his Senate office. The idea 
that American soldiers, if they tried hard enough, could 
eventually become guerrillas, living off the land just as 
the enemy did, was a fatally flawed one. The Bay of Pigs 
proved that no matter how well trained the troops, they 
could not function without local support.
The difference between guerrillas, who fight for an cause 
which they believe is long-term and political, and 
commandoes, who are fight for a medium-term military 
solution, or for money or prestige, is a fundamental one. 
The Kennedys, like many US military experts at the time, 
apparently believed that a commando could fight on equal 
terms with a revolutionary if he mastered the 
revolutionary's language and terrain.
However, by failing to recognise the crucial difference 
in motivation between the Green Berets and, say, the Viet 
Cong, John and Robert Kennedy typified American inexperience 
in such matters. Guerrilla warfare did not begin with 
Guevara or Mao. It had its roots (as the Kennedys should 
certainly have known) with Michael Collins' new-look IRA in
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the early 1920s. Collins' "flying columns" worked in small 
units in Irish cities and rural areas, and scored 
small-scale, but psychologically damaging, military 
victories against the British.
Collins' techniques were later taken up by Shamir and 
others agitating for Israeli independence. Although the 
Americans experienced added problems of a tropical climate 
in trying to combat enemies in Latin America and Asia during 
the 1960s, these were not problems which, if overcome, would 
have enabled the Americans to police the regions 
effectively.
American foreign policy experts apparently believed that 
American failures were more a problem of weather conditions 
than ideology. The Kennedys, at least, realised that a 
hearts and minds battle was eventually decisive, and made 
some attempt - through the Alliance for Progress - to 
counter the desire for Communist revolution in the first 
place.
At least in dealing with Latin America the Kennedys (and 
it would appear that on Latin American issues it was Robert 
as much as John who formulated official policy) could draw 
on a tradition of experience within the State Department. 
Unlike the rest of the world, Latin America was not 
unchartered territory for the new superpower. It had 
regarded the region as its legitimate sphere of interest for 
well over a century, and the famous Monroe Doctrine 
(enunciated by President Monroe in 1823 when he warned 
European powers that any expansion in Latin America would be 
regarded as dangerous to US interests) still proved the
114
basis for Washington's special interest in its southern 
neighbours.
During the Second World War, relations between the US and 
Latin America proved strong. In an effort to combat Nazi 
infiltration into the region. President Roosevelt had acted 
as an extremely friendly neighbour, and had successfully 
avoided any dangerous instability in Central or South 
America through a series of non-intervention pacts he signed 
with countries in the region. The Alliance for Progress was 
an extension of this tradition. The Kennedys, in sharp 
contrast to their successors, thought that America's self 
interest was best served by friendly liberal democracies in 
Latin America, rather than pliant but vulnerable dictators 
(although the Kennedys were not romantic enough to prefer a 
Communist regime over a pliant tyrant).
"I think I might have gotten more involved in Latin 
America myself...in the second term, anyway," Robert Kennedy 
said in 1964, although between 1961 and 1963 he had already 
been fairly heavily involved - in the Trujillo episode, in 
the immediate aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion and, 
most famously, in the Cuban missile crisis.
In the days after the Bay of Pigs operation, it was 
Robert Kennedy who took charge of getting the prisoners 
taken by Castro back to the US, and organised for various 
ransoms to be paid. This, although a delicate job, was not 
a crucial one in terms of power or world security. However, 
there is some evidence to show that his actions on the 
initiative were unilateral and had not been cleared with the 
President (again, this is not to suggest that JFK
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disapproved of the plans, but merely serves to indicate the 
extent of Robert Kennedy's licence on foreign policy).
As Arthur Schlesinger records, the Attorney General 
"proposed an exchange of $28 million worth of agricultural 
products for the prisoners. This was peculiarly his 
initiative. On the evening of April 5 [1962], I noted in my 
journal,'the President called me at 7 o'clock to find out 
what the Food-for-Prisoners deal is all about. This is an 
operation which ...is strongly backed by Bobby ....We had 
all assumed that the President knew about it, but apparently 
no-one had told him' ".
Within months of the Bay of Pigs disaster, the Kennedy 
administration set about re-establishing American 
credentials in the region, with a meeting at Punta del Este 
in Uruguay, which formally established the Alliance for 
Progress.
Robert Kennedy's involvement in the Alliance later 
provided him with his first grounds for attacking the 
Johnson administration, and during his Senate years provided 
an opportunity bettered only by Vietnam to distance himself 
from the new President, and suggest that Johnson had 
betrayed the ideals of the Kennedy administration.
The Alliance for Progress reflected the Kennedys' ideas 
for a liberal alternative to Communism which, if it could 
not be achieved through the electoral process, could be 
helped along with counter-insurgency techniques. It was a 
series of trade agreements and objectives in which the 
participants recognised the need for democratic reform. US 
military aid to countries which shared these objectives of
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reform would be increased, while military aid to repressive 
regimes would be cut.
By the end of his career, Robert Kennedy's position on
Latin American affairs had shifted considerably from the
early days, and many of his ideas in 1967 and 1968 were to
prove years ahead of their time, but in 1961 he believed
that the Communist threat could be countered by an immediate 
alleviation of poverty and the promise of democratic 
elections.
These were not ignoble ideas in themselves, but getting 
Latin American dictatorships to agree to elections proved 
difficult, for in the end the dictators knew that, if faced 
with a choice between supporting them or risking a Communist 
overthrow, Washington would put its support behind the 
anti-Communist, regardless of his government's record on 
poverty or human rights.
Che Guevara called the initiative "an alliance of one 
millionaire and 20 beggars", and it was inevitable that such 
a Washington-led proposal would be weighted heavily towards 
US interests.However, the Kennedy administration believed 
that stable democracies in the region were in America's best 
interests, and for a while it appeared as though the 
Alliance could bring about significant improvements in 
standards of living for many Latin Americans. During the 
Kennedy administration, the 2:1 proportion of military to 
humanitarian aid to the region was reversed, so that by 1963 
twice as much humanitarian aid was being sent as military 
aid, a trend which would not be carried on during the 
Johnson years.
117
By March 1964, the new Johnson appointment for the 
region, Thomas Mann, told a meeting of US ambassadors to 
Latin America that they should not continue in their 
criticisms of human rights in the countries where they 
worked. President Kennedy's policies, he said, showed how 
fruitless it was to impose democracy on Latin America, and 
he urged greater emphasis on national security interests.
An early test of the Alliance came with the assassination 
of Trujillo. After the overthrow of the dictator (with or 
without US complicity) , Washington was convinced that it had 
to ensure prompt elections for its policy to maintain 
credibility.
In December 1962 Juan Bosch, a left wing reformer, was 
duly elected in the first free elections in the Dominican 
Republic for 30 years. The election's success relied on 
substantial US political and economic involvement in the 
process, and proved a good advertisement for JFK's policy 
for the region.
When Washington received reports from the US ambassador 
in the summer of '62 that the "government has lost control 
of the streets to the Communists", who threatened to disrupt 
the elections, the President asked Robert Kennedy to 
organise a special counter-insurgency unit to sort out the 
problem.
The Attorney General immediately dispatched two American 
policemen who had been trained at one of the
counter-insurgency schools to Santo Domingo, and order was 
restored. "The same [happened] in Venezuela," Robert Kennedy 
remembered two years later. "They sent three fellows down to
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Venezuela [to restore order]. It's incredible what just a 
few people can do."^°
The Dominican situation, far from being a model for other 
Latin American countries to follow, however, soon exposed 
important flaws in the Alliance for Progress. Newly-elected 
President Bosch was regarded by many in his country as an 
American puppet, installed for the benefit of the Kennedy 
administration. To combat the threat of armed insurrection, 
Bosch had to call on Washington for more and more military 
aid, which in turn fortified allegations of pro-Americanism.
This spiral of military aid from Washington provoking 
criticism of Bosch, which resulted in more military aid from 
Washington, went on until he was overthrown in a coup in 
September 1963. Elsewhere, the Alliance had positive 
results. In some places it improved conditions for many 
people, and even Castro declared in 1963 that "it was a good 
idea, ... a very intelligent strategy".
Although Robert Kennedy was highly influential in US 
actions in the region during the Kennedy administration, he 
only visited Latin America for 24 hours during the whole of 
his brother's presidency, when he was sent at the end of '62 
to bolster the Alliance on a trip to Brazil.
It was, of course, Cuba which attracted his attention 
during these years, and his foreign policy reputation during 
the Senate years was largely based on his involvement in the 
missile crisis of October 1962.
It is indicative of Robert Kennedy's real and perceived 
influence on foreign policy matters in the Kennedy 
administration that most studies on the subject afford him
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as much credit, or blame, for US actions during the missile 
crisis as they do the President. Khrushchev, reflecting on 
the crisis afterwards, recalled that the Americans "had, on 
the whole, been open and candid with us, especially Robert 
Kennedy".Harold Macmillan said in 1969 that "the way Bobby 
and his brother played [their] hand was absolutely 
masterly"
Given his extraordinary lack of foreign policy 
experience, and the limits of his official job as Attorney 
General, his serious involvement in the crisis is truly 
remarkable. Nevertheless, Robert Kennedy had, by the time of 
the crisis in October '62, had already cultivated an 
unconventional channel of communication with the Soviet 
government.
In mid-1961, a New York journalist introduced Robert 
Kennedy to Georgi Bolshakov, who worked for the Soviet 
embassy's public relations department. Robert Kennedy later 
described Bolshakov as "Khrushchev's representative", and 
claimed that the Soviet leader used to send messages to the 
US President through Bolshakov, who would pass them to John 
Kennedy via the Attorney General.
"Most of the major matters dealing with the Soviet Union 
and the United States were discussed and arrangements made 
between Georgi Bolshakov and myself, " said Robert Kennedy in 
1964. "I met with him about whether the [Vienna summit] 
meeting should take place, whether the President wanted to 
meet Khrushchev. . . .When they were concerned about Berlin, he 
would come to me and talk about that...".25
Such message-carrying duties were all part of the network
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of communications which governments build up during the 
course of diplomatic negotiations, but this one gave Robert 
Kennedy highly privileged access to the most secret 
information, some of which presumably was only ever known by 
Bolshakov, Khrushchev, President Kennedy and the Attorney 
General. "I don't know why they [the Soviets] wanted to 
proceed in that fashion, but they didn't want to go through 
their Ambassador [Mikhail Menshikov] evidently," Robert 
Kennedy noted.
By the time of the missile crisis, Robert Kennedy had 
enjoyed over a year of fortnightly meetings with Bolshakov, 
and so was much more familiar with the way Khrushchev 
conducted business than many experts on Soviet relations who 
relied on official State Department channels for their 
information. "The State Department didn't like having him 
[meet with me] much because this involved circumventing 
them, I suppose," admitted Kennedy.
President Kennedy was first shown evidence of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba as he sat on his bed in his dressing gown, 
reading the papers on the morning of October 16, 1962 His 
initial reaction was to call the Attorney General, who was 
informed at 9am. Later that day, other senior officials were 
filled in on what US spy planes had located. Roughly the 
same group which was later briefed in the cabinet room met 
almost continuously over the next 12 days to analyse the 
problem.
Robert Kennedy was already first among equals in the 
group, which became called ExComm (the Executive Committee 
of the National Security Council). It was the Attorney
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General who oversaw the committee's deliberations, and whose 
personal recommendations were eventually accepted by the 
President as the best policy proposals.
Both John and Robert Kennedy were initially keen to 
explore the idea of invading Cuba. During the two ExComm 
meetings held on October 16, Robert Kennedy said little, 
although in the first he pointed out to the President that 
an invasion was one of the options, and asked General 
Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, how 
long an invasion would take to carry out.
In the second, the Attorney General opposed the idea of 
a surgical air strike and endorsed an invasion. A tape of 
the meeting reveals that Robert Kennedy wondered "whether 
it wouldn't be, uh, the argument, if you're going to. get 
into it [Cuba] at all, uh, whether we should just get into 
it and get it over with and say that, uh, take our losses". 
Then he suggested that "there is some other way we can get 
involved in this through, uh, Guantanamo Bay or something, 
er, or whether there's some ship that, you know, sink the 
Maine again [US battleship that blew up off Havana in 1898] 
or something" (ie engineer an incident which can be used as 
a pretext for invading Cuba)
No immediate decision was taken, however, and over the 
next few days Robert Kennedy strongly suggested that a 
"quarantine" or blockade should be undertaken rather than an 
air strike. In arguing against a strike on the Cuban missile 
bases, Robert Kennedy appealed to the moral conscience of 
the group. "For 175 years we have not been that kind of 
country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions," said
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Kennedy^® (although of course it was^ )^ .
Robert Kennedy's next decisive intervention in the crisis 
was his suggestion to the President to ignore an 
aggressively-worded letter sent by Khrushchev and respond to 
another one received some hours earlier, and also sent by 
the Soviet premier. The first letter asked that President 
Kennedy promise not to invade Cuba, in return for which the 
Soviets would remove their missiles. The second was more 
formally worded, and demanded that NATO missiles based in 
Turkey be removed before any solution could be found.
Until the time of Robert Kennedy's death, the official 
US version of events was that the Attorney General's 
inspired idea to ignore the second letter had saved the day 
without a loss of face for the Americans. Dissatisfied with 
the official State Department response to the 
correspondence, Robert Kennedy criticised its hard-line 
approach and, at the President's suggestion, personally 
drafted an alternative response which offered a no-invasion 
of Cuba guarantee to the Soviets. It was this letter, the 
story goes, which convinced the Soviets that they were being 
offered a reasonable deal and were not likely to squeeze any 
more concessions out of the administration.
In fact, Robert Kennedy recorded the true version a few 
months before he died in his account of the incident, 13 
Days, when he reveals that he struck a deal with the Soviets 
based on the terms of the second letter, without NATO, the 
US Congress, or even his ExComm colleagues knowing about it.
The details of the solution were apparently known only 
to Robert Kennedy and the President. 13 Days. which was
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published posthumously, reveals that Robert Kennedy met with 
the Soviet Ambassador (now Anatoly Dobrynin) and agreed that 
the NATO Jupiter missiles would be removed.
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury and ExComm 
member, later noted that "I was there, and I don't recall 
the ExComm telling Bobby Kennedy anything very specific 
about what he should say to Dobrynin. He got his last-minute 
and final instructions from the President and only from the 
President. There would be no written record of this. The 
ExComm was not even briefed about the Robert 
Kennedy/Dobrynin encounter the next day.
Dobrynin reported that "Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. 
One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. 
He himself said he had not been home for six days and 
nights. 'The President is in a grave situation,' Robert 
Kennedy said, 'and he does not know how to get out of it. We 
are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure 
from our military to use force against Cuba. ' As Robert 
Kennedy remembered it, he told Dobrynin that "it was our 
judgement that, within a short time after this crisis was 
over, those [NATO] missiles would be gone", and they were.^^
Arthur Schlesinger, while heaping laurels on Robert 
Kennedy for his intelligence in dealing with the crisis, 
describes the deal struck with Dobrynin as "a singular 
exercise in secret diplomacy"The difference between the 
earlier version of how the situation was resolved and the 
fuller, posthumous one, is crucial when studying Robert 
Kennedy's Senate career and presidential chances.
Much of his reputation as a tough, decisive politician
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rested on the belief that he and his brother had not given 
way over the Cuban missile crisis, had stood eyeball to 
eyeball with the Soviets, and had not flinched. In fact. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk later criticised Robert Kennedy 
for being too emotional during the episode. "This was the 
first major crisis he had ever lived through. Fortunately, 
that emotional aspect was not the controlling mood of 
President Kennedy. He was as calm as an iceberg throughout 
this situation. The difference in the emotional overtone 
between Bobby and John was very important to me.
The CIA photo expert who showed Robert Kennedy the U2 
pictures of the missiles in Cuba also remembered the 
Attorney General's agitated state. "He walked around the 
room like a boxer between rounds, thumbing his nose and 
uttering epithets.
Nevertheless, it was the reputation as a steely advisor 
to the President which survived, and Robert Kennedy was 
never forced to prove his anti-Communist credentials during 
his Senate career. The tough image made his suggestions of 
negotiations over Vietnam, and offers of blood to the Viet 
Cong, more credible to the public than if they had come from 
someone who was regarded as soft on Communism.
The truth was, of course, that the Kennedys had struck 
a deal with the Soviets, and had given away more than had 
originally been admitted to. None of this was known to his 
New York constituents, however, during Robert Kennedy's 
Senate career.
The low-income, white, urban and mid-western whites who 
were attracted to Kennedy during the presidential primaries
125
did not know it either, and such issues were traditionally 
very important to them. Many Poles, for example, might have 
been surprised to learn that Robert Kennedy had struck 
secret bargains with the Soviets. None of this would be so 
important, of course, had not Kennedy's appeal in the 1968 
presidential primaries rested so heavily on his hard-guy 
image which attracted the ethnic whites. In this sense at 
least, his much-vaunted "poverty coalition" between poor 
whites and blacks was founded on an untruth.
During his early days in the Senate, before his break 
with the White House over Vietnam, Robert Kennedy's 
reputation on international affairs rested largely on his 
dealings with Cuba and other Latin American countries. 
However, he had gained virtually all of his knowledge of the 
region second-hand. He had been sent on various missions 
elsewhere in the world, though, and was establishing himself 
in the world community as an international trouble-shooter 
for President Kennedy.
His first official trip abroad for his brother came in 
August 1961, when he visited President Houphouet-Boigny of 
the Ivory Coast. Boigny had been to Washington earlier in 
the year was dissatisfied with the treatment he had received 
from the State Department. It was left to Robert Kennedy to 
patch things up and make the August trip for Ivioriens ' 
independence celebrations.
Other trips followed, including a sweep of Asia which 
took up the whole of February 1962. He visited Japan, where 
the US ambassador noted that when he needed advice or help 
in a hurry, he would in future call the Attorney General
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instead of going through the State Department.
The main purpose of the 1962 mission was to force the 
Dutch and Indonesians to negotiate over Indonesian 
independence. Kennedy believed his trip was successful: 
"Nobody had visited Indonesia. I went to offset what was 
happening there...I did get [Sukarno] to agree to sit down 
with the Dutch . . . .They avoided a war.
By mid-administration, Robert Kennedy was almost 
functioning as a mini-State Department, negotiating in 
secret with Khrushchev's representative, acting as an 
alternative channel for ambassadors to reach the President, 
and bringing peace to the parts other officials had failed 
to reach.
Significantly, too, during that 14-nation trip in 
February, he stopped briefly in Saigon. "We are going to win 
in Vietnam. We will remain here until we do win, " he told 
the crowd at the airport.^
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V - FOREIGN POLICY: THE POLITICS OF DISSENT
"He's come too far, too fast." - President Johnson of 
RFK, May 1967.
AT THE END of his brother's administration, Robert Kennedy 
was an acknowledged expert on foreign affairs. The career 
options he seriously considered after President Kennedy's 
assassination all involved foreign affairs. In 1964, 
President Johnson offered him the post of US Ambassador to 
the UN, and although he declined it, Robert Kennedy 
mentioned that he was prepared to be Ambassador to Saigon.
Johnson was not keen on this, however, and so Kennedy 
opted for the Senate - not out of a burning desire to 
represent the people of New York - but, as he confided in 
1964, because as a senator he would be in a stronger 
position to criticise Johnson's foreign policy. "... if he's 
not doing anything for the Alliance for Progress, or if he's
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not paying proper attention to Panama or Brazil....If I was 
in the United States Senate, I would have raised a fuss 
about [US military intervention in] Panama," he said.^
Once elected. Senator Kennedy did not have to wait long 
before an opportunity to attack President Johnson's handling 
of affairs in Latin America presented itself. The situation 
in the Dominican Republic had worsened since the overthrow 
of Bosch in September 1963. Following the coup, the Kennedy 
administration had shut off all military aid to the new 
right-wing regime, but this policy was soon reversed by 
President Johnson.
The unpopular authoritarian government on the Caribbean 
island, backed by the military, found itself the target of 
an uprising in April 1965. Johnson, alarmed at the prospect 
of a Communist takeover, ordered 22,000 US troops into the 
country to restore order. He had not consulted with the 
Organisation of American States, and his action provided 
Kennedy with ammunition for his first open assault on the 
President.
Ironically enough, it was during a debate on Vietnam that 
Kennedy first broke with the administration over the 
Dominican Republic. On May 6, 1965, Kennedy rose to speak on 
a request from Johnson that more money be made available for 
the war in Vietnam. After agreeing to vote for the request 
(although warning that it should not be seen as a "blank 
cheque" by the administration) , Kennedy used his time on the 
Senate floor to bring up the Dominican situation.
"Our determination to stop Communist revolution in the 
hemisphere must not be construed as opposition to popular
132
uprisings against injustice and oppression just because the 
targets of such popular uprisings say they are 
Communist-inspired or Communist-led, or even because known 
Communists take part in them," he declared.^
I,F.Stone's Weekly picked up on the significance of the 
speech with characteristic perception. "Taken in connection 
with Teddy Kennedy's leadership in the fight against Johnson 
on poll taxes, we have here the possible nucleus of a 
liberal opposition to Johnson," he wrote the week after the 
speech.^ Stone was to prove a regular an incisive critic of 
Kennedy in the following years, and he often used his 
influential newsletter to prod the senator towards a more 
forthright stand against Vietnam.
Later that year, Kennedy visited Latin America for his 
first substantial political trip to the region. In keeping 
with his habit of ignoring State Department procedure, he 
visited the universities and labour gatherings he had been 
warned against. In Chile, he met Communists in a mine and 
declared: "If I worked in this mine I'd be a Communist
too.
Elsewhere, in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, he witnessed 
the demise of the Alliance for Progress ideal of putting 
America on the side of social revolution. Johnson had not 
maintained the former policy of encouraging reform, and it 
had been replaced with the old line of anti - Communism at any 
cost.
At the end of his first year in the Senate, he appeared 
on Meet the Press and warned that "if all we do. . . is to 
associate ourselves with those forces which are against
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subversion and against Communism and have rather a negative 
policy, then I think it is self-defeating".^
The reversion to the old policy of the primacy of 
national security considerations was made complete within a 
year or so of Johnson taking power, and was reflected in a 
piece in Le Monde in March 1966, which warned that LBJ's 
policy of siding with the dictators "spelled the end of 
Kennedyism"
Within months of this article appearing,, Kennedy made 
an all-out attack on what he regarded as a betrayal of the 
Alliance for Progress principles. It should be remembered 
that when he made the speech, in May '66, he had already 
broken with thee administration's policy on Vietnam, when he 
had urged negotiations with the National Liberation Front. 
The Vietnam break, which had come in February, generated 
considerable press attention, and by comparison the 
declaration on Latin America caused only minor ripples.
What precipitated Kennedy's outburst on the Latin 
American question was Johnson's decision to appoint Lincoln 
Gordon, a former Ambassador to Brazil who had advocated the 
overthrow of the progressive Brazillian government by its 
military, as his Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American affairs.
In remarks to the Senate in May 9-10, in what Senator 
Wayne Morse of Oregon lauded as "the most important speech 
that has been made on Latin American problems... in the 
country since President Kennedy initiated the Alliance for 
Progress...", Kennedy restated the original aims of the plan 
and pointed out where they were not being pursued.^
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"If we had dealt with Cuba and Batista in the fifties we 
would not have to worry about Castro, " he said.® He went on 
to criticise the State Department for withholding aid from 
Peru when the Peruvian government was in dispute with a US 
oil company. Kennedy pointed out that no expropriation had 
taken place, and that the President of Peru was simply 
looking for a better tax deal from the oil companies working 
in his country.
The senator also pointed out similar cases in Argentina, 
and attacked hold-ups in aid disbursement where, "for 
approximately two years, both in Peru and Argentina, 
important aid projects under the Alliance for Progress were 
held up because the private US companies were not able to 
reach agreement with the representatives of the governments 
of Argentina and Peru"
It was, of course, his first break with Johnson over 
Vietnam which really caused a furore. Presuming that 
Kennedy was keen to distance himself from the administration 
wherever appropriate, and thereby begin to establish an 
independent political base from which to launch a bid for 
the presidency, a break with Johnson over Vietnam was a 
logical step.
However, at this time, early 1966, the country was 
overwhelmingly in support of the winning the war, and 
Kennedy was saddled with the further burden of having 
advocated that exact policy himself during his brother's 
administration, and had personally made ringing declarations 
of US intent to stay and defeat the enemy during his trip to 
Saigon in 1962.
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He had not opposed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which 
gave Johnson almost unlimited powers to pursue his war aims, 
and as late as June 1965 was asking that magazine articles 
which emphasised the heroism of US troops in combat with the 
Viet Cong be inserted in the Congressional Record.
By the end of 1965, however, there was no mistaking that 
Johnson was prepared to increase substantially America's 
involvement in the war. In the last six months of that 
year, he had increased the number of US troops in Vietnam 
from 75,000 in July to 185,000 in December. When Kennedy 
made his speech in 1966, US bombing, which had been halted 
since Christmas Eve, 1965, had just resumed.
The build-up to Senator Kennedy's first major statement 
on Vietnam suggests that he was interested in staking out an 
identifiable political patch for himself which would be 
independent of the administration, but would not alienate 
mainstream Democrats who would ultimately determine his 
presidential aspirations.
This dilemma never left Kennedy, of course, and dogged 
him right up to end of his career. The tension between 
independence and disloyalty was a difficult one with which 
to deal, and he never really mastered it. He had tested the 
water some months earlier, when in October 1965 he proposed 
that blood plasma be given to the enemy as a humanitarian 
gesture. The suggestion was used throughout the next three 
years to associate him with appeasement, with a small degree 
of success.
Undeterred, he decided to associate himself with those 
dissenting on the war. This was not easy, however, for
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despite all his experience in foreign affairs, he was still 
a very junior senator, and had not been selected to sit on 
any of the glamorous foreign affairs committees.
He stood frustrated at the back of the hearings into the 
war conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee in the 
first two weeks of February 1966, astutely associating 
himself with the proceedings in the minds of the press and 
public without actually being part of them. His aides 
remember how he "several times went to the hearing room and 
stood among the listening spectators".10 The hearings were 
shown live on the television, but Kennedy preferred to 
attend in person and so publicly associate himself with the 
debate in this way.
His statement, when it came, made an enormous splash. He 
began by claiming the tradition of Abraham Lincoln, who "was 
reviled for opposing the war of 1848", and in a gesture to 
his father's record, mentioned those who had advocated 
fuller debate before World War Two.^ Then he spoke out 
against the resumption of the bombing and then finally 
spelled out his ideas for peace.
The proposal itself sought to set out terms for 
negotiation with the Communists in Vietnam. "If negotiation 
is our aim, as we have so clearly said it is, we must seek 
a middle ground. A negotiated settlement means that each 
side must concede matters that are important in order to 
preserve positions that are essential...we must be willing 
to face the uncertainties of election, and the possibility 
of an eventual vote on reunification".^^
Although nowhere in his speech did Kennedy mention the
137
word coalition, most commentators agreed he was advocating 
just that. Izzy Stone could not contain his enthusiasm for 
the the break, welcoming the speech as "a political event of 
the first magnitude", and publishing a special edition of 
his weekly to include Kennedy's remarks in full.
The rest of the press also regarded it as a highly 
significant statement, and many influential columnists took 
their cue. Walter Lippmann in the Washington Post enthused: 
"It has remained for Senator Kennedy to raise the decisive 
question about a negotiated settlement...a negotiated 
settlement of the war in South Vietnam will have to be 
negotiated by the South Vietnamese, and our policy should be 
to refrain from vetoing it".
The New York Times chose to regard the statement as a 
helpful suggestion for the administration, rather than an 
attack on it: "Senator Kennedy's proposal... is less a
criticism of the President's policies than an invaluable 
contribution to the decision-making process",^ while the 
Washington Star reported Vice-President Hubert Humphrey's 
reaction to the statement, when he compared allowing 
Communists to join a coalition government to "putting a fox 
in the chicken coop".
Other administration officials were also unenthusiastic. 
McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's principal White House 
advisor on foreign affairs, described them as "neither 
useful nor h e l p f u l U n d e r  Secretary of State George Ball 
denounced the proposals to negotiate with Communists with a 
view to power-sharing as "unacceptable".
However, all of the senior Johnson officials who opposed
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the idea had all been in favour of coalition when President 
Kennedy sought peace on Laos in 1961 on that very basis. 
Among the participants of the National Security Council 
meeting which advocated bringing Communists into the Laos 
government were Vice-President Johnson, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, Ball and Bundy. All of them went along with 
President Kennedy's efforts to establish a popular front in 
Laos.
The New Statesman likened Kennedy's February statement 
to a "ministerial resignation".^® In a piece headlined 
"Kennedy ends the consensus", it proclaimed: "Kennedy has, 
in one stroke, made the unthinkable thinkable: getting out 
of Vietnam. ... Kennedy has made opposition to the 
war...politically possible", while The Spectator recorded 
that Kennedy, in making his speech, had "chosen internal 
exile".
In an interview with US News & World Report two weeks 
after the speech, Kennedy sought to clarify his position. 
"One of the facts of life... is that the Communists...will 
play some role in the Government of a negotiated 
settlement. . . .They've been around a long time and they have 
considerable support in the villages...[South Vietnamese 
premier] General Ky has said he has complete control over 
only 25 per cent of the population at the present time"
Senate doves welcomed the statement. Wayne Morse, a 
long-standing critic of the war, expressed "enthusiastic 
support for the general policy expressed by the junior 
senator from New Y o r k , w h i l e  Claiborne Pell played down 
the differences between what Kennedy was proposing and the
139
administration's policy, claiming the differences were 
"slight". Pell did credit Kennedy with having established 
"the irreducible minimums on each side and [having] 
highlighted the areas where negotiation could be 
conducted"
Kennedy had made the unthinkable thinkable - he had put 
a coalition solution on the political agenda, as only few 
politicians could have. When Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota 
had advanced the same idea some weeks before, he noted 
ruefully that it had been considered so "far out" that 
nobody noticed. It would not be the last time for McCarthy 
to be so upstaged.
Journalists sympathetic to Kennedy's ideas even sought 
out former Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, who had 
headed the coalition government in that country at the end 
of World War Two. Although Nagy was overthrown by Communists 
who formed part of that coalition, he came in on Kennedy's 
side during the national debate.
"A coalition...of the participating political parties or 
groups is not dependent at all on domestic popular support 
but on the help of the outside great powers which are behind 
them politically," he o f f e r e d . T h a t  Nagy's thoughts on 
such a topic were considered so relevant by the American 
press gives some indication of how Vietnam was regarded in 
the overall context of the Cold War, and seen as easily 
comparable to the Hungarian situation of 20 years before.
Kennedy, meanwhile, wished to be seen as part of a 
general movement unhappy about the conduct of the war, but 
did not want to go as far as publicly joining its leaders.
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He was careful only to make a speech, and not call for it to 
be debated as a Senate resolution, which would have caused 
a more serious split with the White House. The following 
month, he did not vote for a motion which called for the 
repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Eugene McCarthy 
did) .
In April, he warned of further escalation, and in July 
voted for a bill introduced by Senator Fulbright to put 
three members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
the Armed Services Committee (which oversees CIA 
activities). Although the bill failed, it provided some 
indication of Kennedy's continuing dovishness on the war.
The second half of 1966 appears to have been a most 
indecisive time for Robert Kennedy. No doubt distracted by 
a trip to Africa, mid-term elections and the need to tip-toe 
around internecine political struggles in New York, his 
public comments on the war were relatively rare.
It was a time, too, when he was being mooted in some very 
reputable quarters as a vice-presidential possibility for 
Johnson in the '68 election, and he was certainly reluctant 
to go any further than his February statement in attacking 
the administration's foreign policy. In early 1967 he seems 
to have decided that the most prudent course was a decisive, 
final break with Johnson over Vietnam, but for the remainder 
of 1966 he frustrated doves with his apparent reluctance to 
address the war. The New Statesman noted in July of that 
year that "...opposition to the war is generally expressed 
in testimonials of faith in Senator Robert Kennedy. In his 
turn, he responds with inscrutable smiles and delphic
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comments... .He did not sign [a motion critical of the 
administration's Vietnam policy] with the 18 doves - for no 
very good reason, except that he was late getting into the 
Senate chamber.
The Spectator, meanwhile, thought it sensed a subtle bid 
for the vice-presidency in 1968. A June Gallup Poll had 
shown Johnson's popularity rating slip to below 50% for the 
first time since he became President, and a month later 
another poll in California suggested that Kennedy was 
preferred to Johnson by a margin of 2:1.
"The chances are that he [LBJ] will come to 1968 badly 
in need of a new face. . .under the circumstances, it would be 
by no means surprising if he dismissed the loyal Mr Humphrey 
and accepted the distrusted Senator Kennedy as his 
vice-presidential candidate," predicted The Spectator.^ 
"This would be the most unpleasant dose imaginable for 
him. . .but there is almost nothing he would not do to make 
safe an election," it concluded, in an oblique reference to 
Johnson's capacity for distorting ballot returns.
Ruminations about Robert Kennedy's long-term political 
ambitions seem to have been all the rage that summer. The 
Spectator went as far as to publish a 3,000 word article in 
September, mapping out the senator's various options in some 
detail.^" It concluded that the chances of Johnson asking 
Kennedy to join the ticket were "dubious", and the chances 
of Kennedy accepting such an offer "uncertain". Kennedy 
seems to have been uncertain about many political decisions 
that year, and wisely appears to have been keeping as many 
options open for as long as possible.
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If the February speech had opened the door to his 
championing a significant anti-Vietnam movement which might 
sweep him to the presidency in 1972, or even before, he had 
been careful not to push the door so forcefully that it 
would close any possibility of a reconciliation with 
Johnson, should the senator decide to make a gambit for the 
vice-presidency in '68.
Not showing his hand was no doubt frustrating for those, 
like Izzy Stone, who wanted him to throw in his lot with the 
doves and make an irrevocable break. "While others dodge the 
draft, Bobby dodges the war," he charged in an issue of 
October '66. "Kennedy in the US Senate has at his disposal 
a forum second only to that of the Presidency. But he hasn't 
said a word about the war in the Senate since last 
February. ...He even achieved the feat of delivering a speech 
in New York on October 11 without mentioning Vietnam!
Stone also thought the vice-presidency theory credible. 
In September he had noted that Kennedy "has said very little 
about the war in months. . . [he is] being careful not to burn 
his bridges with the White House and make such a development 
[the vice-presidential nomination] impossible".^®
Kennedy was not given to unnecessary bridge-burning. He 
knew better than most what it took to become president and, 
assuming that objective was always an important one for him, 
he could not afford to make any more enemies than he needed 
to. Besides, if he had thrown in his hand with the anti-war 
protestors and become an all-out dove, what sort of movement 
would he be heading, and could he steer it towards a 
presidential victory?
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The full implications of the war had still not hit home 
to most Americans by 1966. At the end of the year, it would 
be revealed that, for the first time, US casualties 
outnumbered those of the South Vietnamese in the conflict, 
but even that wasn't enough to persuade most Americans that 
the war could not, or should not, be won.
Media reports of the war were still overwhelmingly 
pro-administration at this time, the anti-Vietnam war 
movement remained unstructured politically, and was made up 
of several distinct factions, each wanting slightly 
different things.
Some who were opposed to the war were simply opposed to 
the way it was being run, and believed (as Nixon later 
tried) that a "Vietnamisation" policy, whereby the 
Vietnamese did all the fighting themselves, was the answer. 
Others questioned American ability to do the job, others 
Americans moral right to be there in the first place, and 
others still questioned the idea of war at all.
It must be stressed that the moral arguments of pacifism, 
or even of America's right to impose its will on the people 
of Vietnam, did not figure very prominently in the arguments 
put forward by the Senate doves during those years (although 
Kennedy himself, in March 1968, in a speech on the Senate 
floor, wondered aloud about America's moral right to act 
"like the God of the Old Testament",^® and another time made 
the ludicrous statement that "what we are doing to the 
Vietnamese is not very different than [sic] what Hitler did 
to the Jews")
. Most doves, however, simply wanted to end the war because
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it was costing too much money and because America was losing 
it. When Kennedy did criticise the administration's policy 
on the war, he did it guardedly and via a related subject, 
usually an American citizen's right to dissent against it.
For example, when calls came for historian Eugene 
Genovese to be dismissed from his university post because he 
said he hoped the Viet Cong would win, Kennedy defended his 
right of free speech. Similarly, Ted Kennedy's criticism of 
the war concentrated on the issue of refugees rather than 
the moral question of whether the US should be fighting it 
at all.
It was a difficult time for Kennedy, who had so much to 
lose should he jump the wrong side of the fence on the war. 
If he went all-out against it, like Morse had, he would have 
become isolated from the mainstream party, and have only the 
anti-war movement (which had certainly not proven itself as 
an electoral force in 1966) on which to base his run at the 
presidency.
If, on the other hand, he refused to criticise Johnson 
publicly, he ran the risk of someone outflanking him on the 
left, and stealing much of his natural, radical 
constituency. Moreover, there was not just the presidency to 
worry about. He had hardly won New York by a landslide in 
1964, and in the early years of his Senate career was still 
on trial in the eyes of many constituents.
There were convincing reasons for Kennedy to sit tight 
and wait out the political storm of the late '60s. Time was 
on his side - in 1984 he still would have been younger than 
Johnson was in '68 - and many Democrats urged him to wait
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until the 1972 election before he made his move.
His hesitancy grated on those who knew him to be 
personally dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, 
however, and pressure on him grew steadily during the latter 
half of 1966 to declare publicly and forcefully against 
Johnson.
When General de Gaulle offered himself as a mediator 
between Washington and Hanoi in September of that year, 
Kennedy wrote a letter openly welcoming the French proposals 
for instant negotiations with a view to power-sharing. In an 
act typical of his prevarication in those months, he did not 
send it.
He held out against the pressure for a long time. In 
early October his first speech on the war since the February 
statement welcomed UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg's 
suggestions for the Vietnamisation of the war. This, 
according to Stone, put him "safely back in LBJ's camp".
The statement helped confirm William Shannon's view, 
published in that month's edition of Harper's. that the 
vice-presidency theory was a strong one. "With skilful 
publicity this could be made to appear not as an act of bold 
usurpation and impatient ambition by Kennedy but a reluctant 
rescue mission to prop up an aging wartime President whose 
popularity is sagging," he proposed.^
As the autumn dragged on, so the pressure on Kennedy 
mounted. The anti-war movement, however, provided no clear 
evidence in the mid-term elections that it was a force which 
could unseat an incumbent president.
The senator remained in two minds. Privately, there was
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no question that he was opposed to continuing military 
involvement, but told colleagues that to oppose the war more 
openly would only result in increased bombing, as Johnson 
would prove the independence of his policy by doing the 
exact opposite of what Kennedy proposed.
While he stalled, the war ground on in a peculiarly 
futile fashion. American inexperience in foreign affairs 
was exposed as never before. Johnson opted for the 
disastrous "strategic hamlet" policy, whereby people were 
removed from land their families had owned for generations, 
and put into hamlets where they could be protected from the 
Viet Cong. Unfortunately for Johnson, many locals believed 
American troops to be more of a menace that the Viet Cong, 
and the US never looked likely to win the battle for hearts 
and minds.
A basic misunderstanding of local needs and preferences 
punctuated American policy towards those it protected. When 
the Communists destroyed much of the South's rice harvest in 
the mid-'60s, the US rushed in California and Louisiana 
rice, only to find that the Vietnamese hated American rice 
so much that they used it instead of dirt to fill their 
sandbags.
It was during this summer of hesitancy that he decided 
to travel to Africa. Whatever he eventually did in the short 
term, a successful, high-profile foreign trip would do his 
chances of getting the vice-presidency, or challenging for 
the presidency itself, no harm at all.
America was becoming more and more unpopular throughout 
the world (a fact which Kennedy did not fail to mention on
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his return), and the goodwill which President Kennedy had 
elicited was being steadily eroded.
Moreover, nothing emphasised the difference between 
Kennedy and Johnson more sharply than the sight of the young 
senator being mobbed by crowds in the Third World, while the 
President was besieged by anti-war protests at home and 
abroad.
Holding to the Kennedy administration theme of being on 
the side of the people during their revolutions. Senator 
Kennedy made for South Africa in June. The trip, which also 
included visits to Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia, produced a 
few good speeches from Kennedy and some excellent publicity.
His interest in Africa dated back to the 1961 mission to 
the Ivory Coast, and he had learned a lot since his first 
speech on the continent when, addressing an Ivoirien 
audience, he had described President Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
as "the George Washington of your country", presumably 
imagining that Boigny could envisage no higher honour.
Interestingly, his only altercation with President 
Kennedy over foreign policy concerned Africa. Robert Kennedy 
had argued against the US building the Volta Dam. The dam, 
which was to be built in Ghana, was in danger of being taken 
over by Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah who, the Attorney 
General argued, was "going Communist" Robert Kennedy 
insisted that the money ($96 million) should be spent on 
America's real friends in the region, like Boigny. In the 
end. President Kennedy's position prevailed, although he and 
the Attorney General" had some spirited arguments about it", 
as Robert Kennedy remembered in 1964
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After President Kennedy’s death, he appeared genuinely 
concerned that Johnson was not paying enough attention to 
African matters. "I've had a major effort in the last four 
months to try to get somebody to do something about 
Zanzibar..." he complained at the end of 1 9 6 4 Presumably 
stung into action by Kennedy's trip, Johnson made his only 
Presidential speech on Africa the week before Kennedy left 
for Cape Town.
By 1966, the winds of change had almost swept right 
through the continent, with only a few countries left 
operating under minority rule. South Africa, with its 
archaic apartheid system but relatively sophisticated and 
liberal press, seemed an obvious place to generate the sort 
of attention Kennedy needed.
The trip duly confirmed his image as a world statesman, 
and a man of the people. President Kennedy had halted loans 
to the South African government, and forbidden any weapons 
deals with the Pretoria regime in protest at its policies, 
and Kennedy's credibility with the majority population was 
swiftly cemented with a trip to "banned" Nobel prize winner, 
Zulu chief Albert Luthuli.
Thanks to a developed media network in the country, 
Kennedy's trip made headlines across the world in a way 
which his stops in the other African nations couldn't 
manage. Although he was treated like a head of state by 
Nyrere in Tanzania, Kenyetta in Kenya and Selassie in 
Ethiopia, their poor press facilities did not generate the 
same impact as the South African leg.
The memory of the African trip was dominated by the
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experience in South Africa, when thousands of blacks had 
cheered Kennedy for defying their government and speaking 
out against apartheid (the South African Prime Minister 
Hendrik Verwoerd declined to see him or permit other 
ministers to do so).
Kennedy was among the first foreign politician to attack 
the South African government on its own soil, and became an 
instant hero in the townships for doing so. By 1984, 
however, when his brother Ted attempted to rally 
anti-apartheid forces in the country, he was forced to cut 
his trip short in the face of militant black Azapo 
activists, who threatened to sabotage his meetings and 
accused him of being an "agent of American imperialism"
The 1966 trip also developed the idea of Kennedy as more 
than a one-issue wonder, disagreeing with Johnson on nothing 
but Vietnam. Part of Kennedy's problem at this time was his 
need to mark out his own political territory. If he opposed 
Johnson solely on the war, and the war ended, his political 
career would be finished. While he tried to develop a new 
philosophy to deal with racial problems on the domestic 
scene, he also had to try and carve out an alternative 
approach to foreign policy.
By the end of 1966, his mind apparently made up to break 
with Johnson rather than wait for the offer of the 
vice-presidency, he embarked on a sophisticated strategy 
geared to project himself as a worthy and experienced heir 
to Johnson, familiar with international events and more 
popular with foreign publics and governments than the 
President.
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It was time for a decision. By December attacks on 
Kennedy's silence were reaching a crescendo, with Stone 
accusing him of "sounding like Hubert [Humphrey] At this 
time, too, his image was being damaged by a long-running 
battle with William Manchester over the author's account of 
the Dallas assassination. The Death of a President. Although 
Kennedy tried to stop extracts of the book from appearing on 
the grounds that they did not respect Jacqueline Kennedy's 
privacy, others thought that the most offensive passages 
were those which threatened his relations with Johnson.
Some of the manuscript, it appears, included evidence 
from Kennedy aides complaining about President Johnson's 
lack of sensitivity towards President Kennedy's family and 
colleagues in the way he took over at the White House.
If Kennedy was at all serious about the chances of a 
vice-presidential spot, he could not afford such revelations 
to be made public. Moreover, when the nature of the passages 
became common knowledge anyway, with drafts of the book 
circulating in New York and elsewhere, he was put under 
increasing pressure to make a decisive break with the 
administration.
He chose to make another speech on Vietnam in March, one 
which could only be construed as an all-out attack on the 
President's policies. For maximum impact, he gradually built 
up to the announcement with a well-publicised trip to 
Europe, which reinforced the idea that Kennedy was more in 
touch with attitudes in foreign capitals than Johnson was.
In January he left for London, where he met with Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson and discussed the possibility of
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British entry in to the European Common Market. He was 
afforded the sort of welcome not usually extended to most 
senators, as most European government officials recognised 
they were probably dealing with a future president.
In France, he was told that a Communist government in 
Vietnam was inevitable. De Gaulle warned him that the US 
could not prevail against the forces of history which were 
at work in Vietnam. In Rome, Italian President Giuseppe 
Saragat told him that Johnson appeared to be neglecting his 
allies. In his State of the Union address to Congress two 
weeks before, the Italian premier noted, Johnson's speech 
had included 50 lines on Latin America, 20 on Africa and 
only one brief mention of Europe.
The message Kennedy brought home was clear: Johnson was 
out of touch with the rest of the world, unlike Kennedy, 
whose top-level discussions with the great European powers 
had helped convince him that the war was wrong.
Another message Kennedy brought home was not so clear. 
The confusion arose over a peculiar incident in Paris, when 
during discussions with an official from the French foreign 
ministry, terms of negotiation with the NLF had been 
mentioned. The US Ambassador to France, who was present at 
the meeting, thought Kennedy had been the target of a 
subtle "peace feeler", and relayed this information to the 
State Department.
The feeler was so subtle, apparently, that the senator 
did not pick it up at all, and was surprised at the fuss it 
caused. When news leaked that Kennedy might have been the 
recipient of such a signal, Johnson was furious, believing
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Kennedy to have used the message to enhance his own 
prestige.
An acrimonious meeting took place between the President 
and Kennedy on the latter's return to the US. "I think the 
leak came from someone in your State Department, " Kennedy is 
reported to have said.
"It's not my State Department, it's your State 
Department," Johnson is supposed to have shouted back, 
meaning, presumably, that it was staffed by Kennedy 
sympathisers who were more in agreement with the senator 
than the President.This was a remarkable attitude for 
Johnson to adopt, since it not only confirmed the extent of 
Kennedy's influence, but also rested on the belief that 
Kennedy was a favourite in the Department, which he clearly 
had never been.
The meeting carried on, with Kennedy advising the 
President to stop the bombing and begin negotiations. His 
patience tested, Johnson eventually warned Kennedy that he 
would "destroy you and every one of your dove friends in six 
months. You'll be dead politically in six months." Kennedy 
stormed out angrily, according to his aides. 
Unsurprisingly, the vice-presidency was not mentioned by 
either side.
The stage was set for Kennedy's break. Harried to the end 
by Izzy Stone, whose February 20 issue claimed that "even 
[New York's other senator. Republican Jacob] Javits is more 
outspoken than Kennedy on the bombing", Robert Kennedy's 
second major speech on Vietnam, and the one which separated 
him irrevocably from the administration, came on 2 March,
153
1967/°
As always, the speech was only as effective as the 
publicity it generated. Johnson went to extraordinary 
lengths to divert attention away from it. As Kennedy aides 
William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman recall: "On the 
day of the speech. . .Johnson made two unscheduled speeches in 
Washington, held an unscheduled news conference to announce 
that Russian Premier Kosygin had agreed to talks on reducing 
the stockpile of nuclear weapons, announced he was inviting 
all the nation's governors to the White House, had Senator 
Henry Jackson of Washington read on the floor of the Senate 
a predated letter from him, explaining why the bombing was 
necessary, and confirmed the rumour that his daughter Lucy 
was pregnant.
Despite his exertions, Kennedy's proposal was the lead 
item the next day. He proposed a unilateral bombing halt and 
an announcement that the US would be "ready to negotiate
within a week". The negotiations, he suggested, could be
secured by both sides agreeing not to substantially extend
the war while talks were being conducted. He also
recommended a gradual withdrawal of US and North Vietnamese 
troops, which would be replaced by an international 
peace-keeping force, which would also guarantee free 
elections in which the Viet Cong would participate.
Before he made his speech Kennedy consulted with Tom 
Hayden and Staughton Lynd, two radical anti-war activists 
who had recently returned from Hanoi, but his statement was 
essentially a restatement of the orthodox dove line. No-one 
in the Senate at this time was calling for a unilateral
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withdrawal of American troops, and the country was still 
overwhelmingly in support of winning the war.
In a Gallup poll published the week before Kennedy made 
his speech, only 24% of the public said they favoured a halt 
in the bombing, and by May of that year most college 
students questioned by Gallup said they considered 
themselves hawks on Vietnam.
The press reaction to the speech, although extensive, was 
less enthusiastic than it had been about his declaration in 
February '66. Commentators were now more wary of Kennedy's 
intentions in breaking with Johnson, and many agreed with 
The Spectator, which noted that Kennedy had "a way of 
speaking and then lapsing into long silences".A fortnight 
before, the magazine had described him as "a concealed and 
sporadic enemy [of the President]: he emerges every six 
months or so openly to express an otherwise muted 
discontent.
Few publications applauded the bridge-burning exercise, 
and although The New Statesman conceded that "the impact of 
the speech was to separate Kennedy, perhaps once and for 
all, from the Johnson administration", it also noted that 
Kennedy had been careful to deliver his speech when the 
Senate debate on the war had ended, so avoiding having his 
remarks associated with the other Senate doves.
Inevitably, Stone's Weekly tackled him over this tactic, 
and accused him of refusing to lead the opposition, while 
putting speeches on the record "to look good afterwards", as 
he had done in 1 9 6 6 One immediate effect of the speech 
seems to have been an order from Johnson to intensify the
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bombing to show his determination to defy Kennedy.
Kennedy's dilemma was over: he had finally set himself 
apart from the President, even if he was not ready to join 
the dove team. The break, as he had expected, made him very 
unpopular in the country, and his Gallup national approval 
rating dropped 11 points that month (from 48 to 37). That 
figure would, of course, rise in the coming year, as he had 
also predicted.
In effect, Kennedy was now running for President, 
although he hadn't decided in which election. He probably 
saw 1972 as the only real possibility, but he needed to be 
ready in case Johnson looked like faltering before....
The rest of 1967 was taken up with swipes at the 
administration's inattention to problems elsewhere in the 
world, reinforcing Kennedy's image as a politician with a 
comprehensive foreign policy, in contrast to the President, 
who appeared increasingly preoccupied with a small country 
in Asia.
To emphasise his broad range of policy alternatives for 
the rest of the world, Kennedy brought out a book that year 
which was to act as a manifesto for his presidential 
campaign in 1968. To Seek a Newer World is essentially a 
rehash of his major Senate speeches, but more than 
three-quarters of it is taken up with foreign policy 
matters: where the Alliance for Progress was betrayed; how 
to negotiate over Vietnam; the prospects for an overture to 
China; nuclear disarmament, etc etc.
One curious act which is not mentioned in any of the 
Kennedy biographies is his decision to co-sponsor a bill in
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May of 1967 with Senator Alan Bible of Nevada, aimed at 
increasing penalties on those who desecrated the US flag.
For all his declarations about free speech, and his 
defence of academics encouraging the Viet Cong to victory, 
this decision does seem out of character. Nevertheless, as 
the Congressional Record duly shows, on May 3, 1967, he
co-sponsored a bill with Bible to "amend section 3 of title 
4, US Code of Conduct, which prohibits the desecration or 
improper use of the flag of the US by any person within the 
District of Columbia, so as to make such prohibitions 
applicable throughout the US, to increase the penalties 
prescribed in such section with respect to desecration of 
the flag, and for other purposes"
Of much more importance, though, were his now rampant 
assaults on the administration. He attacked proposals to 
cut funding for the Alliance for Progress, and outlined some 
sensible proposals for the rejuvenation of Latin American 
economies.
Robert Kennedy's ideas for attracting private investment 
into the ghettoes of America were,if not proven to be the 
answer to poverty, at least ahead of their time. It was many 
years before the private capital ideas he had propounded 
were tried out on a large scale, both in the US and Europe.
In his ideas for revitalising Latin American economies, 
too, his policies made sound business sense and many of his 
suggestions are now considered standard practice in areas 
relating to a Third World country's protection of its 
foreign exchange earnings, for example.
By mid-19 67, now liberated from any compunction to
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criticise his President, he described the intervention in 
the Dominican Republic as "a smarting wound". He hammered at 
the necessity for the US to join the side of revolution, and 
proclaimed that there could "be no preservation of the 
status quo in Latin America" His ideas for the region
did not involve any reduction of US interest in the affairs 
of Latin American countries, which would be maintained 
through a series of "partnerships", like that which existed 
between California and Chile. California sent technical 
experts and industrial advisors to Chile, in an attempt to 
improve living conditions in the South American country.
Kennedy proposed a major increase in development aid to 
the region in the following years, including a doubling of 
capital aid, which, he pointed out, would be the annual 
equivalent of the cost of the Vietnam war for two weeks.
His agricultural reforms proposed the creation of 
internal markets, and crop diversity. Many of the problems 
Kennedy raised seem obvious today, but at the time few were 
seriously addressing these questions. At a 1967 conference 
in Punta del Este in Uruguay, birthplace of the Alliance for 
Progress, the participating governments could not settle on 
a trading agreement between the US and its southern 
partners.
Kennedy suggested that the US was the problem. "We sought 
guarantees for US investments and lower tariffs on US sales 
to Latin America; they sought more favourable treatment for 
Latin American exports, both of commodities and manufactured 
goods, to the US, and had no further desire to protect our 
economic interests in their countries," he told the Senate.
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us companies feared nationalisation by unstable 
governments, and so would not make long-term commitments to 
the country. Investments by major US companies were often 
short-term, and were often only made on the understanding 
that the company retained total control of these 
international operations (this short-term profit motive was 
also evident in many US companies' attitude to ghetto 
investment, when they feared similar problems of sabotage, 
a volatile workforce, and physical violence against their 
managers).
However, Kennedy argued (with some considerable insight, 
as would be revealed in the following decades in Latin 
America and Africa) that for for American companies to gain 
real security in their investment, they had to be willing to 
surrender control of them to the local authorities.
What Kennedy advocated was US companies giving up 51% of 
their shares in a foreign venture to local shareholders. In 
this way, the success of the company's project would be in 
the interest of the local authority, and therefore more 
secure. In Mexico, this arrangement was already being tried 
with notable success. However, it took years before many US 
companies would willingly surrender majority shareholdings 
abroad.
Kennedy also continued his long-standing criticism of 
("his") State Department, claiming that US withdrawal of aid 
from unco-operative countries was simply an admission of 
policy failure. Moreover, in these 1967 remarks on the Latin 
American situation, he recognised the existence of
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nationalistic Communism, as opposed to one orchestrated by 
Peking/Moscow - hardly an earth-shattering discovery, but 
one which many of his Senate colleagues would never make.
Robert Kennedy experienced a "growth" in many areas of 
belief after his brother's death, we are assured by his 
closest colleagues. On civil rights and Vietnam he 
"matured", and moved to the left. However, his policies on 
Latin America, while less trumpeted, bore the marks of 
genuinely new thinking, and were among the most far-sighted 
he advocated during his Senate years. Latin America was not 
a burning issue during the 1968 election, of course, which 
was fought on the issues (as far as it was fought on any 
issues) of Vietnam and racial tension. The Hispanics who 
voted for Kennedy in such impressive numbers did so largely 
as a result of his interest in them as migrant workers and 
ghetto inhabitants, not because of the new business 
regulations he was proposing for Central and South America.
Similarly, his overwhelming support in the black 
community had less to do with what he had said in South 
Africa than what he said in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Even the 
Vietnam war, apparently, did not figure very highly as an 
issue in black areas, although most black leaders had come 
out against it, it diverted funds from the War on Poverty, 
and blacks suffered the highest proportion of casualties in 
combat.
Having staked out his independence from Johnson, without 
distancing himself from the party machine (many of whom, 
like Mayor Daley of Chicago, were quietly voicing concern 
about the conduct of the war in late 1967) , Kennedy began to
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seek advice on whether a coalition of blacks, anti-war 
activists and those otherwise disaffected by Johnson's 
leadership would be strong enough to pull off a presidential 
election victory. Almost all the answers he received agreed 
it was impossible, that a candidate heading such a movement 
would have no chance at unseating the incumbent President.
Securing the party's nomination would be difficult 
enough. At the 1968 convention, about 20% of delegates would 
come from southern states, where Kennedy was hardly a folk 
hero. Another 30% would be dominated by labour interests, 
where the Johnson-Humphrey team was especially strong, and 
where Kennedy was still resented for his hounding of former 
Teamster boss Jimmy Hof fa. The remaining half of the 
delegates would come from the rest of the country, some 
directly as a result of primaries, others from closed deals 
arranged by local party officials.
The south and the unions remained dominantly hawkish, and 
the rest of the country still favoured staying and winning 
in Vietnam, although support among this section of the 
public was dwindling.
A significant shift in attitude on the war began to take 
shape in the second half of 1967 which, within a year, left 
the electorate notably more dovish than it had ever been 
before. However, the swing in opinion came too late for the 
American democratic system, which produced two candidates 
(and Wallace) the following November who proposed fighting 
on, while about half the country wanted an immediate halt to 
hostilities.
This change in opinion also came too late for Kennedy to
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jump into the presidential race in time to plan his campaign 
very effectively. Why much of the US public suddenly awoke 
to the implications of prolonging the war is not clear. 
Rules on draft deferments were tightened up in October 1967, 
making it much harder for students to evade the draft. This 
undoubtedly brought the war home to many families for the 
first time, and encouraged a fresh wave of protest from a 
previously unpoliticised middle-class. Unsurprisingly, too, 
campus opposition to the war grew stronger during that 
semester, and in November of that year 50,000 people staged 
a march on the Pentagon to protest against the war.
Mounting casualty figures no doubt played a major part 
in moulding public awareness. 112 Americans were killed in 
action in 1964, 1130 in 1965, 4179 in 1966, and 7482 in
1967. At the end of 1964, there were 23,00 American troops 
involved in the conflict. By the end of 1967, the number had 
risen to 525,000.^*
Other reasons have also been suggested for the shift in 
US opinion at this time. Respected television journalist 
Walter Cronkite visited the war zone at the beginning of
1968, and on his return broke with the established network 
tradition of newscaster neutrality by criticising the 
conflict directly on his show. Much of the rest of the media 
took up the anti-war cause about this time.
It has been suggested, too, that the Vietnam war was the 
first to be fought on television, and that when Americans 
witnessed the general horror of war beamed into their homes 
on a nightly basis, they lost the stomach to continue the 
fight. Television ownership certainly increased dramatically
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during these years: in 1960, 45 million American homes
boasted a television set, but by 1968 that number had 
reached 75 million (a quarter of them colour)
Whatever the direct effects of watching war on the 
television, a definite mood swing against the 
administration's policies began in late '67. (Whether 
television reporting had much to do with this is debatable, 
but the US authorities were careful in later conflicts to 
deny reporters the sort of access to combat zones they had 
enjoyed in Vietnam.) In November of that year, too, Nixon 
pulled ahead of Johnson in opinion polls for the first time. 
The administration was clearly in trouble, and the more 
unpopular it, and its war, became, the more pundits looked 
towards Kennedy for any sign of movement. Typically, he 
hesitated.
In June he had introduced Johnson at a New York political 
dinner with the definition of greatness as defined in 
Webster's dictionary. In an inordinately fawning 
introduction of the President, punctuated by the noise of 
1400 anti-war protestors outside the hall, Kennedy noted how 
Johnson "has poured out all his own strength to renew the 
great strength of the country...he has sought consensus, but 
has never shrunk from controversy...he has gained huge 
popularity but never hesitated to spend it on what he 
thought important. In 1964 he won the greatest popular 
victory in modern times, and with our help he will do so 
again in 1968," he gushed.
It is hard to see what Kennedy was angling for in acting 
in such a way - it could have been that he wanted to prove
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before party hacks that there was no unbridgeable gulf 
between himself and the White House, or that, no matter 
what, he would not threaten party unity, or it simply could 
have been that one of his speechwriters (in this case, Ted 
Sorenson) went a little over the top in preparing a few 
routine remarks.
Whatever the reason, such gestures, coupled with 
Kennedy's unwillingness to go for the jugular during these 
months, forced anti-war activists to search around for a 
more reliable champion. It was proposed that economist J.K. 
Galbraith, an Ambassador to India in the Kennedy 
administration, should stand for president in the upcoming 
'68 elections on an anti-war platform.
Galbraith was keen, but a birth certificate showing him 
to have been born in Canada ruled his candidacy out on 
Constitutional grounds. Another attempt, this time to get 
dovish Senator Fulbright to run, failed, as did attempts to 
get Martin Luther King, Dr Benjamin Spock, and retired Army 
General James Gavin to seek the presidency.
Kennedy refused to enter the race, although he was 
contemplating it. At a series of confidential meetings held 
in October and November '67, top advisors met to discuss the 
possibility of his toppling Johnson. Most, including Ted 
Kennedy, opposed the idea, although a Lou Harris opinion 
poll in October showed him beating Johnson 52-32.
In many ways, however, these strategy meetings were 
futile. Much of the electorate believed that he was in the 
race, if undeclared, and the media quickly magnified any 
criticism he made of Johnson into a signal that he was about
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to declare his candidacy.
In such a situation, Kennedy was almost forced to run by 
public opinion. If he defied common belief and held out 
until 1972, he risked being blamed for extending the war 
when he could have won the presidency and stopped it. If 
that scenario were played out, much of his national 
constituency might turn against him in the following four 
years.
He cancelled a proposed trip to Eastern Europe in late 
'67 (which would have done his standing with 
Polish-Americans no harm at all) to monitor the situation. 
No doubt the Polish government, and the US embassy in 
Warsaw, were relieved. During his trip to the country in 
1964, Kennedy had annoyed the authorities so much with his 
emotional appeals to crowds that "he got the embassy so mad 
it could hardly sputter," recalled the ambassador
At the end of November, 1967, Bob McNamara "resigned" as 
Secretary of Defense. His removal scotched all realistic 
hopes that a negotiated settlement on the war was near, and 
further convinced Kennedy that Johnson was unlikely to pull 
out of Vietnam.
Ted Kennedy, meanwhile, went to the war zone to witness 
the refugee situation. On his return, he confirmed the 
reports that Robert Kennedy had been receiving for some 
months: that the administration was playing down the
civilian casualties and its efficiency in subduing the 
enemy.
The former Attorney General began to get moral about the 
issue. On the television show Face the Nation at the end of
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November, he went beyond the usual criticism of the way the 
war was being run, and the high casualties, and questioned 
the right of the US to be there in the first place.
"We're going in there and we're killing South Vietnamese, 
we're killing children, we're killing women, we're killing 
innocent people...because [the Communists are] 12,000 miles 
away and they might get to be 11,000 miles away."
"Do we have the right here in the United States to say 
that we're going to kill tens of thousands, make millions of 
people, as we have...refugees, kill women and children? I 
very seriously whether we have that right. . . .Those of us who 
stay here in the United States, we must feel it when we use 
napalm, when a village is destroyed and civilians are 
killed. This is also our responsibility...".^^
Far more eloquent now that he had been earlier in the 
year in a televised debate on Vietnam with California 
Governor Ronald Reagan, who had forced him onto the 
defensive and easily won the contest, Kennedy almost 
appeared ready to join the campaign fray.
Calmer counsel prevailed, however, and he refused a final 
plea from New York anti-war activist A1 Lowenstein to 
declare his candidacy. Lowenstein went instead to South 
Dakota Senator George McGovern, who refused on the grounds 
that he was up for re-election, and then to Senator Eugene 
McCarthy from Minnesota who, to general surprise, accepted.
McCarthy formally declared his candidacy on November 30, 
and ensured that some of the Democratic primaries, at least, 
would be dominated by the Vietnam issue.
Kennedy's long silence in the second half of 1966 had
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forced many to conclude that he was a cynical opportunist, 
and his delay in entering the presidential race only 
confirmed this view. A full three and a half months after 
McCarthy had declared (and thereby "split the party" - a 
reason Kennedy always put forward himself for not running), 
he eventually threw his hat into the ring.
What probably tipped the scales, apart from various 
family members urging him on, and an increasingly 
embarrassing position which, he believed, meant that 
McCarthy was taking over much of the constituency which was 
rightfully his, was the Tet offensive. At the end of
January 1968, the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong 
guerrillas based in the south launched a large-scale 
operation against US troops throughout South Vietnam. 
Although a failure in strictly military terms, which 
resulted in extraordinarily high casualty figures for the 
guerrillas, it was a devastatingly successful psychological 
coup.
It exploded the myth that the US was about to win the 
war, as the Viet Cong struck at the most protected American 
enclaves - including the US embassy in Saigon, which it 
captured for several hours - proving that the US army was 
failing dismally to subjugate the Communists.
The Tet offensive (so named because it took place during 
the Vietnamese religious holiday of Tet) also increased US 
public resistance to the war, although a Gallup poll taken 
just before the offensive showed 70% of the public in favour 
the bombing. "Half a million American soldiers, with
700,000 Vietnamese allies, with total command of the air.
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total command of the sea, backed by huge resources and the 
most modern weapons, are unable to secure even a single city 
from the attacks of an enemy whose total strength is about 
2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , Kennedy told an audience in Chicago on February
7.
If he was not to lose his status as the most important 
anti-war figure in the country, Kennedy would have to act, 
and he did. During his trip to Chicago, Mayor Daley 
mentioned to him the possibility of setting up a 
Presidential commission to review the war. Just before 
Kennedy declared his candidacy, after McCarthy's narrow loss 
to Johnson in the New Hampshire primary had proved that the 
President was more vulnerable than almost all the experts 
had predicted, he made a last-ditch attempt at the 
commission idea.
Kennedy met with the new Secretary of Defense Clark 
Clifford in mid-March to discuss the proposal. Conflicting 
reports of the meeting make it impossible to know for sure 
what was said, but it appears as though Kennedy offered not 
to enter the presidential race if a serious effort was made 
to set up a commission to review the war.
The commission idea could never have worked, of course, 
as no president would accept the usurpation of his power in 
such a way. However, Kennedy probably went through the 
motions of proposing it anyway to make clear to party bosses 
that he had gone the extra mile, and really had been left 
with no alternative other than to go for the nomination.
Moreover, the most serious proponent of the commission 
idea had been Mayor Daley, with whom Kennedy could not
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afford to fall out if he was to have a serious chance of the 
nomination ("Daley's the ball game", he noted to an aide 
during the campaign)
Inevitably, the commission idea was rejected by Johnson. 
The President's decision to ignore the findings of another 
commission, into the race riots of the previous summer, also 
spurred Kennedy towards announcing his candidacy.
The Kerner Commission Report, published on 29 February, 
cited white racism a major cause of the disturbances and, 
together with the failure of US foreign policy, provided 
Kennedy with reason enough to join the race.
When he declared, however, most of the country was still 
probably hawkish, although the impetus was definitely moving 
towards the doves. Media comment against the war was just 
beginning to take off, and major atrocities against 
Vietnamese civilians were still secret at this time.
In fact, at exactly the time Kennedy was declaring his 
candidacy in Washington on March 16, 1968, the infamous My 
Lai massacre was taking place in Vietnam, when US troops 
from Charlie Company murdered hundreds of innocent 
civilians.
That Saturday morning, as GIs raped, murdered and 
mutilated their way through 400 defenceless Vietnamese 
civilians, Kennedy was announcing his candidacy to end the 
war. "I run because I am convinced that this country is on 
a perilous course.... For the reality of recent events in 
Vietnam has been glossed over with illusions, " he 
announced.
Earlier that week, he had hit on the morality theme again
169
on his strongest speech yet on Vietnam. "Are we like the God 
of the Old Testament that we can decide here in Washington, 
D.C., what cities, what towns, what hamlets in Vietnam are 
going to be destroyed?" he had demanded in the Senate.His 
public comments on the war in the next few weeks were often 
even more emotional. Kennedy’s best chance of capturing 
the nomination, thought his campaign team, was to 
concentrate on his public appeal. In this way, the thinking 
went, he would not only generate valuable votes in the 
primaries he entered, but also persuade party bosses (who 
held the key to many more convention delegates) that he was 
the likeliest candidate to win in November.
"We're going to do it a new way - in the streets," 
predicted Senate aide Adam WalinskyStudent  audiences 
would convey this idea best, as they were often wildly 
enthusiastic about Kennedy, and identified with his "pop 
star" image. Consequently, many of Kennedy's speeches were 
made at college campuses so television viewers could now 
witness how popular the candidate was (black audiences were 
often just as emotionally charged as students, but such 
images sent the wrong sort of signals to television 
watchers, so Kennedy tried to avoid addressing them in such 
a way).
To hype up a student crowd, of course, Kennedy 
concentrated his attacks on the Vietnam war, which by now 
was very unpopular on campuses. "Can we ordain to ourselves 
the awful majesty of God - to decide what cities and 
villages are to be destroyed, who will live and who will 
die, and who will join the refugees wandering in a desert of
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our own creation?" he asked at Kansas State University/’ 
Most of his major addresses in the first days after he 
announced his candidacy were to these sorts of audiences 
who, according to various reports, were "wild, 
"uncontrollable", or simply "frenzied".
In California, he spoke to what reporter Jules Witcover 
described as "a mob scene that in size, frenzy and physical 
threat of stampede rivalled anything that DeMille ever had 
committed to film"
Kennedy hammered on at his emotional Vietnam theme. "Our 
brave young men dying in the swamps of Southeast Asia. 
Which of them might have written a poem? Which of them might 
have cured cancer? Which of them might have played in a 
World Series or given us the gift of laughter from the stage 
or helped build a bridge or a university? Which of them 
would have taught a child to read?"^^
In Los Angeles ("before one more screaming crowd," as 
Arthur Schlesinger remembered it^ )^ , he accused Johnson of 
calling on "the darker impulses of the American spirit". 
Even sympathetic journalists were uncomfortable with the 
emotive attacks, and some press reports described the 
senator as a demagogue.
Kennedy was making an overt attempt to cash in on the 
emotion surrounding his name, but defended his actions by 
suggesting that the system left him with no alternative." I 
have to win through the people. Otherwise I'm not going to 
win, " he explained to the New York Post
The first primary contest was in Indiana, however, which 
was among the most conservative above the Mason-Dixon line.
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Wallace had done very well there in 1964, winning 30% of the 
vote in the Democratic primary, and Kennedy had to modify 
his approach for the primary, scheduled for May 7.
After Johnson's sensational withdrawal from the race on 
March 31, Kennedy was left to slug it out with McCarthy in 
the rest of the primaries without substantial differing over 
the main issue of Vietnam.
In Indiana, at least, a "favourite son" candidate was 
standing. Governor Roger Branigan represented the powerful 
local machine, and by beating him Kennedy could show the 
Daleys that his organisation was just as powerful as theirs. 
With Johnson out, Branigan's candidacy was interpreted as an 
effort for Vice-President Humphrey, who had announced his 
candidacy in the days after Johnson's withdrawal.
However, with the main primary contests now between 
McCarthy and Kennedy, the war receded as an issue, and 
became secondary to that of race. The "ghetto problem" was 
brought into focus even more sharply four days after 
Johnson's announcement that he was no longer a candidate, 
when Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis. The 
killing sparked off a wave of violent reaction in nearly 
every major US city, and put the whole question of racial 
violence top of the political agenda.
Kennedy's win (by 42% to Branigan's 31% and McCarthy's 
27%) was fairly impressive, given his lack of local party 
support. The New Republic noted that "of the top 100 
Democrats in the state who backed John F. Kennedy in the 
1960 primary, only one. . .went with Robert Kennedy this year. 
Of some 200 top elected officials, such as mayors and
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legislators, only three had announced for Kennedy 10 days 
before the primary".
Foreign policy featured well down the list of most
voters' concerns in Indiana. Kennedy concentrated on the 
"law and order" issue, and where he did mention
international affairs, it was, as one reporter noted, to 
"remind his listeners that he knew how to take a ' firm line' 
against the Communists, having learned this during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis".^
That this line had not been quite as firm as Kennedy was 
claiming was, of course, not discovered until after his 
death, but it probably did not make a crucial difference
anyway, as most voters tended to regard Kennedy as radical
or not largely on the basis of what he looked like.
So despite all his soul-searching on the Vietnam war, 
despite the months of inner turmoil on when, and how, to
best criticise the administration's policies on Vietnam,
when it finally came down to what mattered, votes in 
primaries, the issue was not the most important one.
Democrats in Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota and
California were given the opportunity to choose between 
Kennedy and McCarthy, who offered almost identical proposals 
to end the war. Kennedy won all the contests except Oregon 
where, interestingly, the racial problem was not
significant, and the campaign focused slightly more on 
Vietnam.
In California, the contest between Kennedy and McCarthy 
predictably concentrated on domestic issues, although the 
war and one or two other, more minor foreign policy issues.
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did surface sporadically during the campaign.
Foreign affairs were cited repeatedly by Kennedy during 
the campaign to emphasise his suitability for office. It was 
remarkable that after four years as Attorney General, and 
three and a half years as a New York senator, Kennedy's 
major qualifications for the presidency lay in his 
experience of international events.
During a rather stilted debate on television with 
McCarthy on June 1, for example, Kennedy took several 
opportunities to remind viewers of his broad 
responsibilities in foreign policy during the Kennedy 
administration. "While I was a member of the National 
Security Council for three and a half years, I was involved 
in some of those matters during that period of time in 
connection with Latin America and in connection with Africa, 
with the test ban treaty, and I suppose the most critical 
crisis that has ever been faced by mankind, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in October 1962," he recalled for the benefit 
of voters with amnesia.
A few days before, he had stressed the importance of the 
war as an issue in the campaign, and warned that if neither 
himself nor McCarthy arrived at the convention with a high 
enough number of delegates, Humphrey would be nominated, and 
"there will be no candidate [in November] who has opposed 
the course of the war in Vietnam...".^®
During the televised debate a questioner referred to a 
proposal made by Kennedy that week that the US send 50 
Phantom jets to Israel, and asked McCarthy if he agreed. 
McCarthy said he did, and the issue was passed over quickly
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as a minor one on which the candidates did not disagree.
Four days later, Kennedy gave his victory speech in the 
California primary, which he had won by a narrow margin of 
46.3% to 41.8%. He did not realise - ever - that the gap had 
been so tight, as the full returns did not come in for some 
time, and showed McCarthy to have done much better than had 
been predicted earlier.
Kennedy gave the routine victory speech, and rounded up 
his remarks with a reminder that "American troops and 
American Marines [are] carrying the major burden of [the 
Vietnamese] conflict"
Then he left the platform where he had been speaking, and 
was assassinated by a Palestinian supposedly motivated by 
Kennedy's support for Israel. Kennedy - however disturbed 
the reasoning of his assassin - was apparently killed over 
an issue of foreign policy.
Although he never held any ambassadorship, had never 
worked in the State Department, and had never been based in 
any country other than his own, Kennedy had staked his bid 
for the presidency primarily on his experience in 
international affairs, and his alternative suggestions for 
America's role in the world.
He had come along way in a decade (in 1956 he had voted 
for Eisenhower), and his political contribution is generally 
remembered for his advice during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and his opposition to the Vietnam war.
In 1985, Eugene McCarthy noted that the deal which 
finally ended the Vietnam war was based on proposals put 
forward during the Democratic Convention of 1968. "Kissinger
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negotiated the deal and said he based it on the Democratic 
plank of 1968. That plank was a Kennedy plank - it was the 
one suggested by Bobby Kennedy's people and adopted at the 
convention.
These last two chapters have attempted to assess Robert 
Kennedy's wider contribution to American foreign policy. His 
foreign policy legacy lies in the reputation he forged 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when with his brother he 
struck a secret deal with the Soviets which averted an 
escalation of hostilities.
In international affairs, he appears to have operated 
with a generally free hand during his White House days, 
moving the US fleet close to the Dominican Republic during 
a critical juncture there, and bartering with Cuban leader 
Fidel Castro over prisoners taken at the Bay of Pigs.
He claimed to have entered the Senate to influence 
foreign policy, and based his opposition of the Johnson 
administration largely on the Vietnam War, speaking out 
against it as early as February 1966.
He was not the most powerful or consistent opponent of 
the war, however, and other senators led Congressional 
opposition to its conduct. On other issues, Kennedy 
demonstrated remarkable judgement, for example in the 
policies he advocated for US relations with Latin America 
and Africa.
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VI - THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
"On to Chicago and let's win there..." - RFK, June 5 
1968.
EXACTLY when Kennedy decided to run for president in 
unclear. He had hovered near the brink of declaring himself 
a candidate for much of 1967. By January 1968 he was ready 
to go, and then suddenly pulled back from an announcement, 
momentarily frightened that it would be a reckless and 
harmful decision.
In many ways, of course, he had been running as an 
undeclared candidate ever since he entered the Senate in 
January 1965 (some Democrats believed he should have been a 
presidential candidate even before that, and during the 1964 
primaries he won write-in votes in six states, including 
more than 19% of the Massachusetts primary vote).
However, he never seriously considered challenging 
Johnson for the presidency that year, although of course he
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was initially disappointed not to be offered the 
vice-presidency. By the 1966 mid-term elections, however, 
rumours that Kennedy might stand in '68 were beginning to 
gain momentum. His diligent campaigning for Democrats during 
the ' 66 elections led many to believe he was granting 
favours he would soon ask to be returned in the form of help 
with his own campaign.
He was particularly popular with candidates whose 
campaigns had financial problems. As the Wall St Journal of 
October 17 1966 explained: "When a Kennedy comes for a
fund-raising affair, not only do tickets sell fast but the 
local party keeps practically all the proceeds. When Mr 
Johnson or Mr Humphrey comes for a fund-raiser, anywhere 
from 50% to 100% of the proceeds usually must go to the 
Democratic National Committee in Washington.
Kennedy made a series of appearances for both those with 
safe seats and no-hopers that autumn, and took the 
opportunity to impress party bosses with the enthusiasm he 
could generate among voters. With an eye on courting the 
sort of constituency he would focus on during his own 
campaign, he made a series of appearances in Polish-American 
districts of Chicago, and joined a motorcade through the 
city with the all-important Mayor Daley, whose support would 
be crucial to any Kennedy bid for the presidency.
Speculation during 1966 that he might make an assault on 
the White House two years later was fired by a series of 
opinion polls showing Kennedy a popular alternative to 
Johnson. A Gallup poll in March that year suggested Kennedy 
would be preferred to Nixon by 54% to 41% of all voters, and
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a Harris poll in September had him leading President Johnson 
by 47% to 41% among Democrats, and by 39% to 37% among all 
voters.^
Such statistics we bound to provide fuel for media 
commentary on Kennedy's chances for 1968, and several pieces 
appeared towards the end of '66 exploring the prospects of 
his taking on Johnson during the '68 primaries. Most agreed 
that it would be unlikely that Kennedy would announce in 
1968, but would rather wait until 1972, when Johnson would 
not be standing for re-election, and the other likely 
candidate, Hubert Humphrey, would be regarded as out of 
touch by many of the younger generation.
Helen Hill Miller in The New Republic of October 15 noted 
it was "foolish to talk about Robert Kennedy in '68", but 
outlined how he might be forced into the race if the war in 
Vietnam continued and the president's popularity remained in 
decline.^ The Nation of November 14 suggested that a Kennedy 
bid in '68 was "improbable, but hardly impossible", and 
predicted that the senator would wait until 1972.^
Kennedy's problem was that neither '68 nor '72 were the 
optimum years for him to run for president. In 1968 he would 
have been a senator for less than four years, and would not 
have developed his alternative coalition enough to be sure 
of a strong campaign. Moreover, it would mean taking on the 
incumbent president who personally hated him, and risk 
splitting the Democratic Party. Johnson could also stop the 
war practically overnight, and so deprive Kennedy of his 
most important issue.
By waiting until 1972, however, there was a danger that
183
someone else might begin to attract Kennedy's new-found 
national constituency. A less cautious Democrat might even 
run against Johnson in '68 and win. The 1970 gubernatorial 
elections could throw up a young, liberal candidate who 
might usurp Kennedy's place as the new radical hope. Kennedy 
had already voiced worries about New York Republican Mayor 
Lindsay and anyway, 1972 was a long way off, and Kennedy's 
popularity might wane in the intervening years.
In many ways Kennedy was like an Olympic athlete who 
peaks off-year. The ideal time for him to run for president 
would have been around 1970 when, of course, there was no 
election, so he was left with the choice of running too 
early, or leaving it too late.
The dilemma dogged him throughout 1966 and 1967, and 
advisors offered conflicting opinions right up until he 
announced in mid-March '68. One of the first to suggest he 
run was Senate aide Adam Walinsky, who outlined the case in 
a memo to the senator the day after the November '66 
elections. "Johnson is a lame duck," proposed Walinsky, and 
over the next year the rest of Kennedy's Senate staff joined 
in the effort to persuade him to run in '68.^
During 1967, however, nearly everyone else in the Kennedy 
entourage, including most of JFK's former advisors, (and 
principally his brother, Ted) urged caution, believing that 
Johnson was unbeatable and that Kennedy could spoil his 
chances for '72 if he pushed too quickly. In March '67, Hugh 
Sidey noted in Life magazine that "the last thing Kennedy 
wants to do is run in '68".^ In fact, Kennedy probably quite 
fancied the idea of campaigning in '68, but it was not a
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question of personal like or dislike. Kennedy, 
characteristically, would only run if he thought he could 
win, and kept himself out of the race until he was convinced 
he could get the nomination.
Nevertheless, as the 1968 primaries approached, the 
growing anti-war movement began to search round for a 
presidential candidate, and naturally made advances to 
Kennedy. Allard Lowenstein represented various political 
organisations on the left (he was a former president of the 
National Student Association and in 1967 a vice-chairman of 
the liberal ADA), and headed the search for an anti-Johnson 
Democrat to stand for president.
By the second half of 1967 Lowenstein was hopeful that 
Kennedy might be persuaded to enter the race, even though 
the senator had taken strenuous efforts not to upset the 
administration too much. In June, at a dinner in New York, 
Kennedy had described Johnson as "one who had borne the 
burdens of the world as few other men have ever borne 
them"
Two months later, on a plane to California, Lowenstein 
asked Kennedy for the first time if he would be the anti-war 
candidate. Kennedy declined, and Lowenstein began to search 
for other contenders. A list of possibles was suggested, 
including Martin Luther King, child psychologist Dr Benjamin 
Spock and the economist and former ambassador to India John 
Kenneth Galbraith (who was genuinely interested in the 
possibility but could not overcome the constitutional 
handicap of having been born in Canada).
Lowenstein turned to Congressman Don Edwards of
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California®, and Senator Frank Church of Idaho, both 
opponents of the war. Both said no. He approached retired 
General James M. Gavin, who had denounced American 
involvement in Vietnam. Gavin would have made an attractive 
candidate, but unfortunately was a Republican. As 1967 wore 
on, the pressure for Lowenstein to come up with a credible 
anti-war candidate increased.
In October, an estimated 50,000 anti-war protestors 
demonstrated outside the Pentagon, and the peace movement 
was gaining such momentum that early the same month a group 
of Kennedy's advisors met to explore the possibility of him 
joining the race in '68 after all. Most were still against 
it (although, incredibly, the prospect that Johnson might 
offer Kennedy the vice-presidency the following year was 
still discussed as a serious possibility).
At the end of October, more and more politicians were 
urging Kennedy to run. In a response to a question at 
Berkeley, Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota declared that 
"times arise in politics when an individual like Bobby 
Kennedy has no right to calculate that things will be better 
for him personally if he waits until 1972".*
Early indications also showed that the anti-war movement 
might enjoy more political muscle than had previously been 
expected. In November, the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) 
managed to register 71,000 people and have its name included 
on the California primary ballots.
Kennedy would not be swayed, however, and Lowenstein 
returned to the Senate offices, to ask George McGovern of 
South Dakota if he would run. McGovern considered the offer
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for a few weeks, but declined. He was up for re-election in 
1968, had only won in 1962 by 597 votes, and believed the 
risk of losing his Senate seat was too great to embark on a 
presidential campaign. He did suggest, however, that 
Lowenstein should ask Eugene McCarthy, who was not up for 
re-election.
McCarthy was a successful senator - he had been mooted 
as possible running-mate for Johnson had LBJ won the 
nomination in 1960, and was very nearly offered the position 
in 1964. That year he was re-elected to the Senate by the 
biggest majority ever achieved by a Democrat in Minnesota, 
and was an influential senator, enjoying membership of the 
two most important committees. Finance and Foreign 
Relations.
When McCarthy accepted Lowenstein's invitation at the end 
of 1967 to be a focus for the anti-war movement, Kennedy was 
immediately cornered. A McCarthy effort, if only partially 
successful, threatened to attract the constituency of 
dissent Kennedy had so assiduously cultivated in the 
previous years. If McCarthy's candidacy bombed, on the other 
hand, it would strengthen Johnson's grip on the party and 
would suggest that the anti-war liberals were incapable of 
electoral success.
McCarthy announced his presidential bid at the end of 
October. The first primary was scheduled for March 12, in 
New Hampshire. Meanwhile, Kennedy dithered. The organisation 
he was trying to build was not ready to propel him to the 
White House, he believed. At the end of 1967, although very 
popular throughout the country, he could count on the
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support of very few labour leaders, and very few party 
bosses. Both would be needed to win the nomination in 1968.
The party had not fully emerged from the days when a few 
key Democrats in a few key states could all but decide on 
the nominee. In Illinois, of course, Daley still ruled from 
Chicago. In California, too, there were the remnants of the 
old machine (although Jesse Unruh from that state was, at 
least, on Kennedy's side). In Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania 
and Texas - the other states which sent more than 100 
delegates to the 1968 convention - Kennedy would have to 
rely on local heavyweights to provide delegate votes.
By January, Kennedy was torn between jumping into the 
race, thereby unleashing a wave of resentment against his 
splitting the party, and standing aside to see McCarthy 
steal his place at the spearhead of dissent. That month, Ted 
Kennedy returned from Vietnam and reported on the refugee 
problem first-hand. However, along with most advisors, Ted 
still counselled that Robert Kennedy should not enter the 
campaign, and should bide his time until 1972.
Nevertheless, Ted's report about the state of things in 
Vietnam seriously tempted Kennedy to announce in late 
January. His supporters - some of them politically very 
valuable - were beginning to leave him to join the McCarthy 
campaign. Despite working for McCarthy, Lowenstein was still 
urging Kennedy to run. In a stormy meeting between the two 
in January, Kennedy cited the usual reasons he was going to 
stay out (too difficult to win, spoil his chances for '72, 
disrupt party unity, etc). "The people who think that the 
honour and future of this country are at stake don't give a
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shit what Mayor Daley and Chairman X and Governor Y think. 
We're going ahead and we're going to win, and it's a shame 
you're not with us because you could have been president," 
countered Lowenstein.^® Kennedy was impressed by such 
arguments, and almost decided to join the race.
Then, just as he was on the brink of declaring, the North 
Koreans seized the American ship Pueblo. Immediately, 
President Johnson called up 14,000 reserves and, briefly, 
the public were with him. The incident reminded Kennedy how 
such small events, completely outside his control, could 
determine the popularity of the President and, therefore, 
the success of his own campaign. A week later, however, 
something else changed his mind again. On January 31 the 
Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive. Attacking cities 
throughout South Vietnam, the guerrillas even raided the 
American Embassy in Saigon and held the compound for several 
hours. It was a devastating psychological blow for the 
Americans who were convinced that they were winning the war, 
and as news of the offensive reached the United States, 
public opinion began to swing away from the administration 
and towards the peace protestors.
On February 8, while reports from Vietnam were beginning 
to recognise the significance of the of the Viet Cong 
attacks, Kennedy breakfasted with Richard Daley in Chicago. 
Kennedy hovered once again on the brink of announcing, but 
Daley persuaded him to stall while the idea of a special 
commission on the war was explored.
Kennedy held off, but pressure was growing for him to 
announce. The Tet offensive had generated substantial unease
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among the public, and McCarthy appeared likely to capitalise 
on the mounting disquiet. Apart from the war, Kennedy was 
also outraged at the White House reaction to the Kerner 
Commission's reports into inner-city riots, published at the 
end of February. The commission criticised some of the Great 
Society programmes, and made important recommendations to 
the president to avert more violence. However, the report 
was received by administration officials with stony silence. 
"He's not gong to do anything about the war, and now he's 
not going to do anything about the cities either!" 
complained Kennedy.
Meanwhile, McCarthy was making the most of public 
dissatisfaction. He began campaigning in New Hampshire at 
the end of January from exactly the same spot where John 
Kennedy had begun his campaign for the presidency eight 
years earlier. Speaking next to a bust of the late president 
on January 25, McCarthy began the first of just 15 days he 
would spend campaigning in the state.
The New Hampshire results shocked the most experienced 
political analysts. McCarthy did not actually beat the 
president but, like the Tet attacks, caused enough damage to 
inflict a massive psychological blow on the administration. 
Johnson took 49.6% of the vote, but McCarthy had won an 
astounding 41.9%.^^
Kennedy's mind was all but made up. He was waiting only 
for the proposal on the war commission to be formally 
rejected, and then he could go. He felt it important that he 
should be seen to have walked the extra mile for peace, and 
for party unity. The goodwill of Mayor Daley was also so
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crucial to Kennedy’s plans that he had to stick with Daley's 
compromise proposal of a special commission until the White 
House rejected it.
At about 5pm on Thursday March 14 (the day after the New 
Hampshire results were declared) , Secretary of Defense Clark 
Clifford called the senator's office and relayed the 
president's formal rejection of the idea. Kennedy was now 
free to run without being charged with failing to explore 
all other options to end the war.
It was the last in a series of hurdles in his own mind
he had to overcome to announce his candidacy. "That night I
decided to run for president," he recalled, although in
reality it had been a protracted process of weighing up
advantages and disadvantages over months, and probably 
12years.
Some close advisors, including President Kennedy's former 
Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, were not aware just how 
close Kennedy was to running, and only at this point knew of 
his immediate plans to announce. So "last-minute" had the 
final decision been, in fact, that The Listener magazine 
dated March 14 was being sold containing an interview with 
Kennedy on why he would definitely not be a candidate.
To qualify for the California primary, he had to formally 
open his campaign by Monday, March 18. For media purposes, 
however, Saturday was obviously the best choice, as it would 
be the biggest news for the widely-read Sunday papers, and 
would guarantee him an interview on one of the popular 
weekend political programmes. Moreover, Sunday was St 
Patrick's Day, and the newly-announced candidate could
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expect large-scale media coverage if he joined the march in 
New York.
So at 10am on Saturday March 16, Kennedy walked into the 
same Senate caucus room where he had interrogated Jimmy 
Hoffa in the 1950s, and where his brother had announced his 
presidential candidacy on January 2, 1960. With the same 
opening line used by John Kennedy that day, the senator 
declared: "I am announcing today my candidacy for the
Presidency of the United States," and in a blatant and 
hopeless attempt to deflect attention away from his personal 
feud with the president, continued: "I do not run for the 
Presidency merely to oppose any man but to propose new 
policies. He then went on to outline why he felt it 
necessary to run - because of the war, and the rioting in 
the cities, and praised McCarthy's "remarkable" campaign.
Kennedy's first major decision as candidate would be 
which primaries to enter. He confirmed at the time of his 
announcement that he would be standing in California (June 
4), and that state law required he also be on the ballot in 
Nebraska (May 14) and Oregon (May 28).
However, to win the nomination Kennedy would have to 
convince the party bosses that he was the most electable 
candidate to put up against the Republicans in November. To 
do this, he would have to enter and win most, if not all, 
the available primaries. More importantly, he would have to 
demonstrate that he could win votes from crucial areas which 
might otherwise go Republican, and that he would elicit 
massive support from traditional Democratic voters. Although 
Kennedy's popularity among black voters was expected, he
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would have to show that he could gain those votes without 
alienating whites, especially blue-collar whites, who might 
otherwise be attracted to a candidate like Nixon.
Moreover, many Democrats who would vote in the primaries 
depended on local Democratic control of their state for 
their jobs. The patronage system was still in place in many 
areas of the US in 1968, and party regulars would be hoping 
to nominate a presidential candidate who would improve their 
chances of success in local elections come November.
Were Kennedy to come across as too liberal, for example, 
or too soft on crime, he might ruin the hopes of a number of 
local Democratic politicians running for office from 
national congress to local city hall.
In Kennedy's case, the doubts arose about his ability to 
attract votes from the white working-class. His position on 
the war was not especially helpful to securing support from 
this traditionally patriotic group, and nor was his 
identification with black aspirations. Although running at 
a time of relative economic prosperity, racial tensions in 
northern cities were becoming to dominate the domestic 
political agenda, as low-income whites voiced their fears 
about increased violence and "preferential treatment" for 
blacks, whose neighbourhoods appeared to be enjoying federal 
investment as a reward for rioting.
It was crucial that Kennedy should make an impressive 
showing among blue-collar whites if Mayor Daley and his 
acolytes were to be convinced. An excellent test of 
Kennedy's pulling-power with this group would be in Indiana, 
the first primary he would enter, to be held on May 7.
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Indiana was known as a hard-line state on racial matters. 
Despite its northern geography, it had traditionally 
afforded the Ku Klux Klan a remarkable level of support. In 
the mid-1920, it was calculated that most members of its 
state legislature were supported by the Klan. In more recent 
times, Alabama Governor George Wallace had become a hero 
among its low-income white population, winning 30% of the 
vote in the 1964 presidential primary. Wallace would run 
well here in the general election of '68, taking 11.5% of 
the vote, and also in the 1972 primaries, when he lost to 
Humphrey by 47% to 41%. The state also had a long military 
tradition, was home of the headquarters of the American 
Legion, and, in the spring of 1968, had no real anti-Vietnam 
war movement.
It did, however, have some compensations for Kennedy. A 
write-in campaign organised against his wishes by hard-core 
supporters had won him 5% of the 1964 primary, and if he 
could win here, in a state with such a tough reputation, it 
would go a long way to persuade the hard-bitten party bosses 
that he was serious candidate. Also, there were several 
large pockets of black voters. In 1967, Richard Hatcher 
became only the second black person ever elected mayor of a 
major US city when he narrowly beat machine candidate John 
Krupa by 1300 votes to win in Gary, Indiana. Kennedy had 
asked aide Dick Tuck to go to Gary and help Hatcher during 
the election, and so in 1968 not only had a political lOU 
from the mayor but also an aide with expertise of the city's 
electorate.
Kennedy's initial task was to win the Indiana primary
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convincingly, and win it with a significant number of 
blue-collar votes from white districts. Much of his campaign 
concentrated on this effort, and his staff were quick to 
highlight any evidence that he was popular in these areas.
For years, much of the Robert Kennedy legend has relied 
on the voting figures from Indiana, and they have been used 
to "prove" that Kennedy could have brought about some sort 
of magical coalition between low-income whites and blacks 
throughout the country. However, this belief is rooted more 
in the skilful manipulation of Kennedy's spin doctors than 
in real evidence.
Kennedy strove hard for the white "ethnic" vote, as it was 
called. He also had certain advantages over McCarthy and his 
other opponent. Governor Roger Branigan (a stand-in for 
President Johnson and then, after Johnson's withdrawal on 
March 31, Vice-President Humphrey). Kennedy had, after all, 
been "head cop" for four years as attorney general, and 
therefore was a poor target for those hoping to suggest that 
as a liberal he was soft on crime.
Many of the whites he was hoping to attract were Irish 
(although McCarthy, too, was also Irish and Catholic) and 
had regarded President Kennedy as near-saintly, and a 
validation of their cultural origins. Others were Polish. 
Kennedy had been very enthusiastically received during his 
trip to Poland after President Kennedy's death and, of 
course, had a reputation for not compromising with the 
Soviets from his dealings over the Cuban missile crisis 
(that this reputation was ill-founded was not revealed until 
after his death).
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Kennedy consistently emphasised his law and order 
credentials during the Indiana campaign. "I was the chief 
law-enforcement officer of this country for four years," he 
kept reminding voters in the state.However, the emphasis 
on crime and race during the Indiana campaign was not just 
Kennedy's attempt to shift the agenda onto issues where he 
would be strong with low-income whites.
After President Johnson's dramatic withdrawal from the 
race on March 31, the war temporarily receded as the primary 
issue between the Democratic candidates. Kennedy and 
McCarthy were both doves, and so in the day immediately 
following Johnson's pull-out, the other major concern - 
violence in the cities - began to increase in importance. It 
became dominant when, four days after Johnson's 
announcement, Martin Luther King was assassinated, provoking 
riots in almost every major city across the country.
Kennedy was in Indianapolis the night of King's death, 
and helped to avert violence by speaking in the heart of the 
city's ghetto. Such gestures confirmed his reputation as 
someone that blacks would listen to, and someone who might 
be able to stop them rioting. Such qualities were important 
to the working-class whites Kennedy was hoping to attract.
There were those, of course, who regarded Kennedy's close 
relationship with black voters as dangerous, believing that 
such familiarity could only breed contempt, and that his 
identification with black pride encouraged the violence.
In a poorly-timed piece on the eve of Martin Luther 
King's death, the Wall St Journal suggested that voters 
might hold Kennedy responsible if the Poor People's Campaign
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in Washington turned violent: "Might there not be a sharp 
reaction against him as the man whose speeches helped stir 
the rioters?" it a s k e d I n  fact, in the following days 
Kennedy accompanied police through the streets of the 
capital, helping to defuse tension in the black 
neighbourhoods.
Officially, the campaign was suspended for a week after 
King's death, but Kennedy's trips to riot-torn Washington, 
and the emotion his appearance at King's funeral elicited 
from the black crowds, cemented his image as someone black 
leaders could do business with. The frenzied crowds, often 
black, which characterised the television coverage of 
Kennedy's campaigning reaffirmed his support in this area. 
During the Indiana primary, it seemed possible that he might 
be able to pull off the all-important task of gaining votes 
from large numbers of low-income blacks and whites.
At the end of April, just over a week before the vote, 
a detailed Gallup poll of the national electorate revealed 
Kennedy' strengths and limitations.^* Among voters aged 21 
to 29, Kennedy led McCarthy by 41% to 32% (with Humphrey on 
16%). Among voters aged 30 to 49, McCarthy led Kennedy 35% 
to 27%, with Humphrey on 23%. With voters 50 and over, 
McCarthy held on at 32%, with Kennedy trailing Humphrey by 
29% to 25%.
The study also revealed how McCarthy was more popular 
with those who had been to college, leading him to remark 
that "the better-educated people vote for us", but that 
Catholics preferred Kennedy to the former seminarian 
McCarthy by 36% to 30% (although McCarthy did better among
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Protestants, beating Kennedy 33% to 26%).
Perhaps the most important statistic in the study, 
however, was Kennedy's lead over McCarthy and Humphrey among 
labour-union families. Kennedy was narrowly ahead of 
McCarthy by 31% to 29%, with Humphrey, who was popular with 
union bosses, on 27%. This constituency was one of Kennedy's 
prime targets for his coalition, of course. He needed the 
votes of union members, despite the best efforts of many 
employers and union officials to oppose him.
The union hierarchy in Indiana made an impressive effort 
to prevent Kennedy from winning votes among blue-collar 
whites. The Committee on Public Education (COPE), the 
political wing of the AFL/CIO, had 270,000 leaflets 
distributed to industrial workers in the closing weeks of 
the campaign which appealed to their patriotism, and 
ridiculed Kennedy's anti-war position. In language highly 
reminiscent of that used by George Wallace (who urged voters 
to "Stand Up For America") , the COPE leaflets encouraged 
them to "Stand Up For What's Good in America and Be 
Counted
COPE activities would also hinder Kennedy in Oregon. A 
concerted phone campaign there focused on 50,000 union 
members to vote for President Johnson, whose name remained 
on the ballot, even though he was no longer a candidate 
(Johnson won more than 45,000 votes in the Oregon primary, 
more than 12% of the vote).
Kennedy campaigned hard in the so-called "white ethnic" 
areas of Indiana, notably in the southern part of the state 
and in the suburbs around Gary. He was careful to tone down
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his youthful aggressive manner which had characterised the 
early days of his campaign, when he had appeared at 
universities around the country, and generated emotional 
reactions from students.
For Indiana, he had cut his hair, avoided the excesses 
of emotional appeals - which had led several journalists to 
charge him with demagoguery - and emphasised how he would 
cut government expenditure to pay for social programmes. 
Interestingly, the spending cuts he cited most often were in 
research for supersonic travel and space exploration, both 
of which were proposals enthusiastically supported by 
President Kennedy.
In a similarly conservative vein, he stressed the 
money-saving aspects of his urban renewal proposals, calling 
for "a greater partnership between government and private 
enterprise to make our cities live a g a i n " T h e  New York 
Times noted how his fiscal plans "fit perfectly with that 
advocated by Republican leaders in the House of 
Representatives ".
In the last week of the primary campaign, Kennedy's pitch 
for the blue-collar vote appeared to be paying off. More 
importantly, it was seen to be paying off. Winning these 
votes was only half of Kennedy's battle. He also had to 
convince the party bosses like Daley that he his votes had 
come from this constituency, and that he could repeat the 
effect nationwide come November. What was important to 
Kennedy was not only the result, but also the way it was 
reported to the rest of America. Thus in the days before the 
vote, Kennedy aides stressed the importance of the
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blue-collar vote to journalists, and the theme was taken up 
in several media outlets.
In the sort of coverage Kennedy could only pray for, the 
New York Times noted on the day of the election that "In the 
areas surrounding Gary, Mr Kennedy has found substantial 
support in the white working-class wards that went heavily 
to George Wallace in 1964. Some of those voters indicated to 
reporters that although Mr Kennedy had the negro vote they 
looked upon him as a tough Irishman with whom they could 
identify.
The night before the election, Kennedy's campaign ran a 
half-hour television ad emphasising law and order and local 
control over government programmes - both high-priority 
issues for blue-collar whites. To actually win the election, 
Kennedy had only to rely on a heavy black turn-out and an 
average response from the white wards. However, such a 
result would not have been in the best interests of his 
long-term plan to be hailed as the new champion of the white 
working-class.
The total number of those voting in the primary was 
expected at about 600,000. Kennedy could rely on almost all 
of the black vote in the state, which was 135,000, or about 
45% of the total he needed to win an overall majority. The 
NYT reported that "nearly half the votes Senator Kennedy 
hopes to win in this primary could be cast by negroes. If 
this happens, it may be the first time any politician has 
won an important state election from this kind of power 
base. . . "
However, Kennedy could not afford to be seen to have
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relied heavily on the black vote, which could not be so 
easily repeated elsewhere in the country. He did win the 
primary with 328,000 votes in an extremely high turn-out of 
over 775,000 Democrats. However, having won a huge slice of 
the black vote (NBC showed him taking over 90% of it), 
Kennedy's claim to be the first choice of blue-collar whites 
was not that convincing, even though many newspapers (and 
Kennedy biographers) still peddled the idea that he had 
achieved some sort of class-based coalition, and had united 
poor blacks and poor whites to challenge the political 
hierarchy.
Kennedy won with 42% to Branigan's 30%, with McCarthy on 
27%. It was the early media analysis of the results, 
however, which were crucial in shaping the perception of 
what had happened. The idea that Kennedy had secured a 
coalition of poor blacks and whites immediately took root, 
and has lived on in nearly all of the work done on Kennedy 
since his death.
The New York Times correspondent relayed how "Senator 
Kennedy also did well with blue-collar whites in the 
industrial areas and with rural whites. He carried the seven 
largest counties in the state, where George Wallace polled 
his largest vote in the primary of 1964. Thus in Lake 
County, which contains Gary and where both negroes and 
blue-collar whites live. Senator Kennedy polled 57,842 to 
42,902 for McCarthy and 23,290 for Branigan. He carried most 
of the tier counties in the southern part of the state, 
which are peopled by a number of white southern migrants and 
where the Ku Klux Klan was strong in the 1920s, " and
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reported how the senator made his strongest showing "in Lake 
County, near Chicago Daley could hardly fail to be 
impressed by such a triumph on his own door-step.
Several commentators followed the line Kennedy was hoping 
for, and pushed the idea that he had done magnificently well 
among the working-class whites. Television correspondent 
Charles Quinn remembered "all these whites, all these 
blue-collar people and ethnic people who supported 
K e n n e d y " . A  British television programme. This Week, 
covered Kennedy in Indiana and stressed how well he was 
doing with low-income whites^\ After his death, Paul Cowan 
wrote in the Village Voice that Kennedy was "the last 
liberal politician who could communicate with white working 
class A m e r i c a , a n d  author Robert Coles repeated the idea 
that Kennedy "could do the miraculous: attract the support 
of. . .desperate blacks. . .and. . .working class white people"
In his biography of Kennedy, Jack Newfield recounts how 
"Kennedy carried white backlash counties like Hammond, Gary, 
South Bend, East Chicago..." in the Indiana pr i ma r y. I n  
another Kennedy memoirs, David Halberstam supported the 
myth, suggesting that "The Poles in Gary came through, two 
to one... a fine gift for the omnipresent Mayor Daley, and 
Jules Wit cover, in his book about the Kennedy campaign 
called 85 Days, claims that "Precinct breakdowns showed 
[Kennedy won] more than the usual number of blue-collar 
whites for a Democrat in the backlash neighbourhoods".^'
The misconception still survives. On May 15 1992, Sidney 
Blumenthal wrote in The New Republic that "Reforging the 
black-white coalition that briefly cohered in support of
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Robert Kennedy's candidacy has remained an evanescent 
Democratic dream".
The truth, however, was that Kennedy had depended on 
blacks for nearly half of the votes he took to win the 
Indiana primary, and that support from the "white backlash" 
areas was not impressive at all. Kennedy did win industrial 
centres like Gary, but largely on the strength of his black 
support. McCarthy won the white suburbs which had gone for 
Wallace four years before. Without the huge black support, 
Kennedy would have run about even with Branigan.
The misconception about Kennedy's victory in the white 
neighbourhoods originates with a column written by Rowland 
Evans and Robert Novak the day after the primary, which 
interpreted the result as Kennedy having won 90% in black 
precincts, and "running two to one ahead in some Polish 
precincts".^ In fact, Kennedy lost 59 out of the 70 white 
precincts in Gary. The mistake is pointed out by Kennedy 
aides William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman in their 
biography of Kennedy, and they concede that "the Kennedy 
campaign organisation believed the misconception and 
encouraged it"
Kennedy himself also believed it, and made a point of 
thanking the blue-collar whites in his victory speech on the 
evening of the primary, and later that night told Larry 
O'Brien: "I've proved I can really be a leader of a broad 
spectrum. I can be a bridge between blacks and whites 
without stepping back from my positions.
Moreover, not only did Kennedy not do as well among 
blue-collar whites as he and many others originally
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believed, there is evidence to suggest that he may have 
fared even worse in other states. Apart from having a 
particularly influential Polish community (with whom Kennedy 
was especially popular for his reputed anti-communism), he 
also held a special appeal to some industrial workers in 
Indiana, without which his meagre vote among whites would 
have been even worse.
Although elsewhere in the country his poor relations with 
labour officials would have been a disadvantage, in some 
quarters of Indiana it was something of a bonus. The 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) harboured 
considerable hostility for Kennedy, but the IBT had a 
history of extremely poor relations with truckers in 
Indiana, which may well have worked to Kennedy's advantage.
Although Indiana steel haulers were officially a part of 
the IBT, Teamster boss Jimmy Hoffa had done little to 
advance their cause, believing that these "owner-operators" 
were not proper teamsters. This attitude had led to a 
long-running feud between Hoffa and the steel-haulers. The 
year before Kennedy entered the Indiana primary, a new 
agreement had been worked out between the employers and 
Hoffa which - while very beneficial to most drivers - had 
not done much for the steel haulers.
Steel hauler Bill Kusley led a wildcat strike in Indiana 
in June 1967, which was opposed by the IBT. Violence 
between Hoffa's IBT and the newly-formed Fraternal 
Association of Steel Haulers (FASH) broke out in the 
following weeks, and in August Kusley's strikers began to 
picket the Teamster offices in Indiana in an overt show of
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defiance.
More violence ensued, and although the strike was called 
off in late '67, the residual bad feeling between FASH and 
the IBT carried on for some years. Exactly how much Kennedy 
benefited from the anti-Hoffa feeling in the state is 
difficult to quantify, but Hoffa biographer Walter Sheridan 
was sent by Kennedy to Indiana to maximise support among 
industrial workers. In fact, and early casualty of Kennedy's 
investigations during the McClellan hearings had been the 
corrupt (Democrat) mayor of Gary, who was indicted as a 
result of Kennedy's enquiries. Presumably, Kennedy cashed in 
on some residual popularity gained from ousting a criminal 
politician the decade before. Blue-collar whites around the 
rest of the country might not have been so well-disposed 
towards Kennedy. (The IBT in Indiana backed Governor 
Branigan during the primary.)
Nevertheless, whatever the true figures of the Indiana 
primary, Kennedy had won the battle to create an impression 
of himself as someone who could win the votes of poor 
whites. What was genuinely impressive, however, was the 
extent to which blacks supported him. He not only won about 
90% of the Indiana black vote, but on the same day swept the 
primary in Washington DC by 62% to Humphrey's 37%. The 
capital's overwhelmingly black population favoured Kennedy 
by a huge margin, despite Humphrey's impressive civil rights 
record. Kennedy's Washington DC slate even included black 
radical Colin Carew.
Although John Kennedy had done well among blacks, who had 
supported him in some crucial states and held the balance of
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votes in his 1960 victories in Chicago, Michigan and 
Pennsylvania, Robert Kennedy was far more popular with 
non-white voters. In fact, only 68% of non-white voters went 
for Kennedy in 1960 - the lowest total of any Democratic 
presidential candidate since 1952 (except for Adlai 
Stevenson, who won 61% in 1956, but 79% in 1952). In a poll 
featured in New York Magazine in July 1968, 92% of Harlem 
residents said that the death of their senator affected them 
as much, if not more, than the death of President Kennedy. 
McCarthy saw "no need to stir up the blacks and minorities. 
They were Bobby's people and I saw no point in wasting time 
campaigning there".35
Another area where Kennedy bettered his brother's appeal 
was in the state of Nebraska, which held the next primary 
after Indiana. Although the vast rural area of Nebraska was 
hardly natural territory for Kennedy, if offered him the 
opportunity to keep the momentum from Indiana going and, as 
his opponents hardly bothered to put up a fight in the 
state, to notch up an impressive margin of victory.
John Kennedy's electoral experience in Nebraska eight 
years earlier had been disastrous, losing to Nixon by 62% to 
38% (only the 36% from Mississippi had been worse). During 
the 1960 election, Robert Kennedy had complained to JFK's 
campaign manager in Nebraska, Rip Horton, about his poor 
level of organisation. Kennedy made sure the mistakes were 
not repeated in '68.
Kennedy also enjoyed one or two practical advantages his 
brother never had. Phil Sorenson (brother of JFK advisor 
Ted) had been lieutenant governor of the state for two
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years, and in 1966 had won the gubernatorial primary (though 
lost the general election). His state-wide organisation was 
still intact, and Kennedy made thorough used of it.
While McCarthy made just one visit to the state, and the 
Humphrey campaign relied on the union machine to get out the 
vote, Kennedy made numerous appearances throughout Nebraska, 
and won the primary by 51% to McCarthy's 31% (with combined 
Humphrey and Johnson votes totalling 13%).
Kennedy's staff were keen to interpret the result as more 
evidence of his stunning success among poorer whites, and he 
did win most of the counties with concentrations of Poles 
and Germans. Another statistic the Kennedy campaign was keen 
to push was that he had won in 24 of the 25 counties where 
he had waged a personal campaign (and only lost the other - 
at the University of Nebraska - by two votes) . The 
implication was that Kennedy could break down the hostility 
many felt towards him by appearing in person, and that he 
was become an increasingly attractive candidate.
Once again, however, he had relied on support from the 
black community for his winning margin. The concentration of 
blacks around Omaha had favoured Kennedy by over 85%. 
Nevertheless, Kennedy felt sufficiently lifted by the result 
to make an outright appeal to McCarthy supporters to switch 
to himself as the most hopeful anti-administration 
candidate.
Kennedy had hoped to finish off McCarthy as a serious 
candidate by the Oregon primary, scheduled for May 28, but 
his 31% in Nebraska had kept him in touch, and he was hoping 
for a decent result in Oregon to propel him into the most
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important primary - in California - the following week.
Kennedy, on the other hand, faced problems in Oregon. It 
had no real black voting base on which he could draw, and 
his claims to be the champion of the white working class 
risked exposure. For all his professionalism, too, Kennedy 
made some basic errors in Oregon. He appointed Congresswoman 
Edith Green to run his campaign, largely because she had run 
John Kennedy's successful primary there in 1960, but Green 
was not a popular figure in the state in 1968, as Kennedy's 
intelligence network should have picked up. Kennedy also 
refused an offer to debate McCarthy on television in the 
belief that such exposure could only benefit McCarthy. 
Instead, it made Kennedy look arrogant and helped sway many 
of the don't-knows away from him.
He also began to speak unguardedly to the press. He told 
a reporter on May 21 that "if I get beaten in any primary, 
I am not a very viable candidate".^* The pressure was on 
Kennedy to keep winning - he had to demonstrate to the party 
bosses his claims to be a super-candidate, winning 
everything he entered. (Much of the Kennedy legend was based 
on this principle. In 27 previous political elections, no 
Kennedy had ever lost.)
However, Kennedy had one eye on the California primary, 
and did not ensure that his campaign was organised as it 
should have been. Oregon had little natural constituency to 
offer Kennedy. Prosperous and relatively problem-free, it 
had no obvious ghetto area from which to launch an assault. 
The war was unpopular in the state, but voters preferred 
McCarthy's phlegmatic style to Kennedy's aggression. Gun
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registration was also an important issue for many voters in 
the state, who resented any infringement to their 
constitutional right to bear arms.
On this, McCarthy had a slight edge over Kennedy. While 
Kennedy favoured federal registration and federal 
enforcement, McCarthy was less insistent, and was happy to 
let local states take responsibility for enforcing gun 
controls. In 1967, Kennedy had voted to cut federal funding 
for the National Board for the Protection of Rifle Practice. 
McCarthy had voted against the cut. In an unlucky break for 
Kennedy, too, the revelation that while attorney general he 
had authorised the tap on Martin Luther King's telephone 
broke in the final days of the campaign, resurrecting his 
old ruthless image.
On the eve of the Oregon vote, a Quayle opinion poll 
showed Kennedy holding a slight lead over McCarthy, by 34% 
to 32%. The early returns the next day were good, too. One 
Polish journalist even filed a story to Europe (presumably 
his last) confirming that Kennedy had won.
In reality, Kennedy had been beaten convincingly, by 44% 
to 38%, and his injudicious remark about not be a viable 
candidate if he lost duly reappeared to haunt him. 
Fortunately for him, however, attention swiftly moved on 
towards the California primary, which offered the largest 
number of delegate votes so far (174, compared with 63 from 
Indiana, 35 from Oregon, 30 from Nebraska and 23 from 
Washington DC) . South Dakota (26 votes) also held its 
primary the same day as California.
Although there would be other primaries to follow, in a
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sense California marked the biggest prize for Kennedy. Its 
reputation as a sort of mini-America, containing roughly all 
of the country's facets in microcosm, meant it was the 
perfect place for Kennedy to demonstrate his voter-appeal. 
If he won convincingly, it would probably spell the end of 
McCarthy's campaign, and leave a clear contest between 
himself and Humphrey. Defeat in California, however, would 
almost certainly mean the end of Kennedy's chances to secure 
the nomination.
Kennedy's campaign in California tested his new coalition 
to its limits, as New Leftist Tom Hayden joined in the 
effort with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was to end up in 
the Nixon administration. Kennedy's mixture of new and old 
politics soon ran into trouble, however, over his delegate 
slate, which had been assembled by old-style politician 
Jesse Unruh.
The Peace and Freedom Party, which had surprised many 
conventional politicians by registering enough signatures to 
get on the primary ballot, attacked the slate of delegates 
standing for Kennedy as a largely cynical collection of 
professionals who did not represent the anti-war activists 
he claimed to lead. In fact, many had been ready to stand as 
delegates for President Johnson until they were signalled to 
switch by Unruh. The PFP produced a pamphlet damaging to 
Kennedy in the anti-war movement called "Hookers for 
Kennedy" which exposed much of the delegate slate for what 
it was: a collection of Unruh's political cronies used to 
carving out political deals in the traditional way^ ®.
Not included in this attack on the Kennedy delegates were
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Cesar Chavez, leader of the Mexican-American National Farm, 
Workers' Association, and Paul Schrade, state chief of the 
radical United Auto Workers' Union.Also on the slate from 
the new politics was State Senator Mervyn Dymally, a black 
with militant links and a leading black liberal (now LA 
mayor) Tom Bradley. However, these figures were joined by 
individuals like assemblyman Bob Movetti, who had been in 
favour of the war until just before the election, and had 
sponsored an anti-riot bill which was regarded as hostile to 
blacks.
There were other problems, too. Many Californian pros 
resented the Kennedy machine for imposing one of its own - 
Pierre Salinger - on the state as a senatorial candidate 
during the 1964 elections. Salinger had lost, and although 
the remnants of his organisation were helpful to the Kennedy 
campaign, his candidacy still grated on local Democrats.
Despite these difficulties, Kennedy's personal 
performance in California was excellent. He campaigned to 
the point of exhaustion, drawing impressive crowds wherever 
he went, and rectified his previous mistake of not debating 
McCarthy. In contrast to Oregon, there were plenty of 
centres where Kennedy could count on huge support. Apart 
from the Mexican-American vote, which was almost exclusively 
his following his identification with Chavez's campaigning 
for union recognition, and McCarthy's opposition to migrant 
workers' rights under the minimum wage law, there were also 
large black areas in Watts and around San Francisco. As 
usual, McCarthy's strengths lay in the white suburbs around 
urban centres, and he was aided by at least $50,000 from
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Humphrey's supporters, which was given with the 
vice-president's blessing to stop the Kennedy bandwagon.^
However, it was Kennedy's much-vaunted "personal 
campaigning" which captured the media's imagination. 
"Outside the oldest building in Los Angeles, in the little 
plaza in front of the eighteenth-century mission 
church...worshippers were holding up babies to see their 
champion, and hanging from the branches of liveoaks. In 
Watts they were standing on the roofs of automobiles, 
denting them with their weight, and at Griffith Park in 
Hollywood they were perched on the floodlight pylons, sixty 
feet above the heads of the crowd, " wrote one reporter.
Once again, however, Kennedy had to do more than impress 
journalists that he was popular with blacks. He made a 
special effort with low-income whites and with the sizable 
and influential Jewish vote (on June 18, New York would hold 
the largest primary, sending 190 delegates to the 
convention, and an impressive showing among Jewish voters in 
California would also provide a significant boost to the New 
York campaign).
There was the usual danger, too, that by cosying up to 
black interests Kennedy would put off the more conservative 
whites, and he began to avoid main streets in Watts where 
his motorcade would attract hordes of young blacks and 
television images which would frighten whites.
During the final days of the campaign, Kennedy and 
McCarthy finally met for what proved to be an indecisive and 
disappointing debate. The discussion was aired live on 
television on Saturday June 1 (the day Sirhan Sirhan bought
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his gun) but the contest was bland, with Kennedy repeatedly 
stressing his White House experience - whether it was 
relevant to the question or not. Kennedy scored a minor 
point when he forced an admission that one of McCarthy's ads 
had misrepresented him, claiming that Kennedy was involved 
in the 1965 decision to put US troops in the Dominican 
Republic, when of course Kennedy had left the administration 
by then and had opposed the intervention from his Senate 
seat. Nevertheless, it was a small point and certainly no 
knock-out blow.
More significant, however, was Kennedy's obvious pitch 
to white concerns about black housing. Confident that the 
black vote was his for keeps, Kennedy could afford to make 
extravagant bids for support in white suburbs. When the 
debate turned to urban renewal, Kennedy contrasted his own 
plans for ghetto regeneration with McCarthy's more orthodox 
ideas on inner-city dispersal to the suburbs. " "When you say 
you are going to take 10,000 black people and move them into 
Orange County [a staunchly white backlash area]... you take 
them out where 40% of them don't have any jobs at all", said 
Kennedy.The effect was to petrify Orange County viewers 
and imply that McCarthy was about to inundate them with 
ghetto blacks. It was a cheap shot from Kennedy, and one 
which exposed his preoccupation with diverting white votes 
away from McCarthy. (It also prompted California Governor 
Ronald Reagan to note that Kennedy was "talking more and 
more like me". )
Kennedy, of course, was among the first to recognise what 
a crucial influence television coverage can have on an
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election. As his brother's campaign manager, he had 
encouraged John Kennedy to meet Nixon for the legendary 
debates in 1960. For those debates, 87%
of American had easy access to a television set, a number 
which grew steadily through the 1960s, so that by 1970 the 
figure had risen to 9 5 % Television had developed rapidly 
in those eight years and new levels of technology brought 
with them new demands on the candidates.
The stilted campaign debates were now only one way the 
campaigns were covered. Political media specialists believed 
that for optimum impact a candidate should be featured on 
the nightly news programmes, and so Kennedy conducted a 
sophisticated campaign aimed at maximum tv news exposure.
At that time, California was divided into three 
television areas, centred around San Francisco, Los Angeles 
and San Diego. Hitherto, candidates had circulated from day 
to day among the three areas, sometimes managing to hit two 
areas in the same day by making an appearance in, say, Los 
Angeles in the morning before trekking to San Francisco for 
an early evening event.
However, because of the advances made in jet travel (and 
Kennedy's wealth), he could make appearances in all three 
areas during the same day, when he often did, and so got 
coverage on all three local news stations in the state.
Kennedy's problem, however, was that the coverage was 
generally one-paced, in that it showed him doing much the 
same sort of thing - being surrounded by black (or Mexican) 
faces. Such pictures made good, if repetitive, television, 
but also gave the impression that Kennedy's candidacy relied
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on the emotional reaction of crowds rather than thoughtful 
debate.
McCarthy, on the other hand, used the medium even better 
than Kennedy. Knowing that he was not much of a 
crowd-puller, McCarthy surrendered exposure on the nightly 
news in favour of appearances on daytime chat-shows. These 
suited his calm, witty and relaxed style and were generally 
longer than the quick news clips Kennedy was working so hard 
to achieve. Typically, McCarthy would appear for 15 or 20 
minutes on a chat-show, discussing the state of the nation 
in a measured and reasonable manner, while Kennedy would 
appear for two minutes later on in the evening being crushed 
by youngsters swarming around his car in a ghetto.^
The Kennedy staff realised what was happening, but could 
do little to prevent it. They encouraged television stations 
to go into Kennedy's headquarters and record an interview 
with him, but then he would go off to a rally or some other 
crowd-based event, and when the television station came to 
choose which footage to use that night, the crowd scenes 
were usually preferred, as they made better television.
In the end, Kennedy's win was a victory for his new 
coalition. The final totals were Kennedy 1,472,166 (46%) to 
McCarthy's 1,322,608 (42%). As Kennedy's staff later
conceded, the winning margin "had been fashioned in Los 
Angeles, among the negroes and Mexican-Americans who turned 
out in very high numbers for a primary. McCarthy carried the 
suburban areas around Los Angeles and San Francisco and 
those metropolitan areas, like San Diego, which tend to be 
more conservative and have a specially high proportion of
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white voters who moved to California from the South or 
Southwest."^*
The strong appeal to blacks and Mexican-Americans won 
Kennedy this primary, and not any fusion of poor whites and 
blacks. By working with the new Mexican-American
organisations, lead by Chavez, Kennedy had circumvented the
old political route of party machinery, and had drawn out
black voters in huge numbers. Some Mexican-American 
precincts gave him 100% of the ballot.
"In the counties of the Central Valley, the
Mexican-American vote stimulated by Chavez had given Kennedy 
majorities, but in all the other ranching, agricultural and 
sparcely-settled areas of the state he did poorly, " admitted 
his campaign organisers By working with unorthodox 
political "bosses" like Chavez and "black Jesus", a local 
community leader in Oakland, Kennedy applied the old rules 
to the new game. Some of these figures from his coalition of 
new politics could still be used like old ward managers, 
turning out the vote for the appointed candidate.
"In Mexican districts that morning [of the primary], in 
house after house, workers came around saying very simply: 
'Cesar says this is the day to vote for Robert Kennedy'. It 
was the biggest turnout in their history. They voted roughly 
15-1 over McCarthy..." noted one journalist.^®
One area where Kennedy had succeeded with whites, 
however, was with the Jewish vote, and thanks to concerted 
efforts in the last weeks of the campaign, had drawn about 
level with McCarthy - a good omen for what might have 
transpired in New York.
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An equally encouraging result came from the South Dakota 
primary, which Kennedy won with surprising ease, beating 
McCarthy by 49% to 20%. What was especially gratifying, 
however, was that Humphrey only managed 30% (it was actually 
still Johnson's name which appeared on the ballot, but a 
vote for LBJ was recognised as support for his 
vice-president). Humphrey was born in South Dakota, and 
should have appealed strongly to its farming communities. 
Had Kennedy not been killed, it could have proved a damaging 
blow to Humphrey as the party bosses would have been 
unimpressed with such a poor showing in his native state.
Had Kennedy lived, however, it is unlikely that the 
California result would have knocked McCarthy out of the 
race. McCarthy had finished a strong second and may have 
fancied his chances of beating Kennedy in New York. In fact, 
McCarthy went on to win in New York on June 18, taking 63 
delegates (30 still went for Kennedy, even though he was 
dead, in the hope that another candidate might emerge behind 
whom they could rally).
If Kennedy had gone on to win the nomination, it is 
likely that he would have done so not on the strength of 
blue-collar white support, but on massive turnouts from 
black and Mexican-American areas. This sort of power base 
might have frightened the party power brokers, but Kennedy's 
staff may have been able to keep the real nature of his 
coalition hidden, and exaggerated instead his popularity 
with white ethnics to make the constituency appear more 
palatable.
Of course, most of the delegates at the convention would
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corne from states without primaries, and while Kennedy was 
busy demonstrating his voter appeal, Humphrey was quietly 
picking up delegate promises from around the country. 
Ultimately, however, the party would probably have gone for 
the candidate which it believed was most electable (unlike 
in recent years, where the wider primary system has thrown 
up a series of losing nominees) . The 1968 nomination was 
largely decided by the party professionals, however, and 
Kennedy aide Richard Goodwin recalls the conversation he had 
with the senator after the first California returns were in 
and just before Kennedy left his suite in the Ambassador 
hotel to make his victory speech.
According to Goodwin, Kennedy believed that too many 
delegates not subject to primary results were controlled by 
governors and other establishment political leaders beholden 
to Johnson and Humphrey, and put his own chances of securing 
the nomination at 50-50.^^ Nevertheless, others on his staff 
were confident after the California result that they had the 
potential to win enough delegates.
Figures drawn up by Kennedy's campaign and shown to the 
senator on the evening of the California primary estimates 
of his delegate strength - either firmly committed or 
"preferring" him at 524 delegates, out of a total of 1,312 
needed to win.^®
McCarthy, at that point, had 204 delegates either 
committed to him, or preferring him for the first ballot. 
Humphrey, on the other hand, already had 994, with only 872 
left undecided. It would have been a tall order for Kennedy, 
but if he could have pulled off a victory in New York (where
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he certainly would have been favourite) he may have managed 
it. His organisers predicted that come the convention, they 
would have most of McCarthy's delegates, and were aiming at 
a total of 1,432 to Humphrey's 1,153.
Despite McCarthy's declaration in 1985 that "I was 
prepared to give my delegates over to Ted on the second 
ballot, but I wouldn't have done it for B o b b y M c C a r t h y ' s  
campaign manager Jeremy Larner conceded that at the Chicago 
convention "it was commonly accepted that no delegate count 
on earth could have stopped Ted's brother from taking the 
nomination"
There is only a limited point in guessing what would have 
happened at the convention, or in the general election in 
November, but had Kennedy won the nomination, it appears 
likely that he would have been a stronger candidate than 
Humphrey, and beaten Nixon fairly easily.
Of course, the results from November '68 are complicated 
by Wallace's candidacy as an independent, and Kennedy 
supporters' claims that he would have taken significant 
numbers of Wallace votes had he lived. In July that year, 
the Village Voice suggested that "many of them [Wallace 
supporters] planned to vote for Kennedy this year...but now 
that Kennedy is dead they are nearly lost to the 
Democrats" However, the hard evidence for supposing that 
Kennedy was the first choice of many Wallace voters remains 
fairly thin. For example. Lake County went to Humphrey in 
November anyway (by 47% to Nixon's 36% and Wallace's 16%), 
so a Kennedy nomination might not have been very beneficial 
in attracting white ethnic support.
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Wallace did cost the Democrats victory, however. If 
Kennedy (or any other candidate) had done only marginally 
better than Humphrey in a small number of states, it would 
have been enough to swing the election. Apart from the 46 
electoral college votes which Wallace won outright, Wallace 
came second or held the balance of votes in 222 more. Nixon 
beat Humphrey by 301 electoral votes to 191, and by a 
popular vote of 43.4% to 42.7%, with Wallace taking 13.5%. 
If the states where Wallace held the balance and Nixon won 
by less than 3% had gone to Humphrey, the Democrats would 
have won with an electoral college majority of 275 to 261.
However, Kennedy's strength would have been in generating 
a huge turnout among the black and Mexican-American voters, 
rather than taking votes away from Wallace. If he had won on 
that basis, it would have been a whole new power-base. By 
1968 this base may just have been sufficiently strong, in 
electoral terms, to present the presidency to Robert Kennedy 
(or even to his brother Ted). However, no other candidate - 
even Jesse Jackson - has managed to reproduce the sort of 
enthusiasm Kennedy enjoyed among blacks and 
Mexican-Americans. Had he won, the Democratic Party would 
have realigned behind this new coalition which.Kennedy had 
pulled together in little more than 1,000 days as senator.
In this chapter on Kennedy's bid for the presidency in 
1968, his initial hesitancy and electoral results have been 
explored in some detail. His success in the primaries relied 
heavily on black and Mexican-American support. He won in 
Indiana, Nebraska, South Dakota, Washington DC and
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California, losing only in Oregon. Elsewhere, notably in the 
South, these ethnic blocks of support might not have proved 
so powerful.
By appearing to appeal to "Wallace supporters", however, 
Kennedy may have managed to hide the true nature of his 
coalition (as he had in Indiana) to persuade local 
Democratic Party officials around the country to support 
him.
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2. New Republic Oct. 15 '68
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6. Life, March '67
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8. Edwards was president of the ADA, and he was one of the 
candidates RFK had campaigned for during the 1966 elections.
9. Hyman pl04
10. Ibid no. 5 p89
11. Vital Statistics on American Politics (Harold Stanley & 
Richard Nieri - all voting stats from here unless otherwise
Stated)
12. Witcover p80
13. Ibid p87
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15. WStJ Apr 3 '68
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17. NYT May 6, '68
18. WStJ May 1 '68
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20. NYT May 7 '68
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22. NYT May 8 '68
23. Stein p276
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24. This Week, May 12 '68
25. Schlesinger p891
26. Ibid
27. Newfield p83
28. Halberstam pl22. Halberstam, although sympathetic to 
Robert Kennedy, had been a thorn in JFK's side. The 
President had suggested to The New York Times publisher 
Arthur Hays Sulzberger that Halberstam be removed from his 
position as correspondent from Vietnam because the stories 
he was filing were not sufficiently sympathetic to the 
administration's policy. The NYT refused.
29. Quoted in Vanden Heuvel p348
30. New Republic May 15 1992. Clinton's association with 
Kennedy's legacy is double-edged. In the final weeks before 
his presidential election victory, a man was arrested in Las 
Vegas after threatening to assassinate Clinton. "This 
Thursday coming up Bill Clinton is coming to town and he's 
going to have a big surprise just like Robert Kennedy. He's 
going to get what he deserves. Robert Kennedy, he was 
killed," the man was quoted as threatening (Evening 
Standard, October 21 1992).
At the Democratic Convention in New York on July 15 1992, 
Ted Kennedy also alluded to his brother's poverty coalition. 
Addressing the convention immediately after the documentary 
film of Robert Kennedy had been shown, Ted Kennedy declared: 
"Perhaps more than any other leader in memory, my brother 
Bobby reached across the deepest divides of American life - 
Black activist and blue collar, suburb and city, the young 
students on campus who protested the war and the young
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soldiers drafted to fight it...".
31. Ibid
32. Ibid
33. Witcover pl80
34. See Dan Moldea - The Hoffa Wars ppl80-220
35. Eugene McCarthy. Personal Interview May 1985
36. Witcover p207
37. Herzog pl71
38. PEP ran Eldridge Cleaver as their nominee. He was 
Minister of Informaton for the Black Panthers, but on parole 
for murder at the time of the election and did not meet the 
minimum age requirement to be President as stipulated by the 
Constitution.
39. Paul Schrade was in the pantry with Robert Kennedy when 
the senator was shot. Schrade was also wounded, hit by a 
bullet in the head. He has since led the struggle to have 
Los Angeles Police Department records on the assassination 
made public, and for the murder investigation to be re­
opened. With other assassination experts, Shrade believes 
that there may have been more than one gun fired at Kennedy 
that night, and that Sirhan may have been part of a 
conspiracy.
40. Herzog pl49
41. Ibid no. 5 pl31
42. Ibid p344
43. Witcover p247
44. From Statistical Abstract of the US Dept of Commerce 
p551
45. Halberstam p203
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46. Vanden Heuvel p379
47. Ibid
48. Halberstam pl95
49. Richard Goodwin, private conversation with RFK, quoted 
in Stein p313
50. Appendix to Vanden Heuvel
51. Ibid no. 34
52. Lerner pl89
53. Village Voice July '68: There is no way of knowing how 
the Wallace votes would have split had he not been a 
candidate, although it is likely that most would have gone 
to the Democrats.
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IV - CONCLUSION
HAD HE SURVIVED, of course, many things might have been 
different. Tom Hayden wrote in the late 1980s that "If you 
believe that [Kennedy would have won the presidency], his 
death becomes one of the central events of your life. That 
single event was the death of hope for peace in Vietnam for 
five, six or seven years, and the death of political hope 
for many people..."
That might be overstating Kennedy's political 
contribution, but there is no doubt that an unquantifiable 
legacy remains. A certain political generation grew up 
around Kennedy's coalition, the "burned out Robert Kennedy 
workers", as Hayden calls them. Tip O'Neill noted that in 
the immediate aftermath of the Watergate scandal, there was 
significant public pressure on government to open up, and 
the influence of Robert Kennedy could be detected in the new 
intake of elected officials.
During the Congressional elections of 1974 and 1976, many 
new Democrats were elected to Congress, promising to clean
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up Washington and do away with the old vestiges of 
Congressional privilege and seniority. In many ways, these 
"Watergate babies" heralded the decline of the old party 
system. Many were elected without significant machine 
support, and felt no obligation to be loyal to the party.
O'Neill - no friend of Kennedy's - "was struck by how 
many told me they had no interest in politics until Robert 
Kennedy's Presidential campaign in 1968. Kennedy was their 
hero, and he was the one who had turned them on to the 
possibility of running for office".^
This Congressional generation were faced with many of the 
same issues which Kennedy tackled in the mid-60s, like where 
Democrats stood on foreign intervention, what new proposals 
they had to promote racial equality, and how they could 
reorganise the left after the demise of union power.
Kennedy may not have been a prophet for the Democratic 
Party, but he did pioneer programmes and approaches which 
others would only recognise years later. His four-year 
journey from Cold Warrior to standard New Dealer to radical 
liberal criticising welfare dependency was a transformation 
which took the main body of American liberalism 30 years to 
complete.
However, Kennedy's full impact on the development of 
American radicalism has yet to be fully investigated. 
Although much has been written about him since 1968, many 
commentators have found it difficult to separate the 
substance from the hype. All of Kennedy's biographers knew 
him personally, and so lacked a detachment helpful to cold 
analysis. Others who have written about him have often been
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distracted by issues other than straight politics, like his 
alleged involvement with Marilyn Monroe, and the 
circumstances surrounding his assassination.
It was Emerson who wrote that "Each age, it is found, 
must write its own books; or rather, each generation for the 
next succeeding. The books of an older period will not fit 
this. However, so far the books on Robert Kennedy have 
all been written by his contemporaries, most of them his 
friends (Emerson warns that the "love of the hero corrupts 
into worship of his statue").
The books which significantly feature Robert Kennedy can 
be considered in several loose chronological groups, 
starting with the series of post-Dallas tributes written 
about President Kennedy by some of JFK's closest advisors. 
This clutch of stylish hagiographies includes Arthur 
Schlesinger's 1.000 Days in the White House. Ted Sorenson's 
Kennedy. both written in 1965, and Pierre Salinger's With 
Kennedy (1966).
These early histories, written at the very beginning of 
Robert Kennedy's Senate career, portray him as the late 
President's dependable lieutenant, obviously more important 
to the administration than Lyndon Johnson. "As for the 
President," notes Salinger, "his closest friend and 
confidant was his brother, Robert .... It was Bob that JFK 
turned to in moments of crisis... .His advice to JFK was 
sound and his judgement good".^ Schlesinger is even more 
emphatic about the Attorney General's relationship with the 
President, which he describes as "an extraordinary 
partnership....The communication was virtually telepathic
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and their communion complete....Especially in foreign 
affairs, one turned more and more to Bobby".^
He soon became the subject of biographies in his own 
right. As early as 1967, William Shannon's The Heir Apparent 
appeared, followed the following year by Penn Kimball's 
Bobby Kennedy and the New Politics. Both were written while 
Kennedy was still alive, as was the bulk of Margaret Laing's 
Robert Kennedy. Largely sympathetic, they concentrate on 
Kennedy's chances of eventually winning the presidency, and 
Shannon's effort also presents the idea of Kennedy as an 
existential politician, a theme which would be taken up with 
great enthusiasm in the works which appeared after his 
death.
Although Ted Kennedy had declared in his eulogy at Robert 
Kennedy's funeral that "my brother need not be idealised or 
enlarged in death beyond what he was in life," several 
biographies appeared in the following year which were 
generously sympathetic to his memory. ^ Written by 
journalists friendly with Kennedy, they emphasised his 
attractive qualities, and were weak on criticism. The 
Unfinished Odvssey of Robert Kennedy, by David Halberstam
(1968) was followed by Jules Witcover's 85 Davs and Jack 
Newfield's Robert Kennedy; A Memoirs a year later. All were 
written by young liberal journalists who perceived the Nixon 
victory as an unmitigated calamity. Kennedy, in exaggerated 
contrast, is presented as a political saviour
"The year 1968 marked a breakthrough for the new 
politics, but only that; the old politics still hung on. 
Robert Kennedy might have achieved transition; in his
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absence there was, instead, chaos," mourned Witcover.^ 
Newfield's was even more desolate: "From this time forward, 
things would get worse," he wailed. "The stone was at the 
bottom of the hill and we were alone."®
A study of the 1968 election called American Melodrama
(1969) by a team of reporters from the London Times was more 
detached, and analysed Kennedy's campaign with a colder eye 
than their American colleagues. Similarly, On His Own RFK 
1964-68 (published in 1970) by two of Kennedy's aides, 
William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, largely avoids 
the excesses of journalism, and offers a detailed, if 
partial, analysis of Kennedy's Senate years.
The earlier emotional works of both the JFK and RFK 
biographers spawned an equally emotional revisionism in the 
early 1970s which was every bit as unbalanced as the 
original accounts. During those years a reaction against 
government institutions gained considerable force. 
Journalists of the 1960s were mocked by their colleagues for 
having been so gullible in believing the hype about Vietnam, 
the Great Society, and the piety of the Kennedys. However, 
the gullibility was often replaced with cynicism, which did 
not necessarily make for clearer analysis.
The Kennedy Neurosis (1973) by Nancy Gager Clinch was 
aimed at President Kennedy's drive for dominance and power, 
which it explained in largely unconvincing psychoanalytical 
terms. Henry Fairlie's The Kennedy Promise (1973) also 
sought to debunk the legend but its analysis is flawed by 
such an obvious anti-Kennedy bias, which accuses the 
brothers of magnifying the Cuban Missile Crisis for
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political gain, and for keeping the country is a state of 
feverish excitement as they lead it from one crisis to the 
next. At least Fairlie did not claim to be a clinical 
observer of Robert Kennedy's politics, conceding that "it is 
difficult to write sensibly of the man" before concluding 
that "his achievements were so slight".*
Others were also sceptical about the Kennedy record, and 
New Left historians began to depict the Kennedy brothers as 
aggressive Cold Warriors, responsible for Vietnam and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. In David Horowitz's 1973 overview of 
American foreign policy since the Second World War (From 
Yalta to Vietnam) , John and Robert Kennedy are presented as 
a couple of jingoistic machomen. "Robert Kennedy declared 
there was no question but that the President would order the 
use of nuclear weapons to save Berlin," he noted.
The first hints of a reaction to the revisionism appeared 
in the following years with Arthur Schlesinger ' s epic Robert 
Kennedy and His Times (1978). However, Schlesinger's 
biography is not so much a work of post-revisionism as a 
seductive restatement of the early assessments of Kennedy as 
a great liberal hope. Schlesinger's book, it should be 
remembered, appeared during a Democratic presidency at a 
time when the Republicans looked to be set for many years in 
opposition, and it avoids the apocalyptic tone of those 
written during the first Nixon administration.
A more balanced picture began to emerge, at least in the 
more serious studies. While the BBC produced a programme in 
1980 (Reputations) which offered a studied interpretation of 
Kennedy (even if it did appear to dwell on Eugene McCarthy's
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bitter analyses), a series of sensational stories began to 
emerge with increasing frequency in the world's popular 
press.
Originally fuelled by revelations at the Senate hearings 
on assassinations in 1977, which suggested that John Kennedy 
had cavorted with at least one woman close to the Mafia, the 
press accusations were widened to include Robert Kennedy's 
relationship with various women, particularly Marilyn 
Monroe.
Such accusations had actually begun much earlier, during 
Kennedy's 1964 election to the Senate. The Strange Death of 
Marilyn Monroe. published in September that year, was 
written by rightwing activists Frank Capell. It alleges that 
Kennedy was involved in a communist conspiracy to kill 
Monroe to protect his reputation. The charges were not taken 
seriously at the time, and the book did Kennedy no 
perceivable harm, but as the line between serious history 
and popular journalism began to blur in the late 1970s and 
1980s, the allegations resurfaced in more respectable 
studies than Capell's .
There are two main theories which implicate Kennedy with 
Monroe's death. Both agree that President Kennedy, and/or 
Robert Kennedy were sexually involved with the actress. The 
first suggests that Monroe, danerously unbalanced in the 
summer of 1962, threatened to expose her relationship with 
the President, and that the Attorney General had her killed 
to keep her quiet.
The second believes that Monroe was killed by 
anti-Kennedy forces, either a CIA/FBI conspiracy, as
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suggested by Norman Mailer in 1973, or the Mafia, as 
outlined in Anthony Summers' Goddess of 1985, in the hope 
that an investigation of her murder would bring to light her 
past sexual activity with the Kennedys as so destroy the 
administration through scandal.
Despite the flimsy evidence, the notion that Robert 
Kennedy was linked to Monroe's death gained popular currency 
during the mid-'80s, when the history of the Kennedy family 
began to be examined as though it was a century-long soap 
opera. In 1985, The Kennedvs: An American Drama appeared, 
which traced the family's rise and fall in generally 
pedestrian terms, although it does reserve venom for it 
study of Robert Kennedy's children. The Fitzgeralds and The 
Kennedvs: An American Saga of 1986 is in similar vein, 
although its investigation ends with the election of John 
Kennedy to the White House.
At the more serious end of analysis is Alonzo L. Hamby's 
1985 Liberalism and Its Challengers, a survey of the 
American left since the Second World war. Hamby suggest that 
John and Robert Kennedy were from the same tradition of 
liberalism, both working outside the system and relying on 
great personal appeal. However, he repeats the standard myth 
that Robert Kennedy relied on "the lower-middle-class 
blue-collar-ethnics" for support, and suggests that Robert 
Kennedy "alone could revive the old Roosevelt coalition", 
when in fact Kennedy was forced to carve out a replacement 
for the old Roosevelt coalition. Nevertheless, Hamby does 
recognise that "the most intense criticism of both [John and 
Robert Kennedy] appears to have come from believers in
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ideological formulas as the key to political leadership, 
a view echoed by Robert Kennedy's daughter Kathleen Townsend 
in 1988: "He didn't think that words like liberal and
conservative were very appropriate. Maybe that's why 
liberals were always very uncomfortable with my father.
More recently, the Robert Kennedy legacy has been 
re-examined in the context of his brother's presidency. 
Thomas Reeves' scathing biography of the late President, A 
Question of Character (1991), also takes a swipe at his 
Attorney General, who was "more intense, ambitious, abrasive 
and less inclined towards lechery [than John Kennedy]".
There are also, of course, several books which appeared 
under Robert Kennedy's name, including The Pursuit of 
Justice and The Enemy Within, both written as real-life 
crime-busters during the period before his Senate career 
when his prime concern was law enforcement. To Seek a Newer 
World (1967) was also motivated by obvious political gain, 
as it sought to highlight the difference between himself and 
the old-style Democratic Party exemplified by the Johnson 
administration. When Kennedy ran for President, it was 
quickly billed as his manifesto, although it was not much 
more than a collection of Senate speeches.
More interesting are 13 Days - Kennedy's account of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis - and the oral histories he made in the 
years after the Dallas assassination which were published in 
1988. Although 13 Davs was written in last months of 
Kennedy's life, it did not appear until after his death 
(1971) , and so the voters never knew of his secret deals 
with the Soviets.
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Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, the edited oral
histories, are also remarkably candid. Kennedy makes no 
pretence at concealing his distaste for Johnson (who is 
described as "mean, bitter, vicious - an animal in many 
ways"), or for certain foreign leaders (including Nehru and 
Adenauer).^ The private and frank conversations reveal 
Kennedy characteristically hesitant about his political 
future. He is keen that the "Kennedy wing" of the party 
should carry on, although he realises that it is largely up 
to him to determine exactly what that wing should stand for.
His subsequent years as senator ensured that it became 
associated with the more radical elements of the party. 
However, Kennedy ' s Presidential campaign possibly marked the 
zenith of radical liberalism. His alternative coalition was 
submerged by the old Democratic orthodoxy which, in turn, 
was overpowered by the conservatism of the 1970s and 1980s.
The notion of liberalism declined so rapidly that by the 
1988 election it had become the ideology which dared not 
speak its name, being referred in sinister tones as "the L 
word".
The dialectic of liberalism missed a beat with the death 
of Robert Kennedy in 1968, and the development of radicalism 
was retarded by the split of the Democratic Party into the 
McGovernite wing, and the traditional, labour wing 
(exemplified by Mondale's candidacy). A Robert Kennedy 
presidential nomination, successful or not, might have 
provided the party with the direction it has been lacking 
since 1964, and given back liberalism its respectability.
235
This study of Kennedy's Senate career has attempted to 
measure how Kennedy's new liberalism developed, and has 
tentatively suggested that many of his policies were put 
onto the mainstream political agenda only many years after 
his death (notably enterprise zones as a form of urban 
renewal).
It has also tried to avoid some of the excesses of 
earlier biographies of the Senator. All of those who have 
written biographies of Kennedy before this study was 
completed knew him personally. Most were close friends of 
his, and of similar political generations.
As this study enjoyed the considerable advantage of 
hindsight, and was not written by an American, it offers a 
slightly different judgement on Kennedy. It relies 
substantially on evidence from primary Congressional 
sources, and is able to trace the development of his 
policies through the 1970s and 1980s.
Most of the previous biographies, too, were written by 
American liberals (Schlesinger, Witcover, Halberstam, 
Newfield, Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman), and their work to 
some extent reflects the American liberal agenda of the late 
1960s and early 1970s (a heavy emphasis on Vietnam and 
Kennedy's "class-based" coalition).
Issues like the crusade against the tobacco industry and 
Kennedy's proposals for tackling unemployment became more 
significant in the 1980s as issues of jobs and the 
environment rose on the political agenda. Thus this study 
gives greater weight to the senator's policies on those 
areas.
236
Now a new generation of historians, writing at the end 
of the Twentieth Century, unencumbered by the influences of 
personal contact with Robert Kennedy or his contemporaries, 
can begin to offer fresh interpretations of the senator's 
contribution to American liberalism.
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NOTES
1. Witcover p342 (1988 edition)
2. O'Neill p329. Other politicians inspired by Robert 
Kennedy inlcude German activist Petra Kelly. Kelly, the 
leader of the Green movement which swept through Germany 
during the 1980s, had worked in Kennedy's senate office in 
Washington. Kelly was found dead in her apartment in October 
1992.
3. Emerson, "The American Scholar", delivered in Boston 
1837, from The Norton Anthology of American Literature 
(Norton 1979)
4. Salinger p222
5. Schlesinger: 1,000 Days p245
6. Witcover p306
7. Witcover p321. The word "day" or "days" appears in the 
title of a remarkable number of works by and about the 
Kennedys. Perhaps "day" is chosen for its sense of immediacy 
and urgency. Apart from Witcover ' s 85 Days, there are plenty 
of examples. RFK's account of the Cuban Missile Crisis is, 
of course, 13 Days. Schlesinger's history of the JFK White 
House is 1.000 Days (while his chapter on RFK's presidential 
campaign in Robert Kennedy and His Times is called "The Long 
Day Wanes"), and a collection of RFK speeches from 1968 is 
titled A New Day. An article by Theodore White (for Life) on 
RFK's last primary is called "A Precious Last Day", while 
Richard Goodwin's article is titled "A Day in June". Ted 
Kennedy's book published to coincide with his 1980
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presidential campaign is Our Day and Generation,
8. Newfield p312
9. Fairlie pl80
10. Horowitz p278
11.Hamby p323
12. Townsend in Witcover p346. Kathleen Townsend Kennedy has 
run for Congress (unsuccessfully) for a constituency in 
Maryland. She is an active proponent of community service, 
and in 1992 lobbied for new legislation whereby graduation 
from high school would require 72 hours public service in 
the local community.
13.Reeves p210
14. RFK: In His Own Words p313
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